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1. Behavioral finance 
The essays that form this PhD are based on one of the most researched fields 
nowadays in finance, known as behavioral finance, which proposes psychology 
and sociology based theories to explain market anomalies. Behavioral finance 
tries to fill the gap of classical financial models that, based on the idea of fully 
efficient markets where all the agents interact rationally between each other, are 
unable to explain mathematically some market behaviors. 
More precisely, we are going to focus on four behavioral aspects. The first one is 
price clustering, which can be defined as the tendency to observe certain trade 
prices more frequently than others. This fact can affect the decimal part of a 
number, or the integer, or both. In the absence of market frictions, prices in 
whatever market should be uniformly distributed across every likely value; 
however, there is extensive evidence that some prices tend to be traded more 
frequently than others. The presence of price clustering is considered as a source 
of market inefficiency due to prices not following a random walk. 
The second behavioral aspect analyzed is size clustering, which is defined as the 
concentration of orders at specific trade sizes. The appearance of this effect that 
affects the quantity dimension of liquidity can hinder the ability to trade large sizes 
at low costs. Four different theories appear to explain both price and size 
clustering. Firstly, the resolution hypothesis indicates that the presence of 
uncertainty leads the participants to round their equilibrium price and size. 
Secondly, the attraction hypothesis argues that investors prefer certain numbers 
to others without any rational explanation. Thirdly, the negotiation hypothesis 
explains price and size clustering as a matter of convenience, in terms of reducing 
the costs of negotiation. By using a reduced set of values, the quantity of 
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information that has to be processed by the traders is less and the investor can 
reach agreements more easily. Finally, the collusion hypothesis suggests that 
market makers try to negotiate specific prices and trade sizes only to increase 
the profit margins per transaction.  
Another important behavioral basis, also related to the importance that traders 
give to certain prices above others, is the existence of psychological barriers that 
create an impediment to an individual’s mental outlook, which prevent traders 
from moving the price of an asset in a certain direction. The financial literature 
has suggested several possible explanations for the existence of psychological 
barriers. The first one relates the barriers to the concept of anchoring, which can 
be defined as the phenomenon whereby individuals fixate on a recent number 
that may be held out as being important by informed commentators. The second 
explanation is based on the fact that investors tend to round off arbitrary rational 
numbers to integers to simplify their trading process. Finally, the third explanation 
of the psychological barriers effect relates the existence of key prices to the 
possibility of hedging with options contracts, which implies using pre-established 
option exercise prices that are usually round numbers. 
Finally, the last behavioral aspect that we study is the so-called herding effect. 
This behavior commonly associated with animals can also be used in finance to 
define the tendency of investors to mimic the actions of other investors. The 
existence of this pattern suggests that market participants infer from the previous 
participants or from the arrival of new information and change their decisions in 
the direction of the crowd.  
Herding behavior can be viewed from two points of view: irrational or rational. The 
first one, also known as intentional herding, is mainly focused on psychology 
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where people follow one another with the intention of copying the same decisions. 
Some possible reasons for irrational herding can be the existence of pay-off 
externalities, principal-agent problems or the existence of informational 
cascades. This type of behavior can destabilize the market due to massive buys 
or sells increasing volatility and contributing to bubbles or financial crashes. The 
second view of herding is the rational or spurious herding that happens when 
investors react at the same time to certain market conditions or to the arrival of 
information. This second view is interpreted as a mechanism whereby investors 
react to the arrival of new public information, which is in line with the Efficient 
Market Theory.  
2. The European Carbon Market 
All the questions mentioned above have been studied with regard to the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), a relatively new market 
where the investors trading are highly qualified. Due to this fact, we are studying 
behavioral patterns in a market in which we should not find these types of effects. 
The European Carbon Market was set up in January 2005 under Directive 
2003/87/EC, when the EU ETS was launched. The EU ETS is a multinational 
system that covers power generators, heavy industry, energy-intensive industry 
and aviation emissions of the 28 member countries and the three countries of the 
European Economic Area –Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway–, with more than 
12,000 installations being subject to the program, covering around 45% of the 
European Union’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The EU ETS is the largest 
emissions market in the world both in terms of the volume of emissions traded 
and the installations covered. 
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The EU ETS is a cap and trade based system where a limit or cap is fixed to 
determine the total amount of GHG that can be emitted. This cap is reduced each 
year and, as a consequence, the total emissions are reduced. Installations 
participating in the program are subject to monitoring and must report their yearly 
emissions, and by the 30th of April of the following year each company must 
surrender enough allowances to cover their emissions, otherwise they will have 
a non-compliance penalty and heavy fines will be imposed. 
Since it was created, the program has been divided into phases: Phase I from 
2005 to 2007, Phase II from 2008 to 2012, Phase III from 2013 to 2020 and Phase 
IV that will take place from 2021 to 2030. The objective of emissions reduction is 
to emit in 2020 21% less than in 2005. This implies a yearly reduction of 1.74% 
for Phases I to III and emitting 43% less in 2030, so the yearly reduction will be 
2.2% less during Phase IV. 
Phase I was known as a pilot period, with the main objective of this phase being 
to establish a fully-functioning emissions market by the start of the Kyoto Protocol 
Commitment. In this phase, each member country had to prepare a National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) that had to be approved by the European Commission. As 
it was the first phase, countries did not have reliable emissions data and caps 
were set under best guesses. Penalties were €40 per tonne of CO2 emitted for 
which allowances were not surrendered. 
 Phase II took place at the same time as the Kyoto Protocol Commitment. During 
this phase, new GHGs were incorporated into the program (nitrous oxide and 
perfluorocarbons), the number of member countries of the program increased 
with the joining of the EEA-EFTA states, and the non-compliance penalty was 
fixed at 100 €/tonne. Another important aspect introduced was the possibility of 
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banking, i.e. the ability to use allowances from the present period in the following 
one, and borrowing, which is just the opposite, using the allowances from future 
periods to meet current emissions requirements. Borrowing is allowed only in the 
same phase and banking is allowed both in the same phase and between phases. 
In Phase III, the NAP system was abandoned and from this phase on there will 
be one single cap for all the member countries. Furthermore, the grandfathering 
aspect, i.e. the free assignation of emissions allowances to installations, is 
gradually being reduced. In 2013, more than 40% of the allowances were 
auctioned. The Commission also focused its efforts on reducing the surplus of 
emissions from previous phases by implementing short-term measures, such as 
back-loading, defined as the delay in the auctioning of 900 million allowances 
from 2014, 2015 and 2016 to be auctioned in 2019 and 2020. In the long term, 
the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) will be established in 2018, operative from 
January 2019, which is a rule-based mechanism on the basis of which the auction 
volumes are adjusted in an "automatic manner" under pre-defined conditions, that 
reduces the amount of emissions that are auctioned if an upper threshold of 
emissions in circulation is exceeded, and releases them if the emissions in 
circulation fall short of a lower threshold. 
Also, efforts are being focused on reviewing the free allocation system and to 
maintain the grandfathering aspect only for those sectors at the highest risk of 
relocating their production outside the EU, amounting to around 50 sectors. 
Furthermore, benchmarks will be updated to reflect technological advances since 
2008. 
The main asset of the European Union Emission Trading System is the Emission 
Union Allowance (EUA) that grants the owner the right to emit one tonne of CO2 
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or equivalent gas. The evolution of the quotation of the EUA has mainly been 
affected by two events in the first and second phases. During Phase I, the over 
allocation of allowances and the impossibility of banking to the second phase 
caused the price of the EUAs for Phase I to sink to zero, and in Phase II this over-
allocation problem continued. Furthermore, the financial crisis had an influence 
on lowering the demand for carbon allowances. Some other events helped to 
explain the slump in carbon prices in Phase II over 2009 and 2010, such as the 
wait-and-see attitude of the international negotiations in the Copenhagen summit 
(December 2009), the failure by allowance sellers to pay back to Member States 
the VAT they collected (December 2008 to May 2009), and several phishing 
attacks that hacked into registry accounts (end of 2010). In June 2011, the draft 
of the European Commission about the Energy Efficiency Directive raised 
concerns about the (lower) demand for allowances in Phase III, triggering an 
additional decline in prices. All these events contributed to causing the EUA price 
to oscillate between €5 and €30 from 2006 to 2015.  
3. The ICE ECX 
Currently, four platforms offer trading of EU ETS contracts: Nasdaq OMX, 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, European Energy Exchange and Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE). Among all of them, the ICE market is the most active and 
concentrates the majority of the volume. The volume originally traded in the 
European Climate Exchange (ECX) began to be traded in ICE after the purchase 
of ECX in April 2010. In this platform can be traded the most important futures 
contracts of the EU ETS whose underlying assets are: EU Allowances (EUAs), 
EU Aviation Allowances (EUAAs) and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). It 
is also possible to trade spot (daily futures) and options contracts. Despite the 
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fact that there are monthly and quarterly maturity contracts, the reference of the 
market are annual contracts which expire on the last Monday of December.  
ICE ECX contracts can be traded for ordinary trades, the Block Trade Facility, for 
bilateral transactions of large size (minimum 50 lots), or the Exchange of Futures 
for Physicals (EFP) and Exchange for Swaps (EFS) to transfer an OTC position 
to an on-exchange futures position. 
The ICE Futures Europe market operates an electronic order-driven market with 
market makers and brokers. The daily session starts with a pre-open period of 15 
minutes (from 6:45 a.m. UK local time) to enable market members to input orders 
in readiness for the beginning of trading. The pre-trading period finishes with a 
single call auction, where the opening price and the allocated volume are 
determined by an algorithm. During the continuous session, from 7:00 to 17:00, 
investors can submit limit orders, market orders, and block orders. The futures 
market price settlement period runs from 16:50:00 – 16:59:59 UK local time, 
which is the weighted average during this period. The futures contracts are traded 
in lots. Each lot equals 1,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent, that is, 1,000 EUAs. The 
minimum tick size was €0.05 until 27 March 2007 when it changed to €0.01. The 
settlement period for the ICE Futures Contract ceases trading at 17:00 hours UK 
local time on the last Monday of the contract month. 
ICE ECX is a price driven market where trades submitted are listed in a unique 
Limited Order Book and are executed following a price and time criteria. This 
Limited Order Book is open during the continuous session for transparency 
purposes but the orders entered and the executed trades are anonymous. 
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4. Dissertation structure 
The PhD dissertation is structured in four different chapters. The aim of the 
dissertation is to study some behavioral aspects in the European Carbon Market, 
focusing on the European Union Allowance futures, which is the main asset of 
this market. Specifically, the four objectives are: (i) to assess the existence of 
price clustering, (ii) to test the presence of size clustering and its relationship with 
price clustering, (iii) to study the existence of psychological barriers on prices and 
volatility, and (iv) to investigate the presence of herding behavior among carbon 
traders. 
The titles of the chapters that form the PhD dissertation are: 
 Chapter I: Assessing price clustering in the European Carbon Market. 
 Chapter II: What makes carbon traders cluster their orders? 
 Chapter III: Do price barriers exist in the European Carbon Market? 
 Chapter IV: Do carbon traders behave as a herd? 
Chapter I studies the presence of price clustering in the European emission 
market. Its existence is inconsistent with economic rationality and it is not in 
agreement with the idea that prices follow a random walk. In this chapter we find 
a strong presence of price clustering at prices ended in 0 and 5, supporting both 
the attraction hypothesis and the negotiation hypothesis. 
Chapter II documents size-clustering behavior in the European Carbon Futures 
Market and analyzes the circumstances under which it happens. Our ﬁndings 
show that carbon trades are concentrated in sizes of 1 to 5 contracts and in 
multiples of 5. We have also shown that more clustered prices have more 
clustered sizes, suggesting that price and size resolution in the European Carbon 
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Market are complementary and that carbon traders round both the price and the 
size of their orders. 
Chapter III investigates the existence of key reference points in the European 
Carbon Market. We document the presence of key levels and barrier bands 
around European Union Allowances (EUAs) prices and we show that traders tend 
to consider these price levels as resistances in upward movements and as 
supports in downward movements. Furthermore, we have observed that the 
existence of price barriers affects both return and volume dynamics. 
Finally, Chapter IV detects the existence of the herding effect in the European 
Carbon Futures Market. Preliminary tests prove the presence of herding at high 
frequency data. A pattern analysis shows that herding intensifies with the level of 
speculation and other behavioral bases such as psychological prices or price 
clustering. Finally, we observe that herding behavior destabilizes the market due 
to the overreaction of volatility to past herding behavior. 
5. The Data 
The entire PhD dissertation is based on the study of Emission Union Allowances 
(EUAs). As we have mentioned previously, this asset can be traded in different 
markets such as spot, options or futures. However, the European Carbon Market 
is characterized by the low relevance of options and spot markets and, by far, the 
major concentration of EUAs in terms of volume can be found in the December 
maturity. For these reasons, we have chosen the EUA futures contract with 
December maturity traded in ICE ECX as the reference benchmark, given that 
this platform concentrates the highest activity among all the platforms that trade 
EUAs. 
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The database is composed of two types of data: daily and intraday data, and for 
both we have December futures contracts from 2005 to 2020. Intraday series 
contain the time stamp, the trade price, the size and the sign of the transaction, 
i.e. whether it is buyer or seller initiated. In addition, the options intraday database 
used contains the strike price. On the other hand, the daily data contains open, 
close, high and low prices, the total volume and the open interest. All the prices 
are nominated in euros, the time stamp is measured in GMT and the volume and 
open interest are in lots. 
More precisely, in Chapter I we use both intraday and daily data of EUA futures 
contracts with maturity in 2010. This contract goes from 21 September 2006 to 
20 December 2010 over which time 304,189 transactions took place. This futures 
series belongs to Phase II but it started to be traded during Phase I, so we can 
compare if there is any difference in the period in which the futures contract is 
traded, either the Phase I period or the Phase II period. 
Chapter II includes three different maturities, December 2010, 2011 and 2012, 
which allows us to examine the results obtained over the years. The data sample 
periods run from 21 September 2006 to 20 December 2010, from 23 March 2006 
to 19 December 2011, and from 23 March 2006 to 17 December 2012, for the 
December 2010, 2011 and 2012 futures contracts, respectively, covering in this 
way the whole lifespan of the three December futures contracts. A total of 
304,189, 359,003 and 491,205 transactions took place, for the ﬁrst, second and 
third futures contracts analyzed, respectively. 
The sample period analyzed in Chapter III takes the December front contract of 
Phase II that goes from 18 December 2007 to 17 December 2012. Three different 
databases have been employed by us in this chapter: futures daily data and 
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intraday data for futures and options. The sample contains 1,306,765 
transactions for a total trading volume of 9,201,096 futures contracts and the price 
oscillates between €5.61 and €29.69. The most repeated price is €15.25. The 
majority of the transactions have a size of 1 lot and the maximum number of 
futures contracts traded in one transaction was 1,682. 
Finally, Chapter IV uses intraday and daily data for EUA futures with maturity 
during Phase III. More precisely, the December futures maturities that contain the 
front contract are 2013, 2014 and 2015. During the period from 18 December 
2012 to 14 December 2015, 1,214,304 transactions took place. 
6. Summary of the chapters 
The thesis dissertation has covered different aspects of behavioral finance 
applied to the European Carbon Market. Chapter I starts with the study of price 
clustering in the EUA futures market; Chapter II extends the analysis to size 
clustering and its relation to price clustering; Chapter III tests the influence of key 
prices in the behavior of EUA returns, volatility and volume; and Chapter IV 
detects the existence of herding behavior in the European Carbon Market. 
Chapter I: Assessing price clustering in the European Carbon Market. The 
presence of price clustering in markets is taken as a sign of market inefficiency 
that can influence trading strategies. In this chapter, we study the presence of a 
concentration in prices in carbon futures markets. Specifically, we analyze the 
European Carbon Futures Market and test for evidence of a preference for certain 
prices above others. Our results reveal the strong presence of price clustering in 
the carbon market at prices ending in digits 0 and 5. These findings support the 
attraction hypothesis, which endorses a significant clustering on gravitational 
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prices, but also backs the negotiation hypothesis, which advocates greater 
clustering when trading costs are higher. 
A first version of this chapter was written during the last year of my Quantitative 
Finance Master’s degree. The first version of the chapter was presented at the IX 
Workshop in Banking and Quantitative Finance (Toledo, Spain, July 2011), 
organized by the University of Castilla La Mancha. The final version was 
submitted in July 2011 and it was accepted in October 2011 by Applied Energy. 
Chapter II: What makes carbon traders cluster their orders? The ability to 
trade large amounts of assets at low costs could be hindered when the size of 
the orders is concentrated at speciﬁc trade sizes. This chapter documents 
evidence of size clustering behavior in the European Carbon Futures Market and 
analyzes the circumstances under which it happens. Our ﬁndings show that 
carbon trades are concentrated in sizes of one to ﬁve contracts and in multiples 
of ﬁve. We have also demonstrated that more clustered prices have more 
clustered sizes, suggesting that price and size resolution in the European Carbon 
Market are complementary and that carbon traders round both the price and the 
size of their orders. Finally, the analysis of the key determinants of the size 
clustering reveals that traders use a reduced number of different trade sizes when 
uncertainty is high, market liquidity is poor, and the desire to open new positions 
and cancel old ones is very strong. 
A first version of this chapter was written during the last year of my Quantitative 
Finance Master’s degree. The first version of the chapter was presented at the IX 
Workshop in Banking and Quantitative Finance (Toledo, Spain, July 2011), 
organized by the University of Castilla La Mancha. The preliminary version was 
accepted for presentation at the VIII Conference of the Spanish Association for 
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Energy Economics (Valencia, Spain, January 2013). A preliminary version of this 
paper was published by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas 
(IVIE) as Working Paper (WP-EC 2012-10). The final version was submitted to 
Energy Economics in October 2013, and it was finally accepted in March 2014. 
Chapter III: Do price barriers exist in the European Carbon Market? It is 
generally thought that psychological prices in markets primarily traded by 
professional participants should play a limited role. This chapter investigates the 
existence of key reference points in the European Carbon Market, which can be 
considered as a market with highly qualified stakeholders. We document the 
presence of key levels and barrier bands around European Union Allowances 
(EUA) prices. It appears that traders tend to consider these price levels as 
resistances in upward movements and as supports in downward movements. 
Furthermore, we have observed that the existence of price barriers affects both 
return and volume dynamics. 
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the XIV Iberian-Italian 
Congress of Financial and Actuarial Mathematics (Madrid, Spain, January 2013), 
at the X Spanish Association for Energy Economics (Tenerife, Spain, January 
2015), and at the 6th Workshop on Energy Markets (Valencia, Spain, March 
2015). The final version was submitted to The Journal of Behavioral Finance in 
December 2015, and it was finally accepted in June 2016. 
Chapter IV: Do carbon traders behave as a herd? This chapter analyzes the 
presence of herding behavior in the European Carbon Futures Market. It is 
important to remember that this is a blind market in which the vast majority of 
investors are institutional. Both features lead us to study the existence of herding 
under very restrictive conditions. An intraday trade database has been used in 
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order to analyze this phenomenon at high frequencies. A pattern analysis shows 
that herding intensifies with the level of speculation and other behavioral biases 
like psychological prices or price clustering. The reaction of seller-initiated trades 
to the arrival of market news also induces an increase in the degree of herding. 
Furthermore, we detect higher levels of herding with higher levels of uncertainty 
and with a larger number of trades. Finally, we show that herding destabilizes the 
market and leads traders to overreact to these circumstances. 
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the XVI Iberian-Italian 
Congress of Financial and Actuarial Mathematics (Paestum, Italy, May 2016). 
The final version was submitted to The North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance in September 2016. 
7. Stays, grants and prizes 
I developed my PhD dissertation thesis in the University of Valencia (Department 
of Financial Economics, Valencia, Spain), as a PhD student from the University.  
During my PhD I have participated in different workshops: 
 Introducing this PhD dissertation at Jornadas de seguimiento de tesis 
Doctorales, (Bilbao), 19 December 2014. 
 Presenting the study entitled Do price barriers exist in the European Carbon 
Market? at the 6th research workshop on energy markets (Valencia), 27 March 
2015. 
 Discussing the study entitled European natural gas seasonal effects on 
futures hedging at the 6th research workshop on energy markets (Valencia), 
27 March 2015. 
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 Discussing the study entitled A new look at oil price pass-through into inflation: 
Evidence from disaggregated European data at the 7th research workshop on 
energy markets (Valencia), 11 March 2016. 
The research was financially supported by: 
 A Mobility Grant for official master’s degree from the Ministry of Education 
(Spain), during the master’s degree period. 
 The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the 
researching project Quantitative Finance (ECO2013-40816-P). 
 The contribution of the Department of Middle Office of Repsol Trading to 
introduce a chapter of this dissertation in a workshop. 
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1.  Introduction 
Price clustering can be defined as the tendency to observe certain trade prices 
more frequently than others. This effect can affect the decimal part of a number 
or the integer or both. In the absence of market frictions, prices in whatever 
market should be uniformly distributed across every likely value. However, there 
is extensive evidence that some prices tend to be traded more frequently than 
others. The presence of this stylized fact is considered as a source of market 
inefficiency.  
Since Niederhoffer (1965) and Osborne (1962) observed this fact in the New York 
Stock Exchange, a large number of studies have documented it in a wide range 
of assets.1 Four different theories appear to explain price clustering well. Firstly, 
the price resolution hypothesis, introduced by Ball, Torous and Tschoegl (1985), 
indicates that the presence of uncertainly leads the participants to round their 
equilibrium price. The higher the uncertainty, the higher the market volatility and 
the higher the probability of finding price clustering. Secondly, the attraction 
hypothesis argues that investors prefer certain numbers than other without any 
rational explanation. This particular preference for certain numbers above others 
can create some level of clustering. Although there are different versions of the 
attraction theory, all the authors agree when they refer to the decreasing order of 
the frequencies of the more observed last digits of the prices: transaction prices 
ending in zero are stronger attracters than prices ending in digit 5, which are 
stronger than the rest of prices. Furthermore, the sum of frequencies of prices 
                                                          
1 To date, Narayan, Narayan and Popp (2001) is the only reference that has studied price clustering in energy markets. 
Specifically, they consider five different oil types and for each oil type they analyze four different contracts. The rest of the 
empirical literature investigates price clustering in financial assets. See Brown and Mitchell (2008) for an excellent survey 
of this kind of literature. 
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around the most gravitational points (0 and 5), that is those trade prices ending 
in 1, 9, 4 and 6 should be greater than the sum of the frequencies of observations 
of prices ending in 8, 2, 7 and 3 (see, for example Goodhart and Curcio (1991), 
Loomes (1988) and Mitchell (2001)). Thirdly, the negotiation hypothesis 
developed by Harris (1991) states price clustering as a matter of convenience, in 
terms of reducing the costs of negotiation. By using a reduced set of prices, the 
quantity of information that has to be processed by the traders is less and the 
investor can reach agreements more easily. Assuming this point of view, a 
coarser grid occurs because traders use a restricted set of prices to simplify their 
negotiations. Therefore, the higher the market volatility and the less the trading 
frequency, the higher the trading costs and the higher the level of clustering. 
Finally, the price collusion hypothesis proposed by Christie and Schultz (1994) 
suggests that market makers would try to negotiate specific prices only to 
increase the profits margins per transaction.  
Following Narayan et al. (2001), the rationale of studying price clustering is that 
its presence is inconsistent with economic rationality and it is not in agreement 
with the idea that prices follow a random walk.2 Furthermore, Schwartz, Van Ness 
and Van Ness (2004) reveals that price clustering may be of interest to traders 
because (i) investors who are aware of clustering points may be able to trade at 
slightly better prices and may be able to place limit orders higher in time/price 
priority by avoiding the clustering points; and because (ii) clustering can be 
interpreted as a signal that traders assign relevant information to some specific 
prices. 
                                                          
2 Feng, Zou and Wei (2011) show that carbon price is not a random walk and, as a consequence, the price history 
information is not fully reflected in current carbon price. 
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The goal of this chapter is to document evidence of price clustering behavior in 
the ECX European Union Allowances (EUA) futures market taking into account 
intraday transactions data. The behavior of the EUA price is crucial for European 
Climate Policy, and the investigation of clustering in EUA prices can provide new 
insights into the efficiency of the European Carbon Future Markets.3 In fact, as 
far as we know, this study pioneers the investigation of clustering in carbon 
futures market. Besides examining price clustering, we study the factors that can 
explain such clustering. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly 
explains the European Carbon Market and the data used to perform this study. 
Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 discusses the findings on price 
clustering, and Section 5 summarizes and concludes.  
2. Market structure and data 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was launched in 
January 2005 and is the world’s largest carbon trading system. Established under 
Directive 2003/87/ EC, the EU ETS limits the carbon dioxide emissions from 
European installations that include power generation, mineral oil refineries, 
offshore installations, and other heavy industrial sectors. Under the EU ETS, each 
Member State must surrender annually to the European Commission a National 
Allocation Plan which sets out that Member State's total quantity of emission 
allowances (known as European Union Allowances, or EUAs) to be allocated to 
all installations covered by the EU ETS in that Member State and how those 
                                                          
3 See Zhang and Wei (2010) for an excellent summary of the main arguments of empirical studies on the EU ETS. 
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emissions allowances will be distributed to each installation which holds a permit 
to emit carbon dioxide.4 
The EU ETS is run on a cap-and-trade basis, i.e., emissions from each installation 
are capped and therefore if an installation emits below this level, then it will be 
able to trade its excess of EUAs. One EUA represents the right to emit one metric 
ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. At this moment, it is possible to trade EUAs in 
spot, futures and options electronic platforms. Four European electronic markets 
currently offer trading EUAs: European Climate Exchange (ECX), BlueNext, 
European Energy Exchange (EEX), and Nord Pool. Among all of them, the ECX 
EUA Futures Market is by far the most active and liquid. 
The ECX market operates an electronic order-driven market with market makers 
and brokers. The daily session starts with a pre-open period of 15 minutes (from 
6:45 a.m. UK local time) to enable market members to input orders in readiness 
for the beginning of trading. The pre-trading period finishes with a single call 
auction, where the opening price and the allocated volume are determined by an 
algorithm. During the continuous session, from 7:00 to 17:00, investors can 
submit limit orders, market orders, and block orders. The future contracts are 
traded in lots. Each lot equals 1,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent, that is, 1,000 
EUAs. The minimum tick size was €0.05 until 27 March 2007 when it changed to 
€0.01. The settlement period for the ECX Futures Market runs from 16:50:00 – 
16:59:59 UK local time for the purpose of determining the settlement price, which 
                                                          
4 The EU ETS has been organized in two Phases. Phase 1 ran from 2005 to 2007, and Phase 2 that runs from 2008 to 
2012 and coincides with the Kyoto Commitment Period. It is supposed that further phases will follow in the future. See 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2008) for further details about the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. 
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is the weighted average during this period. Futures Contract ceases trading at 
17:00 hours UK local time on the last Monday of the contract month.5 
To perform this study, we have chosen the ECX EUA futures contracts with 
maturity in December 2010. This contract began to be traded on 21 September 
2006, and, until its maturity on 20 December 2010, 304,189 transactions took 
place. Therefore, until now, the December 2010 ECX EUA futures contracts is 
the expired futures contract with the longest record of trading data. Specifically, 
for every screen trade, our database reports: the time stamp measured in GMT, 
the traded price in Euros, the maturity of the contract, the traded volume, the sign 
of the transaction (buyer or seller initiated) and the daily settlement price. 
3. Methodology 
Basic statistical analysis has been carried out to establish the presence and the 
profile of price clustering in carbon futures markets. Following Ikenberry and 
Weston (2007), we have applied the Hirshmann-Herfindahl index (HHI) to 
measure price clustering. This index is commonly used to analyze market power, 
but in this case is applied to test the concentration in prices and how it varies from 
a uniform distribution. The HHI is calculated by summing the squared values of 
the market shares of all market participants. In our case, we substitute shares of 
markets participants for percentages of all trades that occur at all available digits. 
Specifically: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑(𝑓𝑖)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
                                                          
5 For further details on the EUAs future contracts, see the user guide of ECX Contracts at the www.theice.com. 
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where fi is the frequency of trades that occur at fraction i, i = 1, 2,.., N possible 
ticks. The HHI is computed based upon the last digit of the trade price according 
to the minimum tick. If there was no price clustering, HHI should be equal to 
100/N.  
To test the statistical significance of price clustering in one sample, we have 
calculated the frequency of trades based on the last digit of the transaction price. 
If the Theory of Efficient Markets holds, the observed frequency of all the 
available digits of the last decimal number of price will be the same, i. e. we 
assume a uniform distribution of the frequency of the digits. To test this fact, we 
use the standard Chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic whose null hypothesis (H1 
hypothesis, from now on) is the absence of difference between the observed 
distribution and the expected distribution: 
𝐷 =  ∑
(𝑂𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where Oi is the observed frequency of the last digit; Ei is the expected frequency 
under uniform distribution, and D is the distributed Chi-square with N-1 degrees 
of freedom under standard conditions. A large value of D would signify a 
significant deviation from uniform distribution and would imply significant price 
clustering. 
When clustering is detected, it can be of interest to check if the level of price 
clustering is the same for two different samples. In this case, the following statistic 
will be calculated: 
?̃? = (
𝐷2
𝐷1
) ∼ 𝐹𝑁2−1,𝑁1−1 
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where Di follows a standard Chi-square distribution with N-1 degrees of freedom 
and the ratio follows an F-Snedecor distribution with N2-1 and N1-1 degrees of 
freedom. In this case, the underlying null hypothesis (H2 hypothesis, from now 
on) to be tested is if the two samples considered are equality clustered. 
To perform a comparison among two proportions of two different samples, the z-
test will be used. The null hypothesis of this test assumes that there is no 
difference between the proportions in both samples. The expression of the 
statistic is as follows: 
𝑍 =
𝑝1 − 𝑝2
𝑠𝑝1−𝑝2
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 𝑠𝑝1−𝑝2 = √?̂? ?̂?√
𝑛1 + 𝑛2
𝑛1𝑛2
 
?̂? =
𝑛1𝑝1 + 𝑛2𝑝2
𝑛1 + 𝑛2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂? = 1 − ?̂? 
 
where p1 and n1 (p2 and n2) are the proportion and the number of observations of 
sample 1 (sample 2). 
Finally, based on previous empirical works, a multivariate analysis will be carried 
out in order to determine the key factors which drive clustering in carbon prices. 
Specifically, the following model has been estimated using both ordinary least 
squares and the Newey and West correction that accounts for heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝜎𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡  +
                                       𝛽4𝑅3𝐻,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅3𝐿,𝑡  +  𝜖𝑡  
The intraday volatility (𝜎𝑡) has been calculated following the measure proposed 
by Parkinson (1980): 
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𝜎𝑡 = √
1
4𝑙𝑜𝑔2
(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑡)2 
where Ht is the highest and Lt are the lowest traded prices on day t. Volatility is 
widely considered as a proxy for uncertainty, therefore the greater the volatility, 
the greater should be the level of price clustering. Trading frequency is defined 
as the number of trades per day. This variable is commonly associated with 
efficiency in price determination; the greater the Trading frequency, the greater 
is the liquidity, prices are known more precisely, and the extent of price clustering 
should be less. Trade size is computed as the daily average trade size calculated 
as the quotient of the sum of the total amount of the transactions expressed in 
Euros divided by the number of transactions. Large size orders are sometimes 
associated with informed agents (see Easly and O’Hara (1987)) and their 
placement should lead to greater clustering. However, ap Gwilym, Clare and 
Thomas (1988, p.1197) indicate that for larger trades market participants may 
find it worthwhile negotiating on a wider range of prices. Finally, we have taken 
into account the daily ratio proposed by Lucia and Pardo (2010) and defined as 
the quotient between the daily change in the open interest and the daily trading 
volume. This ratio oscillates between -1 and 1. When the ratio takes values close 
to 1 and -1, it means that traders are massively opening and closing positions, 
respectively. Specifically, we have introduced the dummy variable R3H that takes 
the value 1 on those days in which the ratio takes values between 0.95 and 1 and 
zero otherwise, and R3L that takes the value 1 on those days in which the ratio 
takes values between -1 and -0.95 and zero otherwise. 
4. Price clustering results 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
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In this section, we perform different tests in order to check clustering in carbon 
transaction prices. We examine all trade prices with a tick size of one cent. We 
use the last digit of the price of all intraday screen transactions of the December 
2010 ECX EUA futures contract to summarize clustering. Before testing for the 
existence of price clustering, we have divided the sample of five years into two 
periods:  2006-2007 and 2008-2010. The reason is twofold: (i) the number of 
observations for the first period (413 obs.) is by far very small in comparison to 
the number of observations for the second period (303,776 obs.), and (ii) the 
results are clearly affected by the change in tick from €0.05 to €0.01 in March 
2007. 
Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of the last digit of trade prices for the 
two periods. We find clear evidence of clustering in both periods, being more 
notorious in the first one. Panel A presents the carbon pricing grid and indicates 
a high concentration of prices ending in digits 0 and 5 for both periods. The 
percentage of trades that occur at the most frequently used prices (x.x0 and x.x5) 
is 66.8% (=41.9%+24.9%) and 31.21% (=16.24%+14.97%), for the first and 
second period, respectively. Panel B confirms the presence of price 
concentration in both periods. The H1 indicates the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the absence of difference between the observed distribution and 
the expected distribution for each subperiod. The HHI values show a higher price 
concentration in the first period (25.42) than in the second one (10.81). The test 
of the H2 hypothesis, not reported in the paper, confirms statistically this 
difference at the 1% level. There is an obvious explanation to this great 
difference, namely that until March 2007, all the transaction prices ended in 0 or 
5 because the minimum fluctuation tick was €0.05. This is the reason why the 
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rest of the analysis is going to be focused exclusively on the second period. 
Specifically, if we focused on transactions in years 2008, 2009 and 2010, we 
observe that the sum of frequencies of observations of prices ending in 1, 9, 4 
and 6 (33.11%) is less than the sum of frequencies of prices ending in 8, 2, 7 and 
3 (35.60%). The z-test statistic for comparing such proportions is 11.97, indicating 
that such difference is statistically significant at the 1% level, giving support to the 
attraction hypothesis as a plausible explanation for the detected profile in carbon 
price clustering.  
Table 2 shows the evolution of the price clustering through the three years of the 
second period. It can be observed that clustering is persistent through time but it 
decreases every year. There are several items that indicate this fact. The level of 
the clustering at the 0 and 5 digits decreases from 51.7% (=28.5%+23.2%) in 
2008 to 30.3% (=15.7%+14.6%) in 2010. This fact can also be observed in the 
HHI that decreases from 16.47 to 10.69. Therefore, as the futures contract moves 
toward its expiration in 2010, the degree of price clustering is smaller. This 
behavior suggests that clustering will be affected by the time to maturity and it 
would confirm the hypothesis suggested by Ball et al. (1985) that price clustering 
should diminish as futures contracts move toward expiration, because the price 
of the underlying asset is better known. However, another possible explanation 
for this effect could be found in the increment of the trading frequency observed 
for each year. The higher the trading frequency is, the less is the degree of price 
clustering. This last phenomenon was employed by Harris (1991) to argue his 
negotiation hypothesis.  
Once we have detected clear evidence of significant clustering on carbon market 
prices, the next question to be solved is in which situations is the clustering more 
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notorious. For this purpose, we have measured the clustering in several 
scenarios. We have studied the price clustering in the maximum and minimum 
prices trading during the day, in the price of the last transaction of the day, and in 
the daily settlement price of the futures contract. Furthermore, we also analyze if 
price clustering is influenced by the sign of the trade, i.e., whether the trade is 
buyer initiated or seller initiated. Finally, we have taken into account the daily ratio 
proposed by Lucia and Pardo (2010) to differentiate between days in which 
traders have opened or closed massively their positions. 
Table 3 presents the results for all the scenarios considered. We observe that 
there is clustering for the highest, the lowest, and for the price of the last 
transaction, with HHIs of 11.11, 11.38 and 11.05, respectively. The clustering is 
statistically significant in all the cases at the 1% level. The picture is totally 
different in the case of the grid of prices for the daily settlement prices. While the 
prices of the last transaction prices show a clear clustering in digits 0 and 5 
(32.27%=16.62%+15.55%), the settlement price frequencies do not present price 
clustering. The HHI is 10.13 and the null hypothesis of absence of clustering (H1) 
cannot be rejected. This is an interesting finding given that the settlement price 
is used in many papers as the reference for the price in carbon market and the 
results show that this price series is the only one in which a coarser grid of prices 
is not detected. The explanation for this result could be found in the fact the 
settlement price is a trade weighted average.  
Next, we have divided the sample of intraday transactions prices taking into 
account the sign of the order. The price concentration is significant at the 1% level 
in both samples. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of the price 
clustering (H2) between buyer and seller initiated trades (the p-value is 0.62). 
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Finally, we have tested if there is a coarser grid when the trading session is 
dominated by traders that are closing or opening positions massively. We 
observe that traders cluster on prices ending in 5 (29.31%) when they are 
massively opening carbon futures positions contracts. However, when they are 
closing positions, the most repeated digits turn out to be 0 and 5, with 12.79% 
and 18.25%, respectively. In both cases, the null hypothesis of the absence of 
price clustering is rejected at the 1% level. Notice that, in spite of the high value 
of the HHI for days with high R3 values (17.43), the hypothesis of equality in price 
clustering between the two subsamples (H2) cannot be rejected. 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Taking into account the results obtained in the univariate analysis, we define the 
measure Price clustering as the sum of the percentages that occur at pricing 
increments of x.x0 and x.x5 on day t. Furthermore, given that Trading Frequency 
and Trade Size variables are highly positive skewed, we report multivariate 
results for the natural logarithm of such variables.6 
Table 4 shows the Spearman cross-correlation coefficients among Volatility, 
Frequency Trading and Trade Size, all of them described in section II, and the 
Price Clustering variable. We observed that frequency of clustering is, positively 
and significantly correlated with the measure of volatility at the 10% level, but 
negatively and significantly correlated with the number of trades per day at the 
1% level. Surprisingly, we do not observe any relationship between Price 
Clustering and the Trade Size variable. 
                                                          
6 These tests are not included for the sake of brevity, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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Next, we have performed a multivariate regression analysis in order to detect the 
key determinants of the price clustering in the carbon market. Following Schwartz 
et al. (2004), given that the measure of price clustering is limited between 0% and 
100%, we use the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution as our 
measure of price clustering for regression purposes. Specifically, we regress 
Price Clustering against daily volatility, the logarithm of daily trading frequency, 
the logarithm of daily trade size and R3H (R3L) defined as a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 when R3 is between 0.95 and 1 (-1 and -0.95) and zero otherwise. 
Table 5 presents the results of the multivariate regression analysis. We find that 
volatility and Trade Size influence positively and significantly price clustering at 
the 5% and 10% level, respectively. On the contrary, Trading Frequency has the 
opposite effect and affects it negatively at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, 
our findings indicate that price clustering in the European Carbon Markets 
increases when surrogates for greater uncertainty such as volatility and trade size 
rise. However, the degree of price clustering is lower when liquidity increases; 
that is, it decreases with trading frequency. As a whole, these results suggest that 
a coarser pricing grid occurs because traders want to make their negotiations 
less costly. These results appear to support the negotiation hypothesis proposed 
by Harris (1991) as the most plausible explanation for the price clustering 
detected in the European Carbon Futures Markets. 
5. Conclusions 
The results obtained for price clustering highlight the existence of this fact in the 
European Carbon Futures Markets. In particular, we have detected that prices 
are concentrated in transaction prices ending in digits 0 and 5, and that the level 
of price clustering is higher at prices of x.x0 than at prices of x.x5. 
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The knowledge that carbon price clustering exists is relevant for several reasons. 
Firstly, it is important from the point of view of the microeconomics of carbon price 
formation since the degree of rounding may be used as a new proxy in studies to 
take into account the amount of information present in the carbon market. 
Secondly, clustering in prices is not in agreement with the idea that prices follow 
a random walk and, as a consequence, carbon risk managers should dedicate 
further effort to finding alternative models that consider clustering in order to price 
and hedge EUAs. Finally, knowing of the existence of carbon pricing clustering, 
profitable trading rules can be implemented by carbon traders. These strategies 
should be based on the assumption that a reversal in the direction of the price of 
the EUA becomes likely as the price moves to some gravitational price. For 
example, if trades are taking place at €14.99, sellers may be able to trade at 
slightly better prices by placing limit orders at €15.00 in order to get priority in 
time, while buyers can submit market orders in order to gain priority in prices. 
Preferences for the carbon prices ending in 0 and 5 give initial support to the 
attraction hypothesis as a possible explanation for the price clustering. However, 
the extent of price clustering is greater when less information is available in the 
market, that is, when the volatility is high and the trading frequency is low. It 
seems that price clustering occurs because traders use a restricted set of prices 
to simplify their negotiations. These results point to the negotiation hypothesis 
proposed by Harris (1991) as the most plausible explanation for the concentration 
in prices observed in the European Carbon Market. 
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Annex: tables and figures  
Table 1. Price Clustering in ECX EUA futures contracts 
Panel A: Distribution of last digit of the price 
 2006-2007 2008-2010 
Pricing Grid Number  % Number  % 
x.x0 173  41.90% 49319  16.24% 
x.x1 16  3.87% 23601  7.70% 
x.x2 17  4.12% 26592  8.75% 
x.x3 33  7.99% 26197  8.62% 
x.x4 9  2.18% 26047  8.57% 
x.x5 103  24.90% 45490  14.97% 
x.x6 24  5.81% 26049  8.57% 
x.x7 17  4.12% 27359  9.01% 
x.x8 8  1.94% 28013  9.22% 
x.x9 13  3.15% 25109  8.27% 
Total 413   303776   
% at x.x0 & x.x5  66.80%   31.21% 
 
Panel B: Clustering tests and indices 
  2006-2007 2008-2010 
H1 0.0000 0.0000 
HHI(%) 25.42 10.81 
 
Note: Panel A shows the number of transactions and the percentage of ECX EUA futures 
contracts with maturity in December 2010 traded at the 1 cent interval for period 2006-2007 and 
period 2008-2010. Panel B presents the p-value of the H1 hypothesis that tests the absence of 
difference between the observed distribution and the expected distribution. HHI stands for the 
Hirshmann-Herfindahl index. 
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Table 2. Price Clustering for 2008, 2009 and 2010 
Panel A: Distribution of last digit of the price 
Pricing Grid 2008  2009  2010 
x.x0 28.50%  18.70%  15.70% 
x.x1 5.23%  7.84%  7.80% 
x.x2 5.21%  8.55%  8.84% 
x.x3 5.56%  7.79%  8.79% 
x.x4 6.71%  7.27%  8.79% 
x.x5 23.20%  16.40%  14.60% 
x.x6 6.41%  7.77%  8.73% 
x.x7 5.46%  8.46%  9.14% 
x.x8 7.88%  8.66%  9.32% 
x.x9 5.88%  8.53%  8.26% 
Total 3996  38026  261754 
% at x.x0 & x.x5 51.70%  35.10%  30.30% 
 
Panel B: Clustering tests and indices 
 
 2008  2009  2010 
H1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
HHI(%) 16.47  11.50  10.69 
 
Note: Panel A shows the number of transactions and the percentage of ECX EUA futures 
contracts with maturity in December 2010 traded at the 1 cent interval for trading years 2008, 
2009 and 2010. Panel B presents the p-value of the H1 hypothesis that tests the absence of 
difference between the observed distribution and the expected distribution. HHI stands for the 
Hirshmann-Herfindahl index. 
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Table 3. Analysis of scenarios for price clustering 
 
Note: This table shows the percentage of cases clustered at the final digit of transaction price for various partitions of the sample for period 2008-2010. We 
examine clustering for all the trades of the period, the highest, the lowest, the last, and the settlement price of each day. We also study the degree of price 
clustering depending on the sign of the transaction, i.e. (trade that is buyer or seller initiated) and attending to whether traders have opened (R3H) or closed 
(R3L) positions in futures contracts massively along the day. HHI stands for the Hirshmann-Herfindahl index. H1 presents the p-value of the statistic that tests 
the null hypothesis of absence of price clustering. H2 presents the p-value of the statistic that tests if the two samples considered are equally clustered. 
Partition x.x0 x.x1 x.x2 x.x3 x.x4 x.x5 x.x6 x.x7 x.x8 x.x9 Observations HHI H1 H2 
All trades  16.24 7.77 8.75 8.62 8.57 14.97 8.58 9.01 9.22 8.27 303776 10.81 0.0000 - 
High        17.43 9.12 8.85 8.85 9.65 15.28 6.57 6.97 8.58 8.71 746 11.11 0.0000 - 
Low         16.22 7.91 8.58 9.38 7.64 18.23 7.51 6.84 9.38 8.31 746 11.38 0.0000 0.6242 
Last        16.62 9.38 7.37 10.99 7.77 15.55 7.10 7.77 8.18 9.25 746 11.05 0.0000 - 
Settle      11.53 11.39 10.59 9.79 10.32 10.72 8.98 10.32 8.04 8.31 746 10.13 0.3677 0.0024 
Buyer       15.67 9.13 9.32 8.50 7.67 15.14 9.64 9.20 8.80 6.93 149558 10.79 0.0000 - 
Seller     16.78 6.45 8.21 8.74 9.45 14.82 7.54 8.82 9.63 9.56 154218 10.95 0.0000 0.6206 
R3H 6.34 3.32 3.32 6.34 12.08 29.31 19.94 15.11 2.72 1.51 331 17.43 0.0000 - 
R3L 12.79 7.26 8.70 7.74 7.62 18.25 8.70 12.36 9.18 7.38 1666 11.10 0.0000 0.3366 
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Table 4. Spearman cross-correlation coefficients 
 
Price Clustering 𝜎 
Trading 
Frequency 
𝜎 0.0633 (0.0840) 1.0000  
Trading Frequency -0.1792 (0.0000) 0.4326 (0.0000) 1.0000 
Trade Size 0.0236 (0.5198) -0.4327 (0.0000) -0.1776 (0.0000) 
 
Note: This table shows the Spearman cross-correlation coefficients of price clustering (the sum 
of the percentages of trades at x.x0 and x.x5), the measure of volatility proposed by Parkinson 
(1980), the trading frequency (logarithm of daily number of transactions) and trade size (logarithm 
of the sum of the product of price and volume divided by the daily trading frequency) for the 
December 2010 ECX EUA futures contracts and for the period 2008-2010. P-values appear in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5. Determinants of price clustering 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
𝛼 -0.4097 0.2472 -1.6573 0.0979 
𝜎𝑡 6.2181 2.5268 2.4608 0.0141 
Trading Frequencyt -0.0833 0.0113 -7.3602 0.0000 
Trade Sizet 0.0852 0.0464 1.8359 0.0668 
R3H,t -0.2632 0.1797 -1.4649 0.1434 
R3L,t 0.1293 0.1110 1.1647 0.2446 
R2 0.1220 F-statistic 19.3154 
Adjusted R2 0.1156 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
 
Note: Price clustering is measured as the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution 
of the percentage of trades that occur at pricing increments of x.x0 and x.x5. We regress Price 
Clustering against daily volatility, the logarithm of daily trading frequency, the logarithm of daily 
trade size and R3
H
 and R3
L
 dummy's variables which take value 1 when R3 is in the intervals 
[0.95 1] and [-1 -0.95], respectively. The analysis has been performed for the December 2010 
ECX EUA futures contracts and for the period 2008-2010. 
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 53 
  
 54 
1. Introduction 
Since the inception of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
in 2005, an increasing number of empirical papers have studied the 
microstructure of the European Carbon Market. Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) 
were the first to study market liquidity in carbon markets and observe that trading 
frictions in the form of transaction costs decreased over the first years of the EU 
ETS; Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) and Conrad, Rittler and Rotfuß. (2012) 
show that the decisions of the European Commission have a strong and 
immediate impact on carbon prices; Mizrach and Otsubo (2014) find that 
imbalances in the order book of the European Climate Exchange (ECX) help 
predict carbon returns for up to three days; and Medina, Pardo and Pascual 
(2014) analyze the timeline of trading frictions in the European Carbon Market to 
conclude that the EU ETS market breakdown in 2006 had a persistent negative 
effect on the quality of the EUAs prices.7 
Although the previous papers have studied a broad range of topics about carbon 
market liquidity, none of them have focused on the quantity dimension of liquidity. 
This is an important aspect to consider when trading. Following Meng, Verousis 
and ap. Gwilym (2013), to the extent that investors fail to accommodate size 
along with price in their optimal allocation decisions, their overall costs may 
increase. As Black (1971, p.30) indicates, an asset is perfectly liquid when (i) 
there are always bid and ask prices for the investor who wants to trade small 
amounts of assets and the difference between those prices is always small; (ii) 
an investor can trade a large amount of the asset over a long period of time at a 
                                                          
7 See Zhang and Wei (2010) for a comprehensive review of the main arguments of empirical studies on the EU ETS, in 
terms of the operating mechanism and economic effect of the EU ETS. 
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price not very different from the current market price; and (iii) an investor can buy 
or sell a large block of stock immediately, but at a premium or discount that 
depends on the size of the block. According to Harris (2003, p. 399), a trader 
must minimize the cost of trading a given size or, similarly, maximize the size she 
trades at a given cost. However, the ability to trade large sizes at low costs could 
be hindered when the size of the orders is concentrated at specific trade sizes. 
This empirical fact, known in the literature as the size clustering effect, has 
recently been observed in foreign exchange, equity, index futures, and credit 
default swap (CDS) markets (see Alexander and Peterson, 2007; ap Gwilym and 
Meng (2010); Meng et al., (2013); Moulton, (2005), respectively). 
The financial literature offers some theories to explain clustering. Firstly, the price 
negotiation hypothesis, introduced by Ball, Torous and Tschoel (1985) and by 
Harris (1991), indicates that the presence of uncertainly leads the traders to round 
both trade sizes and their equilibrium prices, with the aim of minimizing the costs 
of the trading process. Secondly, there are some papers that suggest that the 
tendency to round sizes and prices is due to trader's preferences. This is the case 
of different behavioral hypotheses suggested by Wyckoff (1963), Goodhart and 
Curcio (1991), and Ikenberry and Weston (2007), among others, that argue that 
investors prefer certain numbers over others without any rational explanation. By 
using a rounded set of numbers, the quantity of information that has to be 
processed by the traders is less. Combining these hypotheses, clustering 
appears because traders use a restricted set of prices and trade sizes to simplify 
their negotiations. Therefore, the higher the market volatility and the less the 
trading frequency, the higher the trading costs and the higher the level of 
clustering. 
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Finally, Hodrick and Moulton (2009) examine liquidity and how it affects the 
behavior of uninformed traders. One of the implications of their model states that 
in a market with many heterogeneous uninformed investors, the number of 
different sizes traded increases in accordance with their desire for satisfaction. If 
the desire for satisfaction is very high, they choose to trade a wide range of 
different sizes. Therefore, the degree of size clustering should be very low at 
times in which the desire of portfolio managers to satisfy their negotiations is very 
intense. 8 
The finding of coarse price grids, or price clustering, is common across a broad 
range of markets, including, among others, energy, water, foreign exchange, 
stock, bond futures, stock index futures, and carbon futures markets. However, 
as we have cited, the literature about the presence of size clustering is far less 
extensive.9 This study offers the first analysis of observed patterns in European 
Union Allowances (EUAs) trade sizes. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is 
to document empirical evidence of size clustering behavior in the ECX EUA 
futures market and to understand under what circumstances it happens. The 
investigation of clustering in trade sizes could offer new insights into the liquidity 
of the European Carbon Futures Markets as long as its presence would be 
indicative of the fact that carbon traders might not negotiate their desired 
quantities at a given price. As we will show in this paper, size and price rounding 
will result in lower transactions costs. Additionally, the results of this study 
                                                          
8 Moulton (2005) analyzes size clustering in the foreign exchange market and shows that customers trade more precise 
quantities at quarter-ends because this is when investors could have a stronger desire to satisfy their quantity demands. 
A similar explanation is provided by Garvey and Wu (2014) to justify why US equity traders submit more non-rounded 
order sizes and more order sizes overall leading up to a day's market close. 
9 See Brooks et al. (2013) and ap Gwilym and Meng (2010) for excellent reviews of the literature on price and size 
clustering, respectively. 
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contribute to the debate by providing further empirical evidence on whether price 
and size clustering are coincident or not. 
The remainder of the chpater is organized as follows. Section 2 describes briefly 
the European Carbon Market and the data used to perform this study. Section 3 
analyzes the distribution of the trade sizes. Section 4 presents the findings on 
size clustering and its key determinants. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Market structure and data 
Next, we provide a brief description about the main characteristics of the EU ETS. 
For further information, see Ellerman et al. (2010) for a detailed explanation of 
the origins and development of the EU ETS, and Ellerman et al. (2014) for a 
descriptive analysis of the history and structure of the EU ETS from its inception 
through 2012. 
The EU ETS was launched in January 2005 and is, at the moment, the first 
international emission trading system to address greenhouse gas emissions from 
companies. The EU ETS covers emissions from power plants, factories and 
companies belonging to energy-intensive industry sectors in the 28 EU countries 
and the three European Economic Area states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway). Flights to and from the EU and the three European Economic Area 
states are also covered. These installations and flights represent around 45% of 
the EU's greenhouse gas emissions. 
The EU ETS has evolved from a system with 25 national caps and decentralized 
allocation based on national allocation plans dealing with CO2 emissions alone 
towards a centralized system that includes several greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
and features an EU-wide cap (see Ellerman et al., 2014). Within this cap, 
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companies may receive or buy emission allowances each year. These 
allowances give the holder the right to emit 1 tonne of CO2 and are known as 
European Union Allowances, or EUAs. If a company considers that it has more 
allowances than it is going to need, it can sell them in the market. However, each 
company must surrender enough allowances to cover all its emissions for the 
previous year by the 30th of April of the following year, otherwise heavy fines are 
imposed. 
The EU ETS is organized in Phases. Pilot Phase I ran from 2005 to 2007. The 
number of allowances allocated was so high that the EUA price fell to zero in 
2007. Phase II ran from 2008 to 2012 and coincided with the Kyoto Commitment 
Period. The cap was lowered by 6.5% with regard to the level in the previous 
period. However, the economic crisis again caused an unexpected surplus of 
allowances. Phase III, spanning 2013 to 2020, will cover new industries and has 
a prolonged compliance cycle. It will incorporate a centralized EU-wide allocation 
of allowances with a yearly linear decrease of the emissions cap of 1.74% per 
year, even beyond 2020. During Phases I and II the majority of the allowances 
were allocated freely. From 2013 on, there is a combination of free allocation and 
auctioning, and the ETS legislation has set the goal of phasing out free allocation 
completely by 2027.10 
Several electronic trading platforms currently offer trading on EUAs. However, 
the ICE ECX EUA Futures Market is considered as the benchmark as it 
concentrates by far the majority of the total trading volume. In fact, following the 
Futures Industry Association, the ICE ECX EUA Futures contract is among the 
                                                          
10 See ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm for further details about the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (last accessed on December 30, 2014). 
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top 20 most-traded Energy Futures & Options Contracts in the world.11 The ICE 
ECX market is an electronic order driven market whose daily session commences 
with a pre-open period of 15 min (from 6:45 a.m. UK local time) and ends with a 
single call auction. Throughout the continuous session, from 7:00 to 17:00, 
brokers and market makers are able to submit limit orders, stop limit orders, 
market orders, and block orders. The futures contracts are traded in lots, with 
each lot equaling 1000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent, in other words, 1000 EUAs. 
The minimum tick size was €0.05 until 27 March 2007 when it changed to €0.01. 
Futures contracts cease trading at 17:00 h UK local time on the last Monday of 
the contract month.12 
To carry out this study, we have chosen the complete lifespan of the ECX EUA 
futures contracts with maturities in December 2010, 2011 and 2012, all of them 
belonging to Phase II. The data sample periods run from 21 September 2006 to 
20 December 2010, from 23 March 2006 to 19 December 2011, and from 23 
March 2006 to 17 December 2012, for the December 2010, 2011 and 2012 
futures contracts, respectively. A total of 304,189, 359,003 and 491,205 
transactions took place, for the first, second and third contracts analyzed, 
respectively. 
Specifically, our database contains, for every screen trade, the following concrete 
information: the time stamp measured in GMT, the traded price in euros, the 
contract maturity date, the traded volume, the daily settlement price, and the sign 
of the transaction specifying whether it is buyer- or seller-initiated. Following 
                                                          
11 See http://www.futuresindustry.org/volume-.asp for trading volume statistics on Global Futures and Options (last 
accessed on September 30,2013). 
12 For further details on the EUAs futures contract, see the user guide of ECX Contracts at www.theice.com (last accessed 
on September 26, 2013). 
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Alexander and Peterson (2007), a trade that has been buyer-initiated is more 
likely to be followed by another buyer-initiated order if the trades are rounded. 
Therefore, we will take into account the sign of the transaction to check if trades 
initiated by one of the sides could be more size clustered than trades initiated by 
the other side. 
3. Trade size distribution 
In this section, we begin by using the data on trade sizes to calculate their 
frequency. Table 1 shows the frequency of the trades with the same trade size 
expressed in percentage for all the trades (All trades), for buyer-initiated trades 
(Buyer), and for seller-initiated trades (Seller) for the ECX EUA futures contracts 
with maturities in December 2010, 2011 and 2012. The empirical distribution 
shows that about 68% of the trades are concentrated in sizes of one to five 
contracts in all the maturities. We also observe spikes at size multiples of five 
with an upturn at trades of 25 contracts. Furthermore, both buyer- and seller-
initiated trades seem to be distributed in a similar way in the three futures 
contracts. 
Table 2 presents the basic descriptive statistics. The average trade size for the 
sample of all the transactions ranges between 7.6 and 8.6, the minimum 
transaction size is one and the maximum is 1682 contracts (2012 December 
futures contract). However, the median is three, which gives an idea of the high 
concentration of trades around the lowest sizes. These results are in line with 
those obtained by ap Gwilym and Meng (2010) for the FTSE100 futures contract. 
They suggest that this tendency to concentrate on small sizes could be the desire 
of traders to avoid trading large orders with a better-informed counterparty. 
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From Table 1, there appear to be little difference in the pattern of trade sizes 
between buyer- and seller-initiated trades. Next, we have formally tested the 
equality of means, medians and variances of both distributions with the 
parametric Anova F-test, the non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis test and the Brown–
Forsythe's test, respectively. Additionally, we have applied the Wilcoxon/Mann–
Whitney test, a nonparametric test based on ranks, which determines whether or 
not two groups have the same general distribution. 
The results are displayed in Table 2. The null hypotheses of equality of means, 
medians and variances cannot be rejected for the maturity in 2010. However, 
they are rejected at the 1% level for the 2011 and 2012 futures contracts. 
Furthermore, the non-parametric Wilcoxon/Mann– Whitney statistics for those 
contracts confirm that the distribution of the buyer-initiated trade sizes is 
statistically different from the distribution of the seller-initiated trade sizes at the 
1% level. Therefore, the results of all these tests indicate that the distributions of 
trade sizes are affected by the sign of the order, at least for the last two maturities. 
Following Alexander and Peterson (2007), in order to formally test if the degree 
of size clustering in all the samples is significant, we conduct a linear regression 
analysis:  
 
where the dependent variable is the natural log of the percentage of trades that 
occur at size i and we include as independent variables some dummy variables 
that will capture whether the trade size sample is affected by the round numbers. 
In particular, as about 95% percent of trade sizes occur in the range defined 
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between one and twenty-five contracts, we include the dummy variables that will 
detect if the trade size is equal to 5, 10, 15, 20 or 25 contracts. In addition, we 
adapt from Blau, Van Ness and Van Ness (2012) the variable DM5 which 
identifies trade sizes which are multiples of five and bigger than twenty-five. 
Finally, to check how the level of size clustering is affected by the size of the 
transaction, we include the variable LnSizei which is the natural logarithm of trade 
size i measured in number of contracts. 
Table 3 shows the results of the round trade sizes regression analysis carried out 
using both ordinary least squares and the Newey and West correction that 
accounts for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. In all the cases, 
the adjusted-R2 is higher than 96% and all the coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. For all the maturities and for the three subsamples, 
the dummy variables that check the trade size are positively related with the 
dependent variable, as we expected from Table 1. Regarding the variable 
LnSizei, we find that its coefficient is negative and significant, meaning that the 
larger the size of the transaction the lower the frequency of trades with such size. 
4. Size clustering 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
Previous empirical evidence has caused controversy regarding whether price and 
size clustering are complementary or substitutes. Alexander and Peterson (2007) 
and Verousis and ap Gwilym (2013) find that price and size clustering tend to 
occur simultaneously in stock markets. On the contrary, studies such as ap 
Gwilym and Meng (2010) for FTSE100 index futures markets, Blau et al. (2012) 
for NYSE short sales, and Meng et al. (2013) for the CDS market, observe that 
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when traders round prices they tend to quote more refined sizes, implying a trade-
off between price and size clustering. Given that Palao and Pardo (2012) show 
the existence of price clustering in December 2010 ECX EUA futures contract at 
prices ending in digits 0 or 5, we have also tested for its presence in the 
December 2011 and 2012 futures contracts. The idea is to study possible links 
between price and size clustering and to determine whether they are 
complementary or substitutes in the European Carbon Market. 
First of all, to investigate the presence of price clustering, we focus on the 
distribution of the last decimal of the transaction price, in particular, the frequency 
distribution of prices between x.x0 and x.x9. We analyze price clustering as the 
frequency of the number of transactions occurring at each digit (%Trades) and, 
following Brooks, Harris and Joymungul (2013), we have also studied price 
clustering as the frequency of the total amount of contracts traded at each digit 
(%Contracts). 
Price clustering has been analyzed for the sample of all the transactions, for 
buyer-initiated trades and for seller-initiated trades. Table 4 shows that the most 
clustered digits for the three subsamples of each contract are 0 and 5. This fact 
is observed both in the number of trades and in the total amount of contracts. It 
is notable that when we take into account the frequency of the total amount of 
contracts traded, the percentage observed for trade prices at x.x0 and x.x5 is 
higher than when we consider the total number of trades. Obviously, the opposite 
is detected for the remaining digits. This suggests that investors not only trade 
more frequently at digits 0 and 5 but also, when they trade at these digits, they 
place a higher amount of contracts than in the rest of the cases. 
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Additionally, we have applied the Goodness of Fit Chi-squared statistic to test the 
null hypothesis of no difference between the observed distribution and the 
expected distribution. The Goodness of Fit Chisquared statistic, shown in Panel 
B as GOF, is defined as: 
𝐺𝑂𝐹 = ∑
(𝑂𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
~𝜒𝑁−1
2  
where Oi is the observed frequency of the last digit; Ei is the expected frequency 
under a uniform distribution, and GOF is the distributed Chi-square with N-1 
degrees of freedom under standard conditions. In all the cases, the tests reject 
the null hypothesis at the 1% level, confirming statistically the presence of price 
clustering both in the number of trades and in the sum of contracts at prices 
ending in digits 0 and 5. 
Next, we define different variables and perform different tests in order to check 
for the presence of size clustering in carbon markets. We follow the methodology 
proposed both by Moulton (2005) and by ap Gwilym and Meng (2010). 
Specifically, we define the variable Size as the daily number of different trade 
sizes; Count as the daily trading frequency, and Volume as the daily volume. A 
simulated example of the daily trading activity in a fictitious market in Table 5 will 
help to clarify these variables. Panel A presents all the intraday trades for two 
consecutive days. Panel B shows how these trades are classified according to 
different subsamples. In our case, we perform the analysis for the full sample and 
two subsamples that takes into account prices that end in digit 0, in digit 5, in 
digits 0 or 5, and in digits different from 0 or 5. Finally, Panel C shows the 
percentages for each subsample. 
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For example, for Day 1 there are three transactions recorded (see Panel A), the 
variable Count indicates three transactions, while two trades of size one and one 
trade of size ten constitute two Sizes on the same day (see Panel B). Panel C 
deserves special attention because the proportion of size one (2/5) is bigger in 
the sample of prices ended in 0 than in the whole sample (3/10) as happens for 
size one. It is explained because, for each sample, we only consider the sum of 
the different sizes corresponding to each sample. The full sample has ten trades 
while the subsample of digit-0 has five. For this reason, additively cannot be 
assumed when comparing the different samples of Size. 
The reason for employing the daily number of distinct trade sizes (the variable 
size) instead of the variable trade sizes to measure the degree of size clustering 
is because we are interested in analyzing the amplitude of the range of the trade 
sizes and not the frequency of the observations for each trade size. Proceeding 
in this way, we avoid the possibility that a trading day with a high number of trades 
could determine the size clustering level. For instance, we do not mind if the trade 
size quantity equal to one repeats 20 times, though we do mind if an investor can 
trade at such quantity. Therefore, a high (low) number for the variable Size 
implies a low (high) degree of size clustering. 
Next, we perform different tests in order to check size clustering in carbon trades. 
We examine all trade sizes of all intraday screen transactions of the three futures 
contracts and we calculate the daily variable Size. Table 6 presents some 
descriptive statistics and some tests for the different samples considered. Panel 
A shows that the median of the daily number of different trade sizes for the sample 
of All trades is lower for prices ending in 0 or 5 than for prices ending in digits 
different from 0 or 5. Similar results are obtained for Buyer and Seller 
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subsamples. The Kruskal–Wallis (K–W) test in Panel A confirms that this 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases. Therefore, more 
clustered prices have more clustered sizes, indicating that price and size 
clustering are complementary. Panel B presents the Wilcoxon/Mann– Whitney 
statistics and their p-values that test the null hypothesis of equality of the 
distributions for the Buyer and Seller subsamples. As can be observed, we cannot 
reject the equality of the distributions of the variable size between the buyer-
initiated trades and the seller initiated trades in any of the cases. Therefore, the 
sign of the order affects the trade size of the order (as we see in Table 2) but it 
does not influence the variable size. This is the reason why, from now on, the 
multivariate analysis will be focused only on the sample composed of all the 
transactions. 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Finally, based on previous empirical evidence obtained for other assets, a 
multivariate analysis is carried out to determine the key factors which affect size 
clustering in carbon prices. To study possible links between price and size 
clustering, and following ap Gwilym and Meng (2010), we have split the data set 
into two parts in order to capture any differences between observations with 
prices ending in x.x0 and x.x5 and those with prices ending in the remaining 
digits. To do this, we have defined Dt as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
for observations where prices end in digits different from 0 or 5, and 0 otherwise. 
Observations are indexed by t where t = 1,698 across 849 trading days for 2010 
futures contract, t = 2,032 across 1,016 trading days for 2011 maturity, and t = 
2,670 across 1,335 trading days for 2012 futures contract. 
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The following model has been estimated using both ordinary least squares and 
the Newey and West correction that accounts for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation problems: 
 
The dependent variable that represents the level of size clustering is the variable 
Sizet which refers to the daily number of distinct trade sizes. 𝜎𝑡 stands for an 
estimation of the intraday volatility that has been calculated following the measure 
proposed by Parkinson (1980): 
𝜎𝑡 = √
1
4𝑙𝑜𝑔2
(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑡)2 
where Ht is the highest and Lt are the lowest traded prices on day t. We will use 
volatility as a proxy of uncertainty. According to Harris (1991), the arrival of more 
information implies more volatility and a wider range of trade sizes. Moulton 
(2005) observes higher volatility associated with more sizes traded in the majority 
of the currencies she analyzed and Meng et al. (2013) also observe this 
relationship for the CDS market. 
Therefore, the coefficient on 𝜎𝑡 is expected to be negative in the equation. Countt 
is the number of daily trades for each sample. ap Gwilym and Meng (2010) find 
that the number of distinct trade sizes increases with trade frequency which is 
consistent with the idea that the arrival of more information leads to the use of a 
wider range of trade sizes. Therefore, the expected sign for the coefficient on 
Countt is positive, i.e. the more trades there are, the greater the number of distinct 
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trade sizes. Trade Sizet is calculated as the daily average trade size, i.e. the sum 
of the total amount of trade sizes divided by the number of the total transactions 
on such day. As we have seen, our preliminary results suggest that the average 
trade size is higher for the most clustered prices, and by introducing this variable 
into the regression, we can test whether the daily average trade size influences 
the range of the different trade sizes.  
Finally, motivated by the theoretical paper by Hodrick and Moulton (2009), we 
have introduced three dummy variables. Their paper examines liquidity and how 
it affects the behavior of portfolio managers. One of the implications of their model 
is that in a market with many heterogeneous uninformed investors, an asset will 
trade at more distinct quantities when investors have a stronger desire to satisfy 
their exogenous demands, where “at more distinct quantities” refers to more 
variation in the quantities (Sizet) traded, not necessarily more trades or more total 
volume. Assuming the correctness of this theory, the degree of size clustering on 
days with extreme desire would be negatively linked with the desire of uninformed 
investors (portfolio managers) to satisfy their negotiations. 
We apply the R3t measure proposed by Lucia and Pardo (2010) as a proxy to 
study the behavior of the portfolio manager activity in the European Carbon 
Market. This measure is defined as the ratio between the change in the open 
interest and the daily trading volume over a day t. The ratio has no dimension, 
and can take any value ranging from −1 to +1. A positive (negative) number 
indicates that the number of open (closed) positions is greater than the number 
of closed (open) positions. After calculating the ratio for all the trading days, we 
have constructed three variables. R3H,t, R3M,t and R3L,t which take value 1 when 
R3t is in the intervals [0.95, 1], [−0.025, 0.025] and [−1, −0.95], respectively. The 
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first dummy variable indicates days in which the opening of new positions 
outnumbers by far the closing of positions; the second variable identifies those 
days with an abnormal number of intraday traders (those that open and close 
positions on the same day), while the last variable takes into account days in 
which the traders are massively closing positions. 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 7 and show a high 
explanatory power, given that the adjusted-R2 is at least 76%. After controlling 
for all the possible determinants of size clustering, the dummy variable for prices 
ending in digits different from 0 or 5 is positive and statistically different from zero 
at the 1% level, indicating that there are higher distinct trade sizes for prices 
ending in digits different from 0 or 5 than for prices ending in 0 or 5. This implies 
that more clustered prices have a lower range of distinct sizes, and therefore, 
more clustered sizes. This suggests that price and size clustering take place at 
the same time. 
We find that volatility does not affect the size variable for the less clustered prices 
in any contract and is only negatively related with the dependent variable in the 
case of more clustered prices for the 2011 maturity at the 5% level, which means 
that when uncertainty increases, investors prefer to trade transactions ending in 
0 or 5 at a small range of sizes. We also observe a positive and significant 
relationship between the daily number of transactions and the daily number of 
distinct trade sizes that is not counterbalanced for prices ending in digits different 
from 0 or 5. Regarding the relationship between average trade size and size 
clustering, the results indicate that when it is significantly different form zero, it is 
negative. Therefore, the higher the daily average trade size, the lower the range 
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of the different trade sizes. The overall result of these findings supports both the 
price negotiation and the behavioral hypotheses. 
Finally, it is important to note the results obtained when we observe how size 
clustering behaves under different investor decision scenarios. The coefficients 
of the dummy variables that represent massive opening positions (R3H,t) and 
massive closing positions (R3L,t) are negative at the 1% level for more clustered 
prices. Similar results are obtained for significant coefficients of the interaction 
variables. This means that carbon traders concentrate the size of their trades on 
days in which they open new positions and on days in which they cancel the old 
ones, but on those days that intraday carbon traders are extremely active (R3M,t) 
they prefer to use a wide range of trade sizes. Therefore, this result backs the 
theory by Hodrick and Moulton (2009) which states that, in a market with many 
heterogeneous uninformed investors, the number of different sizes traded 
increases with their desire for satisfaction. 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigates, for the first time, the presence and the key determinants 
of the size clustering in the ICE ECX EUA futures market taking into account 
intraday transactions data. We have found evidence of a tendency for carbon 
trades to cluster in small sizes and in round numbers multiples of five contracts. 
We have also demonstrated that more clustered prices have more clustered 
sizes, implying that price and size resolution in the European Carbon Market are 
coincident and that carbon traders place orders rounding the two variables 
simultaneously. This suggests that market players not only trade more frequently 
at transaction prices ending in digits 0 or 5 but also, when they trade at these 
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digits, they place a lower number of different trade sizes than in the remaining 
cases. Furthermore, the analysis of the key determinants of trade size clustering 
indicates that carbon traders cluster their orders to simplify their trading process 
when uncertainty is high, market liquidity is poor, and the desire to open new 
positions or cancel old ones is very strong. We interpret all these findings as being 
supportive of both the price negotiation and the behavioral hypotheses. 
Our findings indicate that there was a reduction in the extent of price and size 
clustering over the final years of Phase II for transaction prices ending in digits 
different from 0 or 5. However, the existence and persistence of a high degree of 
size clustering in transaction prices ending in digits 0 or 5 hinders the ability of 
traders to negotiate orders with large sizes at low costs. These results should be 
of great interest for carbon market players inasmuch as the concentration of the 
size of trades at certain amounts in the European Carbon Market implies that 
carbon market participants may not be able to trade the desired quantity easily. 
Moreover, our overall findings suggest that carbon traders that want to transact 
large trades should seek out liquidity peaks, namely, they should round the price 
of their orders to digits ending in 0 or 5 and, simultaneously, either adjust the size 
of their trades to make them smaller or in multiples of five contracts. 
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Annex: tables and figures  
Table 1. Frequency of the trades with the same trade size 
 2010 2011 2012 
 All trades Buyer Seller All trades Buyer Seller All trades Buyer Seller 
1 42.82 42.82 42.83 41.05 40.15 41.92 39.41 40.42 38.35 
2 6.94 7.12 6.77 8.19 8.29 8.09 9.17 9.04 9.31 
3 4.05 4.08 4.03 4.96 4.95 4.97 5.65 5.45 5.86 
4 3.16 3.19 3.13 3.25 3.36 3.14 3.47 3.49 3.45 
5 11.14 11.11 11.16 10.88 11.00 10.76 10.49 9.90 11.12 
6 1.25 1.23 1.26 1.33 1.39 1.27 1.52 1.55 1.49 
7 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.39 1.41 1.37 1.49 1.49 1.48 
8 1.24 1.22 1.27 1.17 1.23 1.10 1.29 1.32 1.26 
9 1.47 1.42 1.52 1.26 1.29 1.23 1.30 1.31 1.28 
10 10.28 10.17 10.38 8.22 8.25 8.19 8.41 8.21 8.62 
11 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.53 0.51 0.54 
12 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.57 0.58 0.55 
13 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.45 0.37 0.45 0.47 0.43 
14 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.43 
15 1.42 1.46 1.39 1.51 1.57 1.46 1.44 1.48 1.40 
16 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.31 
17 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 
18 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.36 0.37 0.35 
19 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.32 
20 1.70 1.66 1.74 1.65 1.71 1.58 1.64 1.65 1.64 
21 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.24 
22 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.25 
23 0.36 0.39 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.29 
24 0.59 0.60 0.57 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.43 0.45 0.41 
25 5.43 5.40 5.46 5.83 5.93 5.72 5.01 5.00 5.01 
>25 3.63 3.55 3.71 4.61 4.58 4.64 5.10 4.93 5.28 
 
Note. This table shows the frequency of the trades with the same trade size expressed in 
percentage for all the trades (All trades), for buyer-initiated trades (Buyer), and for seller-initiated 
trades (Seller) for the ECX EUA futures contracts with maturities in December 2010, 2011 and 
2012. The first column indicates the number of contracts per transaction. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of trade sizes  
Panel A. 2010 
 All trades Buyer Seller Test 
Mean 7.612 7.587 7.636 F- test: 0.7623 
Median 3 3 3 KW- test: 1.749 
Std. Deviation 15.543 15.577 15.510 BF- test: 0.617 
Minimum 1 1 1 WMW- test: 1.323 
Maximum 995 976 995  
Observations 304,180 149,737 154,443  
 
Panel B. 2011 
 All trades Buyer Seller Test 
Mean 8.285 8.466 8.112 F- test: 36.322*** 
Median 3 3 2 KW- test: 89.164*** 
Std. Deviation 17.612 18.652 16.556 BF- test: 25.304*** 
Minimum 1 1 1 WMW- test: 9.443*** 
Maximum 900 900 518  
Observations 359,003 175,490 183,513  
 
Panel C. 2012 
 All trades Buyer Seller Test 
Mean 8.610 8.428 8.800 F- test: 40.153*** 
Median 3 3 3 KW- test: 113.812*** 
Std. Deviation 20.559 20.076 21.051 BF- test: 26.653*** 
Minimum 1 1 1 WMW- test: 10.668*** 
Maximum 1682 1493 1682  
Observations 491,205 251,562 239,643  
 
Note. This table shows the descriptive statistics of the distribution of trade sizes for all the trades 
(All trades), for buyer-initiated trades (Buyer), and seller-initiated trades (Seller) for the ECX EUA 
futures contracts with maturities in December 2010, 2011 and 2012. The sample period takes into 
account all the transactions made from 2006 to 2012. The F-test stands for the F statistic that 
tests the null hypothesis of equality of means of trade sizes. The KW-test is the Kruskal-Wallis 
statistic that tests the null hypothesis of equality of medians of trade sizes. The BF-test is the 
Brown–Forsythe’s statistic that tests the null hypothesis of equality of variances. The WMW-test 
is the Wilcoxon/Mann–Whitney statistic that tests whether or not two series have the same 
general distribution. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3. Round numbers analysis regression 
Panel A. 2010 
 All trades Buyer Seller 
𝛼 3.679 3.678 3.677 
𝛽5 1.597 1.586 1.602 
𝛽10 2.751 2.728 2.764 
𝛽15 1.495 1.502 1.477 
𝛽20 2.186 2.144 2.214 
𝛽25 3.745 3.721 3.754 
𝛽𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 25 2.328 2.265 2.380 
𝛽𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 -1.780 -1.774 -1.781 
Adjusted-R2 0.961 0.962 0.960 
 
Panel B. 2011 
 All trades Buyer Seller 
𝛼 3.656 3.635 3.674 
𝛽5 1.544 1.538 1.543 
𝛽10 2.475 2.447 2.492 
𝛽15 1.492 1.487 1.483 
𝛽20 2.079 2.070 2.071 
𝛽25 3.733 3.698 3.751 
𝛽𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 25 2.489 2.396 2.568 
𝛽𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 -1.748 -1.725 -1.765 
Adjusted-R2 0.965 0.966 0.965 
 
Panel C. 2012 
 All trades Buyer Seller 
𝛼 3.641 3.656 3.622 
𝛽5 1.482 1.406 1.552 
𝛽10 2.454 2.411 2.488 
𝛽15 1.388 1.396 1.365 
𝛽20 2.017 1.997 2.022 
𝛽25 3.514 3.492 3.521 
𝛽𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 25 2.425 2.343 2.494 
𝛽𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 -1.722 -1.721 -1.718 
Adjusted-R2 0.968 0.969 0.968 
 
Note. This table shows the results of a regression analysis (equation 1) in order to test how round 
numbers affect trade sizes for all the trades (All trades), for buyer-initiated trades (Buyer), and 
seller-initiated trades (Seller) for the ECX EUA futures contracts with maturities in December 
2010, 2011 and 2012. LnPerc.Sizei is the natural logarithm of the percentage of trade size i. D5i, 
D10i, D15i, D20i and D25i are five dummy variables which take value 1 if the trade sizes i are 
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equal to 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25, respectively, and 0 otherwise. DM5i takes value 1 if the trade sizes 
i is a multiple of 5 upper 25 and 0 otherwise. LnSizei is the natural logarithm of trade size i 
measured in number of contracts. All the coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4. Price clustering 
Panel A. 2010 
 All sample Buyer Seller 
 % Trades % Contracts % Trades % Contracts % Trades % Contracts 
x.x0 & x.x5 31.26 37.71 30.85 37.34 31.65 38.07 
Rest 68.74 62.29 69.15 62.66 68.35 61.93 
Total 304,180 2,315,306 149,737 1,136,001 154,443 1,179,305 
GOF 24,756.67 464,341.74 11,928.42 221,485.43 14,731.21 256,690.75 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Panel B. 2011 
 All sample Buyer Seller 
 % Trades % Contracts % Trades % Contracts % Trades % Contracts 
x.x0 & x.x5 28.61 34.19 28.02 33.24 29.17 35.14 
Rest 71.39 65.81 71.98 66.76 70.83 64.86 
Total 359,003 2,974,379 175,490 1,485,744 183,513 1,488,635 
GOF 17,378.67 393,079.03 7771.34 174,284.79 10,724.64 231,185.30 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Panel C. 2012 
 All sample Buyer Seller 
 % Trades % Contracts % Trades % Contracts % Trades % Contracts 
x.x0 & x.x5 28.51 31.67 28.41 31.86 28.62 31.48 
Rest 71.49 68.33 71.59 68.14 71.38 68.52 
Total 491,205 4,229,186 251,562 2,120,267 239,643 2,108,919 
GOF 23,113.27 372,662.92 11,752.05 193,213.12 12,257.67 187,749.16 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Note. This table analyses the price clustering for trades and contracts occurring at digits ending 
in 0 or 5 (x.x0 & x.x5) or at digits different from 0 or 5 (Rest) for all the trades (All trades), for 
buyer-initiated trades (Buyer), and seller-initiated trades (Seller) for the ECX EUA futures 
contracts with maturities in December 2010, 2011 and 2012. Each panel shows the frequency of 
the number of transactions (%Trades) and the frequency of the total amount of contracts traded 
(%Contracts), both expressed in percentage terms. Each panel also presents the total number of 
observations (Total), the Goodness of Fit Chi-squared statistic (GOF), and its p-value. The 
Goodness of Fit Chi-squared statistic tests the null hypothesis of no difference between the 
observed distribution and the expected distribution.  
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Table 5. Example of trading-related variables 
Panel A: Trade Volume Information on two days 
Day 1  Day 2 
Price Contracts  Price Contracts 
15.05 10  15.02 10 
15.00 1  15.03 2 
15.01 1  15.01 3 
  
 15.00 3 
  
 16.00 18 
  
 15.00 3 
  
 15.00 1 
 
Panel B: Trade volume classification for the three variables 
Day 1 Sizes Count Volume 
Full 2 3 12 
0 digit 1 1 1 
5 digit 1 1 10 
0 or 5 2 2 11 
Different 1 1 1 
    
Day 2 Sizes Count Volume 
Full 5 7 40 
0 digit 3 4 25 
5 digit - - - 
0 or 5 3 4 25 
Different 3 3 15 
 
Panel C: Trade size percentage by sample 
Sizes Full 0 digit 5 digit 0 or 5 Different 
1 3/10 2/5 - 2/6 1/4 
2 1/10 - - - 1/4 
3 3/10 2/5 - 2/6 1/4 
10 2/10 - 1 1/6 1/4 
18 1/10  1/5 - 1/6 - 
Count 10 5 1 6 4 
 
Note. This table shows the classification of the trades according to the variables used in the size 
analysis. Panel A provides an example of the trade negotiation on two days. Panel B shows how 
these transactions are distributed according to the distinct trade sizes (Sizes), the frequency of 
observations (Count), and the total volume of contracts traded (Volume) for the full sample, for 
trades where the last decimal is 0, for trades where the last decimal is 5, for trades where the last 
decimal is 0 or 5, and for trades whose last decimal is different from 0 or 5. Panel C shows the 
percentage of trade sizes over the two days for each sample. 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics of distribution 
Panel A: Prices ending in digits 0 or 5 and in digits different from 0 or 5 
2010 All trades Buyer Seller 
Median 0 or 5 9 8 7 
Median Rest 10 9 9 
K-W: 0&5 vs Rest 0.004 0.001 0.003 
2011 All trades Buyer Seller 
Median 0 or 5 8 6 6 
Median Rest 14 10 10 
K-W: 0&5 vs Rest 0.001 0.001 0.001 
2012 All trades Buyer Seller 
Median 0 or 5 11 8 8 
Median Rest 18 13 13 
K-W: 0&5 vs Rest 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
Panel B: Wilcoxon/Mann–Whitney statistic between Buyer and Seller 
subsamples 
Buyer vs Seller 2010 2011 2012 
WMW statistic 0.130 0.036 1.262 
p-value 0.897 0.971 0.207 
 
Note. This table presents some statistics and tests related to Size distribution, where Size refers 
to the daily number of distinct trade sizes for all the trades (All trades), for buyer-initiated trades 
(Buyer), and seller-initiated trades (Seller) for the ECX EUA futures contracts with maturities in 
December 2010, 2011 and 2012. Panel A shows the median of the variable Size for prices ending 
in 0 or 5 and for prices ending in digits different from 0 or 5 (Rest), respectively. Panel A also 
shows the p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) statistic that tests the null hypothesis of equality in 
the medians for the different subsamples compared. Panel B shows the Wilcoxon/Mann–Whitney 
statistic (WMW statistic) and its p-value that tests the null hypothesis of equality of the general 
distribution between Buyer and Seller subsamples.  
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Table 7. Determinants of size clustering 
  
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 Coefficient p-value. Coefficient p-value. Coefficient p-value. 
𝛼 7.121 0.000 7.029 0.000 7.826 0.000 
𝜎𝑡 26.237 0.329 -67.896 0.047 29.139 0.429 
Countt 0.061 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.066 0.000 
Trade Sizet -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.235 -0.002 0.002 
R3H.t -3.453 0.000 -5.003 0.000 -6.459 0.000 
R3M.t -0.045 0.943 0.052 0.934 0.080 0.897 
R3L.t -3.048 0.000 -3.703 0.000 -4.704 0.000 
Dt 1.874 0.000 3.226 0.000 5.003 0.000 
Dt x 𝜎𝑡 37.522 0.197 10.804 0.713 -1.000 0.978 
Dt x Countt -0.032 0.000 -0.035 0.000 -0.034 0.000 
Dt x Trade Sizet -0.001 0.328 0.000 0.932 -0.004 0.006 
Dt x R3H.t -0.221 0.837 -1.816 0.092 -2.916 0.001 
Dt x R3M.t -0.698 0.357 -0.335 0.649 -0.364 0.579 
Dt x R3L.t -0.392 0.696 -1.056 0.213 -3.163 0.000 
R2 0.761 0.828 0.786 
Adjusted-R2 0.759 0.827 0.785 
F-statistic 386.921 709.948 715.657 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. This table analyses the possible determinants of size clustering (equation 2). Sizet refers to 
the daily number of distinct trade sizes. σt is the daily volatility. Countt  is the number of trades per 
day. Trade sizet indicates the daily average trade size. R3H,t, R3M,t, and R3L,t are dummy variables 
that take value 1 when R3 is in the intervals [0.95, 1], [-0.025, 0.025], and [-1, -0.95], respectively. 
D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if contract prices end in a price different from 0 or 5, and 0 
otherwise.  
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1. Introduction 
The study of the behaviour of past prices and some other indicators like trading 
volume is extensively applied in the technical analysis, which is frequently used 
in the practitioners’ world and in a wide number of financial media. Specifically, 
the financial media tend to use expressions such as key reference points, price 
barriers, supports or resistances in order to make reference to specific levels of 
prices that prevent traders from pushing the price of an asset in a certain 
direction. According to Mitchell (2001 p. 402) a psychological barrier can be 
viewed as an impediment to an individual’s mental outlook, that is, an obstacle 
created by the mind, barring advance or preventing access. As Murphy (1999 p. 
550) points out, in the resistance price or level, the selling interest is sufficiently 
strong to overcome the buying pressure, while in the support price or level, the 
buying interest is strong enough to overcome the selling pressure. 
Several authors have reported on the existence of price barriers in different 
markets. De Grauwe and Decupere (1992) and Mitchell and Izan (2006) find that 
psychological barriers are significant in the dollar/yen market and on various 
exchange rates involving the Australian dollar. Donaldson and Kim (1993) and 
Koedijk and Stork (1994) examine the existence of positional effects in stock 
indexes and find that prices that are multiples of one hundred are approached 
and transgressed relatively infrequently. Cyree, Domian and Luton (1999) also 
find evidence of psychological barriers in the conditional moments of the major 
world stock indices. Regarding commodity markets, Aggarwal and Lucey (2007) 
document that prices in round numbers act as barriers with important effects on 
the conditional mean and variance of the gold price series. Finally, Dowling, 
Cummins and Lucey (2016) study psychological barriers in oil futures markets 
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and show that those levels only appear to influence prices in the pre-credit crisis 
period of 1990-2006.  
These types of studies belong to one of the most researched fields nowadays in 
finance known as behavioural finance, which proposes psychology and sociology 
based theories to explain market anomalies. Specifically, the financial literature 
has suggested several possible explanations for the existence of psychological 
barriers. The first one relates the barriers with the concept of anchoring, which, 
according to Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971), is the phenomenon whereby 
individuals fixate on a recent number that may be held out as being important by 
informed commentators. In this way, Sonnemans (2006) points out that when an 
investor buys an asset, he has a target price in mind at which he is willing to sell 
in the future. The second explanation is related to the clustering effect that makes 
reference to the fact that investors tend to round off arbitrary rational numbers to 
integers to simplify their trading process. As Mitchell (2001) indicates, the 
existence of price clustering does not imply the existence of a barrier. According 
to Tschoegl (1988), all the psychological barriers take place at round numbers 
but not all round numbers can be viewed as psychological barriers. Finally, the 
third explanation of the psychological barriers effect relates the existence of key 
prices to the possibility of hedging with options contracts, which imply using 
option exercises prices that are usually round numbers (see Dorfleitner and Klein, 
(2009 p.269)). 
The study about how returns can be affected by the proximity of key levels has 
attracted the attention of many researchers that have analysed the stock market. 
Donaldson and Kim (1993) and Ley and Varian (1994) study the impact of key 
prices on stock index returns and they do not find a way to predict futures returns 
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using these key prices. Another group of papers has analysed the effects of the 
vicinity of target levels on index volatility. While Dorfleitner and Klein (2009) 
observe an increase in volatility around barriers, Cyree et al. (1999) and Chen 
and Tai (2011) only find significant conditional variance effects once the barrier 
is crossed. Regarding commodities, it is worth mentioning the papers by 
Aggarwal and Lucey (2007), Lucey and Dowling (2012) and Narayan and 
Narayan (2014). The first paper shows that the conditional volatility in the gold 
market changes significantly after crossing barriers in a downward direction. The 
second paper finds evidence for psychological barriers in both oil and coal price 
data that affect both the level and the volatility of prices. Finally, the third one 
finds a negative barrier effect induced by the oil price on firm returns when the oil 
price reaches US$100 or more per barrel. 
In this chapter, we study the presence of price barriers in the European Carbon 
Market. The reference to specific price levels or range of prices as a resistance 
or a support is something common among some carbon market analysts that 
consider that certain values hold special significance for carbon market 
participants. For instance, during the third quarter of 2012, the price of the 
European Union Allowances (EUAs) at €8.00 was held by the specialized carbon 
media as a sign of strength. This was the underlying idea of some quotations that 
appeared in Reuters Point Carbon such as: “European carbon prices flatlined on 
Wednesday after trading either side of the psychologically important figure of 8 
euros, a resistance level that traders said has been tested for the last four 
consecutive days.” (Reuters Point Carbon, July 11, 2012); or “EU Allowance 
prices broke through the psychologically-important 8 euro level to hit a six-week 
high on Wednesday, but later retreated as speculators took profits, traders said.” 
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(Reuters Point Carbon, August 22, 2012). Even though these key prices used to 
be established at round numbers, they also can be found in other levels. Thus a 
carbon analyst indicated that “Traders had previously spoken of €15.00 as a 
psychological support level, although many are now pointing to €14.80 as a 
technical resistance level.” (Reuters Point Carbon, October 29, 2010).  
This study is in line with several papers that offer empirical evidence as to the 
efficiency of the European Carbon Market. Daskalakis and Markellos (2008) 
examined the efficiency of the main exchanges under the European Union 
Emission Trading Scheme during the first two years of its operation and found 
that the behavior of the markets under consideration was not consistent with 
weak-form efficiency. Montagnoli and De Vries (2010) extended the previous 
paper and their results indicated that, after an inefficient learning period, the 
carbon market showed signs of restored market efficiency. Similar findings were 
obtained by Niblock and Harrison (2013). However, Crossland, Li and Roca 
(2013), for a comparable sample period, documented robust short-term 
momentum and medium-term overreaction strategies that remained achievable 
after taking into account transaction costs, and concluded that the carbon market 
was not informationally efficient. Finally, Palao and Pardo (2012) documented a 
strong presence of price clustering in carbon markets that was taken as a sign of 
market inefficiency that could influence trading strategies. Our chapter extends 
the aforementioned literature by analysing the existence of psychological prices 
in the European Carbon Market. The presence of resistance or support levels in 
the EUA prices can offer new insights into market efficiency and the effects these 
barriers have on returns and volatility when the market is bullish or bearish. 
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Specifically, we study the existence of key prices in the European Carbon Market 
and we also analyse how returns, volatility and trading-related variables are 
affected by their presence. As far as we know, this is the first study that analyses 
this topic in the European Futures Carbon Market. This market, like energy 
futures markets, is primarily traded by professional market participants and, 
consequently, psychological influences on their trading behaviour should play a 
limited role (see Dowling et al. (2016)). Furthermore, the investigation of 
psychological prices could offer new insights into the efficiency of the European 
Carbon Market and the effects these barriers have on returns and volatility when 
the market is bullish or bearish. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 briefly describes the European Carbon Market and the data 
used to perform this study. Section 3 provides a definition of barrier and studies 
its existence. Section 4 investigates the effects of crossing target levels on 
returns, volatility and trading-related variables such as volume and open interest. 
Section 5 concludes and proposes some profitable trading strategies based on 
the detected effects of key prices on carbon returns and volatility. 
2. Market description and data 
The European Union is the leader in global climate policy and the European 
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is widely considered as the 
cornerstone in the fight against climate change. The EU ETS was set up in 
January 2005 under Directive 2003/87/EC with the aim of limiting total emissions 
of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) while enabling emissions reductions to be made at 
the lowest possible cost. The EU ETS is a multinational system that covers the 
power generators and heavy industry of the 28 member countries of the EU and 
the three member countries of the European Economic Area (Iceland, 
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Liechtenstein and Norway), which means that the largest emissions market in the 
world is composed of approximately 12,000 industrial installations and aircraft 
operators. These installations receive or buy emission allowances which they can 
trade with one another as needed. However, the installations must monitor and 
report their emissions for each calendar year and, by 30 April of the following 
year, each company must surrender enough allowances to cover all its 
emissions. If they fail to comply, they will have a non-compliance penalty.  
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system. This system fixes a cap or limit on the 
total amount of GHGs that can be emitted. This limit is reduced each year and 
the aim of the EU ETS is to emit 21% less in 2020 than in 2005. This scheme is 
divided into phases: Phase I, known as the pre-trading period, took place from 
2005 to 2007; Phase II ran from 2008 to 2012; Phase III that will cover 2013 to 
2020; and Phase IV that will operate from 2021 to 2030.  
The main objective in Phase I was to establish a fully functioning emissions 
market by the start of the Kyoto Protocol commitment. In this Phase, each country 
presented a National Allocation Plan (NAP) that had to be approved by the 
European Commission. The EU cap resulted from the aggregation of the NAPs 
of each member state. The surplus of allowances in Phase I together with the 
prohibition on transferring any surplus of EUAs to the next year, led the EUA price 
in this phase to decrease to zero. Phase II took place at the same time as the 
Kyoto Protocol commitment and, for the first time, the transfer of any surplus of 
EUAs from one year to the next, known as banking, was allowed. Furthermore, 
in Phase II, new GHGs were incorporated into the scheme, and the number of 
member countries increased with the addition of the three member countries of 
the European Economic Area.  
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The NAPs system was abandoned in Phase III and replaced with a single EU-
wide cap, which will be reduced annually by a constant linear reduction factor. 
Furthermore, the free assignation of emissions allowances to installations, known 
as grandfathering, which had characterized both Phases I and II, began to be 
gradually reduced. In 2013, more than 40% of the allowances were auctioned. 
The European Commission has also increased its efforts to reduce the surplus of 
emissions of previous phases through the implementation of two measures:  
firstly, a short term measure to postpone the auctioning of 900 million allowances 
until 2019-2020, known as backloading, and, secondly, a long term measure, that 
proposes the creation of a Market Stability Reserve to address imbalances in 
supply and demand by adjusting volumes for auctions. The increase in the 
number of sectors covered in Phase III has contributed to enhancing the 
importance of the EU ETS as an emissions reduction mechanism. 
There are several trading platforms that trade carbon allowances. However, ICE 
Futures Europe is by far the leading market for European carbon emissions. 
Specifically, ICE Futures Europe currently offers futures, options and spot 
contracts on three types of carbon units: EU Allowances (EUAs), EU Aviation 
Allowances (EUAAs) and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). However, the 
majority of the ICE EUA and CER futures and options volume is concentrated in 
the EUA December Futures Contract for each year, which is widely considered 
as the carbon price benchmark. The EUA futures contracts are traded in lots, and 
each lot equals 1,000 CO2 EU Allowances. Each EUA represents 1 metric tonne 
of carbon dioxide or equivalent gas. The quotation is in Euro cents per metric 
tonne and the minimum tick is €0.01 per tonne (i.e. €10 per lot). 
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ICE Futures Europe market operates an electronic order-driven market with 
market makers and brokers. The daily session starts with a pre-open period of 15 
minutes (from 6:45 a.m. UK local time) to enable market members to input orders 
in readiness for the beginning of trading. The pre-trading period finishes with a 
single call auction, where the opening price and the allocated volume are 
determined by an algorithm. During the continuous session, from 7:00 to 17:00, 
investors can submit limit orders, market orders, and block orders. The daily 
settlement price is calculated from the weighted average of the trades taking 
place from 16:50:00 – 16:59:59 UK local time. 
Specifically, the sample period analysed in this paper goes from 18 December 
2007 to 17 December 2012 and thus spans 1,272 trading days. The series 
contain the time stamp, the price, and the size of the transaction for all the trades 
that took place for the front contract of Phase II from 2008 to 2012. Furthermore, 
we also have the data for the open interest at the end of each day. Carchano, 
Medina and Pardo (2014) assess the rollover criteria both for EUAs and CERs. 
Following them, we have rolled on the last trading day in order to construct a 
continuous series.  Table 1 includes the main statistics for price and trading 
volumes for the continuous series. The sample contains 1,306,765 transactions 
for a total trading volume of 9,201,096 futures contracts and the price oscillates 
between €5.61 and €29.69. The most repeated price is €15.25. The majority of 
the transactions have a size of 1 lot and the maximum number of futures contracts 
traded in one transaction was 1,682. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the intraday data series of the price of the EUA 
December futures front contract during Phase II. At a glance it reveals an overall 
downward trend that can be explained by two factors: the over-allocation of EUAs 
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inherited from Phase I and the global economic downturn that resulted in less 
carbon emissions. The European temperatures during the winter 2008-2009 were 
below the average, a fact that would be expected to increase demand for 
electricity and thus the price of EUAs. However, after reaching a maximum price 
of €29.69 in July 2008, the price slumped until bottoming out at €8.49 in February 
2009, which can be explained by the serious economic recession that more than 
offset the low temperatures. . Following Creti, Jouvet and Mignon (2012), carbon 
prices in Phase II were affected by other events over 2009 and 2010, such as the 
wait-and-see attitude of the international negotiations in the Copenhagen summit 
(December 2009), the failure by allowance sellers to pay back to Member States 
the VAT they collect (December 2008 to May 2009), and several phishing attacks 
that hacked into registry accounts (end of 2010). In June 2011, the draft of the 
European Commission about the Energy Efficiency Directive raised concerns 
about the (lower) demand for allowances in Phase III, triggering an additional 
decline in prices. From December 2011 to December 2012 the price oscillated 
between €6 and €10. 13 
Looking at Figure 1, it could be inferred that more than one unexpected event 
could have affected the carbon price. However, Creti et al. (2012) have shown 
that, after considering all the events mentioned in the previous paragraph, an 
equilibrium relationship existed between the EUA carbon price and its market 
fundamentals during Phase II. 
                                                          
13 See Ellerman and Buchner (2008) and Rickels, Görlich and Oberst (2012) for a further description of the dynamics of 
EUA prices during Phase I and II. 
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3. The barrier level and the barrier band 
Resistance and support levels are identified by traders when systematically a 
quotation of an asset cannot exceed a certain price in a bullish market or drop 
below a certain price in a bearish market, respectively. In order to detect them, 
we follow Dorfleitner and Klein (2009) who define the M-values as 100 classes of 
digits (t = 00–99) on which the price can land or be passed based on a two-digit 
representation. In our study, we have analysed the level 0, defined as the two 
numbers that represent the decimal part of the price, and the level 1, identified 
as the pair of the unit and the first decimal. In particular, we define the M values 
as: 
𝑀𝑡 = 𝑧 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝑧 100⁄ ) × 100 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑧 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝑃𝑡 10
𝑙−2⁄ )  
where 𝑃𝑡 is the EUA futures price at time t and l is the barrier level (0 or 1). For 
instance, if 𝑃𝑡 = € 5.68, the M-values would be 68 and 56 for the level 0 and 1, 
respectively. These M-values allow us to calculate the relative frequencies of 
different prices at different barrier levels.14 
Figure 2 presents the empirical distribution of M-values at both levels. Figure 2a 
depicts the distribution of the M-values for the level 0. The peaks of M-values 
multiples of 5 are in accordance with the previous empirical evidence found by 
Palao and Pardo (2012, 2014). They document that the European Carbon 
Futures Market is characterized by a strong presence of price and size clustering 
at prices ending in digits 0 and 5. Figure 2b plots the empirical distribution of the 
M-values at level 1. At first glance it shows that EUA tends to be traded around 
                                                          
14 We have analyzed only the levels 0 and 1. An analysis of higher levels does not make sense due to the lack of EUA 
prices higher than €30.  
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M-values of 50 and 70 (prices from €5 to €7). As in the level 0, the empirical 
distribution presents severe deviations from a uniform distribution.   
If a barrier level does exist, then the empirical distribution of the M-values should 
be biased and the observed frequency distribution of EUA transaction prices 
would differ from the theoretical distribution. Although this fact can be easily 
observed from Figure 2, we have tested formally whether M-values distributions 
are biased. To this aim, we have performed a chi-squared goodness of fit test for 
both full samples of M-values.  
Given that EUA transaction prices in the sample range between €5.61 and €29.69 
(2,409 possible different prices), the theoretical distribution of M-values at both 
levels should not follow a uniform distribution. For this reason, unlike other articles 
that suppose that each M-value is expected to occur the same number of times, 
we have calculated the expected (theoretical) frequency as 1,306,765 
observations times the fraction of each M-value in the population. 
The results obtained are 182,451.984 for level 0 and 417,660.656 for level 1, 
respectively. The 𝜒2-statistic with 99 degree of freedom and with a probability of 
0.1% takes a value of 148.23. Therefore, the empirical distributions of the M-
values at both levels differ from their theoretical distributions.15 
Dorfleitner and Klein (2009, p.272) consider that “the barrier cannot be viewed as 
a specific number and define the barrier as an interval with a certain length 
around the barrier level”. Following this idea, we distinguish between the barrier 
                                                          
15  The application of these tests can face different challenges when the size of the sample is small, as the Benford’s Law 
shows. This phenomenon points out that the first digits of a series increase following a logarithmic model and, as De 
Ceuster, Dhaene and Schatteman (1998) suggest, this issue is crucial for small samples. We consider that, given the 
large size of our sample (1,306,765 transactions), this effect will not generate a relevant distortion in our analysis. 
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level, given by each M-value, and the barrier band, which is an interval of M-
values around the barrier level. Therefore, we have analysed the level 0 and the 
level 1 taking into account intervals of +/-1 and +/-3 M-values around the barrier 
level, as the possible barrier bands. Furthermore, we have also taken into 
account a zero range that, in fact, implies taking the level as a strict barrier.16 See 
Figure 3 for a graphical example of how the barrier bands have been defined: 
Taking into account this broader definition of barrier, what is relevant is not only 
the occurrence in the strict prices but also what happens around the proximity of 
a possible psychological price. To study both issues, we perform the barrier 
proximity test proposed by Donaldson and Kim (1993): 
𝑓(𝑀𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
where 𝑓(𝑀𝑡) is the frequency of the 100 M-values minus 1% and 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 when the M-value t belongs to a barrier band. If 
the M-values followed a uniform distribution, the theoretical value for each M-
value, from 00 to 99, would be 1% and the parameter 𝛽 will be equal to 0. 
Negative values of 𝛽 show less density around barriers and positive values just 
the opposite.17 
At this point, it is important to highlight the controversy that exists in the literature 
on price barriers regarding the interpretation of the sign of 𝛽 around the price 
level. Authors like Donaldson and Kim (1993), Aggarwal and Lucey (2007) and 
                                                          
16 The choice of both the barrier and the intervals depends on the range of the prices of the asset to be analyzed. For 
example, Donaldson and Kim (1993) study price barriers in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and define barriers at 100-
levels of the index and intervals of 2%, 5% and 10% around the level; Dorftleitner and Klein (2009) examine four European 
stock indexes and eight major German stocks and define the barriers as the multiples of 1000, 100, 10 and 1 and intervals 
of 2%, 5%, 10% and 25%; finally, Aggarwal and Lucey (2007) examine psychological barriers in gold prices at 10s and 
1s digits fixing ranges of 2% and 5%. 
17 The regressions through the study have been carried out using both ordinary least squares and the Newey and West 
correction that accounts for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. 
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Jang, Kim, Kim, Lee and Shin (2015) suggest that if a barrier exists, we should 
expect to find less density around the price barriers. The rationale is that the 
market finds it difficult to reach these levels during upturns or downturns caused 
by the considerable influx of selling or buying orders at those prices, that is, both 
buyers and sellers become less aggressive fearing a turn in the market trend. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no barriers implies that 𝛽 should be zero, while 
the alternative hypothesis implies that 𝛽 should be negative. However, other 
authors like Dorfleitner and Klein (2009) and Chen and Tai (2011) argue that the 
observation frequencies of M-values next to barriers could be even higher, 
because it takes some “effort” for the prices to cross this barrier. As a 
consequence, they assume that if 𝛽 is zero, there is no price barrier effect; 
however, the alternative hypothesis is that 𝛽 may have significant negative or 
positive values.  
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of the barrier proximity test for levels 
0 and 1. In both cases, the Panels show the results for the five M-values with the 
highest observed frequencies.18 Panel A of Table 2 presents the results for the 
barrier proximity test for 0-level. The 𝛽 coefficients are always positive and 
significant at the 1% level in the strict barriers, which indicates that EUA trades 
take place more than expected at those prices. For example, EUA prices are 
traded 0.9930% more than expected at the M-value 00. This also occurs for the 
rest of the M-values that have been chosen (50, 70, 80 and 90). Furthermore, the 
𝛽′𝑠 become non-significantly different from zero further away from the barrier 
                                                          
18 The rationale for choosing the most common M-values both for levels 0 and 1 is that if barriers exist, they should take 
place on or around the most frequent trading prices, which are the most difficult to overcome or at the levels where most 
limit orders are posted. However, we have estimated the results for the complete set of M-values and they are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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level. Therefore, although we detect price barriers at the 0-level, we do not 
observe the existence of barrier bands at such level.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results for level 1. In this case, we have chosen 
to analyse the five multiples of the five most repeated M-values. The 𝛽 
coefficients are again positive and significant at the 1% level in the strict barriers. 
However, unlike what happens at level 0, if we choose wider ranges, the 
coefficients are in general positive and significant at the 1% level. For example, 
EUA prices are traded 0.8949% more than expected at the M-value 70 (= €7) but 
they are also traded with a frequency more than expected at intervals of +/-1 and 
+/-3 M-values around the barrier level of €7. 
These findings indicate that price barriers are observed in EUA prices with a 
second decimal ending in 0 and for round EUA prices such as €7, €8, €13, €14.5, 
and €15, among others. In these last prices, the existence of a barrier band in the 
proximity of the target level has also been detected.  
As we have mentioned, one of the possible explanations for the existence of 
psychological barriers relates the key prices to the option exercise prices, which 
are usually round numbers. For this reason, we have calculated the percentage 
of the number of options traded for each strike price with delivery in December 
2012. Despite the fact that minimum strike price increments can be €0.01, all the 
options are traded with rounded exercise prices. In Figure 4, we observe peaks 
in exercise prices such as €12, €14, €15, €18, €20 and €27. Note that this range 
of prices overlaps with the potential barriers obtained from the analysis in Table 
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2, and consequently, option exercise prices could help to explain why EUA 
psychological barriers exist.19 
4. Effects of target levels  
4.1. Returns and volatility tests 
In this section we study if EUA returns and volatility are affected by the proximity 
of key levels. Firstly, we analyse if there is statistically different behaviour in terms 
of returns and volatility on those days when a potential barrier has been touched 
at any time during the trading session. We compute the returns as the natural 
logarithm of the quotient among the settlement prices of the EUA front contract: 
𝑟𝑡 = log (Pt) − log (𝑃𝑡−1) 
and the intraday volatility has been calculated following the measure proposed 
by Parkinson (1980): 
𝜎𝑡 = √
1
4𝑙𝑜𝑔2
(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑡)2 
where 𝐻𝑡 is the highest and 𝐿𝑡 are the lowest traded prices on day t. 
Specifically, we perform the Wilcoxon’s rank test to compare the median of the 
returns and volatility on those days on which a barrier or barrier band has been 
crossed with the medians of those days on which a barrier has not been crossed. 
In our case, we assume as the alternative hypothesis that the return and intraday 
volatility of these days on which a barrier has been reached is greater than on 
those days on which it has not. Table 3 shows the Wilcoxon’s rank test between 
                                                          
19 All the information about the characteristics of the EUA futures options contract are listed in 
https://www.theice.com/products/196/EUA-Futures-Options. (last accessed on April 27, 2015). 
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the medians of the returns. Both Panels A and B offer similar results. We cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of equality in medians in both panels. Therefore, there 
is no evidence of an effect of crossing barriers or barrier bands on returns either 
at level 0 or at level 1.  
Table 4 shows the results for the one-sided Wilcoxon’s rank test. Now, we are 
comparing the median of the intraday volatility on days where a barrier or a barrier 
band have been touched with those which not. We reject the null in favour of a 
higher intraday volatility on days on which barriers or barrier bands have been 
touched in 24/30 (= 80%) of the cases. The results of the two-sided Wilcoxon’s 
rank test for intraday volatilities, not reported in the paper, show the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of equality of the medians in 29/30 (= 96.66%) of the cases. 
Therefore, daily returns are not affected when transaction prices are in the vicinity 
of key prices but intraday volatility is abnormally high or low on these days. 
4.2. Effects on returns and volatility conditioned to market trends.  
Cyree et al. (1999) show that the behaviour of returns and volatility could be 
different in the proximity of target levels depending on the market trends before 
and after the barrier level or the barrier band has been touched. Therefore, 
following them, we adapt a dummy analysis to assess the influence of EUA 
barriers in four different scenarios. Specifically, we split the market trend in a 
bullish or a bearish market, and we analyse the impact on returns and volatility 
before and after the barrier is touched. Following the suggestions from the carbon 
traders, we consider that the carbon market has an upward (downward) 
movement if the accumulated return of the 3 days prior to the day the barrier is 
touched is positive (negative).  
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The rationale is to separate indicator variables for the pre-crossing and post-
crossing sub-periods, and upward or downward moves. Specifically, UB (Upward 
Before) is a dummy that takes value 1 for the three days prior to an upward 
movement through a barrier and 0 otherwise; UA (Upward After) is a dummy that 
takes value 1 for the three following days after the price crosses a barrier in an 
upward movement, and 0 otherwise; DB (Downward Before) is a dummy that 
takes value 1 for the three previous days before a downward movement through 
a barrier and 0 otherwise; and DA (Downward After) is a dummy that takes value 
1 for the three days following the price passing a barrier in a downward 
movement, and 0 otherwise. 
Firstly, the analysis is focused only on those days on which a key level has been 
touched. Then, we compare the 3-day return for the sub-periods before and after, 
in order to check the behaviour of the conditional mean when EUA prices are in 
the proximity of potential barriers. For example, if we observe negative or zero 
returns after a significant upward movement, the key level could be considered 
as a resistance level. 
Secondly, we have also analysed the impact on the daily volatility. According to 
the methodology employed by Cyree et al. (1999), we have run a joint analysis 
of returns and volatilities at the same time.20 For this purpose, we will estimate 
an ARMA-GARCH model. We have chosen to employ an EGARCH (1,1). This 
parameterization has also been used by another authors, like Medina and Pardo 
                                                          
20 As Cyree et al. [1999] points out, the distributional shifts implied by psychological barriers invalidate the basic 
assumption of OLS. 
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(2013) and Chen, Wang and Wu (2013), who chose this model as the most 
appropriate in the EUA case.  
More precisely, the EGARCH(1,1) model employed to estimate the effect of key 
levels on return and volatility is composed of two equations. The first one is the 
return estimation, where the EUA return, calculated as in the previous section, is 
regressed on the four dummy variables UB, DB, UA, DA described above, and 
the error term follows a normal distribution with zero mean and variance 𝑉𝑡: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑈𝐵𝑈𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝐵𝐷𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝐴𝑈𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝐴𝐷𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  
The variance, 𝑉𝑡, follows a process described below that also includes the four 
dummy variables in order to analyse if psychological barriers affect EUA volatility: 
 
 
where 𝜃(|𝜖𝑡−1| − √2/𝜋) + 𝜙1𝜖𝑡−1 is the conditional variance. 
Table 5 shows the effects of psychological barriers when we estimate returns and 
volatility together. As we can see in Panel A of Table 5 for the level 0, all the 3-
day returns for the sub-period before the touch of the barrier are significantly 
different from zero, being positive the upward movements (UB) and negative the 
downward ones (DB). The 3-day returns for the sub-period after are not 
significantly different from zero in 27 out of 30 cases analysed. Only three 
(Upward After) scenarios are significantly negative at the 1% level. Therefore, the 
prices after touching a barrier remain around it or rebound in the opposite 
direction. Regarding volatility, the results presented in Panel A show that volatility 
is greater before touching the barrier and lower after touching it for all the cases 
𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑡
2 = 𝛿 + 𝜃(|𝜖𝑡−1| − √2/𝜋) + 𝜙1𝜖𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑡−1
2 + 𝜙𝑈𝐵𝑈𝐵𝑡
+ 𝜙𝐷𝐵𝐷𝐵𝑡 + 𝜙𝑈𝐴𝑈𝐴𝑡 + 𝜙𝐷𝐴𝐷𝐴𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 
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at the 1% of significance level.21 The strong evidence of changes in the 
conditional variances of returns observed in the vicinity of EUA price barriers, 
especially in downward movements, is in line with the findings obtained by 
Aggarwal and Lucey (2007) for the gold market and can be explained by the 
greater uncertainty about the evolution of the quotation before the prices touch a 
barrier. 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results for the joint estimation of returns and daily 
volatility for the level 1. We observe, as in the previous case, that all the 3-day 
returns for the sub-periods before the touch of the barrier are significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. However, after touching the barrier the findings are not 
conclusive. In some bullish scenarios the prices continue increasing after 
breaking the barrier (X3.0X) while in others the prices remain around the barrier 
(X8.0X) or go in the opposite direction (X4.5X). This miscellany of results is also 
observed for the conditional volatility. 
4.3. Effects on trading-related variables conditioned to market trends.  
The last contribution regarding the study of the effects of barriers is based on an 
analysis of how daily volume and open interest are affected by the proximity of 
key levels. The daily trading volume accounts for the amount of trading activity 
that has taken place in a specific contract on a trading date. On the contrary, the 
daily open interest indicates the number of outstanding contracts at the end of a 
trading day. Following Lucia and Pardo (2010), there is a convention in financial 
literature that the daily trading volume primarily proxies movements in speculative 
                                                          
21 Following Aggarwal and Lucey (2007) and Cyree et al. (1999), we have applied a chi-squared test to the coefficients of 
the variance equation in order to test if there is no difference in the conditional variances before and after an upward or 
downward touching. We reject the null in both cases confirming a decrease in the levels of conditional volatility in both 
scenarios in all the prices. For the sake of space, these results are not presented in the paper but are available upon 
request. 
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activity, whereas the daily open interest variable captures hedging activities in 
derivatives markets, since open interest excludes by definition intraday traders.  
To look into the effects of price barriers on speculative and hedging activities, we 
have regressed the four dummy variables UB, DB, AB and AD against the 
logarithm of the volume, obtaining the following expression: 
log (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑈𝐵𝑈𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝐵𝐷𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝐴𝑈𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝐴𝐷𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  
where 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 is the total trading volume at day t. 
Results are shown in Table 6. Panel A shows the effects of key prices in volume 
for level 0. We observe that when the market is in an upward movement, the 
volume decreases in all the cases. In a bearish scenario, only prices XX.50 and 
XX.70 show a decrease in the volume before reaching the barrier. Panel B 
presents the results for the effects of psychological prices in volume for level 1. 
In this case, we do not find any common pattern in any scenario. The effect of 
observing low trading volumes when the price is near a barrier in a bullish market 
could be explained by the argument that speculators do not believe that the trend 
will last much longer. As a consequence, they decide to wait and postpone their 
trading activity.22 
Finally, we have performed a similar analysis taking into account the daily open 
interest. We have not observed any significant change in the levels of the open 
interest before or after crossing the key prices, neither in upward nor in downward 
                                                          
22 In order to test if the global financial crisis affected return and/or volume dynamics, we have repeated the estimations 
of equations (5), (6) and (7) only for the period that goes from 3 March 2008 to 31 March 2009. Given that the results are 
qualitatively similar to those presented in the paper for the whole sample, we have decided not to include them but they 
are available upon request. 
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movements. Therefore, we hypothesize that hedgers are not affected by the 
presence of barriers in EUA prices.23 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigates the existence of psychological prices in the ICE ECX 
futures market taking into account intraday transaction data. Preliminary tests 
show the presence of key levels and barrier bands in EUA futures prices with a 
second decimal ending in 0 and for round EUA prices such as 7, 8, 13, 14.5, and 
15, among others. Both price clustering and rounded exercise prices in EUA 
options give support to the existence of these key prices.  
We have observed that once the price has touched a key level, EUA prices 
remain around it or rebound in the opposite direction. Our analysis also shows 
that intraday volatility is greater before a barrier has been reached and decreases 
after touching it. Regarding trading volume, we observe that it decreases in 
upward movements around barriers. Therefore, EUA return and volume 
dynamics are affected by the existence of price barriers at round prices ending in 
zero. 
In summary, the proximity to a barrier contains information about the magnitude 
of the deviation of return and volatility from their expected values. Both results 
are difficult to reconcile with the weak-form of the efficient market theory. The use 
of this information can help carbon traders to make better decisions in the way 
they manage their trading activity. For example, if we are in a bullish scenario 
and traders know that EUA returns increase when the quotations are near the 
                                                          
23 These results are not included for the sake of brevity, but they are available upon request. 
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barrier, they could increase their trading activity by buying EUAs before the 
barrier is reached and selling them once the barrier has been touched. 
Furthermore, if an EUA option trader knows that the volatility is higher before the 
EUA price reaches the key level and lower after it, she could develop a strategy 
based on selling EUA options before the price touches the key level and buying 
them after it. 
All in all, we have shown that in a market as complex as the carbon market, in 
which the predominant role is that of professional traders, there exist certain price 
levels that modify the behaviour of the market participants. Our results are in line 
with those obtained by Menkhoff (2010) who shows that equity and bonds fund 
managers, who are viewed as highly qualified market participants, tend to use 
technical analysis, especially in the short term. 
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Annex: tables and figures  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Price Volume 
Mean 13.02 7.04 
Std. Deviation 4.75 15.48 
Min 5.61 1.00 
Max 29.69 1,682.00 
Mode 15.25 1.00 
Q1 6.01 1.00 
Median 6.15 3.00 
Q3 6.24 3.00 
Skewness 0.79 15.90 
Kurtosis 3.69 629.02 
Note: The table shows some descriptive statistics for the series of prices and trading volume for 
the period 18 December 2007 to 17 December 2012. The statistics reported for both distributions 
are the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum, the most repeated price/size, 
the median of the distribution, the first quartile (Q1), the third quartile (Q3), and the coefficients 
that measure the skewness and the kurtosis of the distributions.  
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Table 2. Barrier Proximity Test 
Panel A. Level 0 
   XX.00 XX.50 XX.70 XX.80 XX.90 
𝛼 
Strict -0.0099 -0.0087 -0.0083 -0.0088 -0.0095 
+/-1 -0.0059 -0.0030 -0.0056 -0.0050 -0.0057 
+/-3 0.0023 0.0081 -0.0012 0.0011 -0.0005 
       
𝛽 
Strict 0.9930*** 0.8729*** 0.8291*** 0.8842*** 0.9454*** 
+/-1 0.1982 0.0996 0.1855* 0.1670 0.1916 
+/-3 -0.0330 -0.1157 0.0172 -0.0157 0.0076 
 
      
R2 
Strict 7.0572 5.4531 4.9201 5.5960 6.3966 
+/-1 0.8267 0.2088 0.7237 0.5870 0.7725 
+/-3 0.0511 0.6305 0.0139 0.0115 0.0027 
 
Panel B. Level 1 
   X3.0X X4.5X X5.0X X7.0X X8.0X 
𝛼 
Strict -0.0085 -0.0084 -0.0078 -0.0110 -0.0059 
+/-1 -0.0206 -0.0215 -0.0216 -0.0293 -0.0203 
+/-3 -0.0414 -0.0466 -0.0526 -0.0652 -0.0349 
       
𝛽 
Strict 0.6444*** 0.6353*** 0.5734*** 0.8949*** 0.3819*** 
+/-1 0.6175*** 0.6482*** 0.6523*** 0.9084*** 0.6061*** 
+/-3 0.5621*** 0.6368*** 0.7224*** 0.9018*** 0.4695*** 
 
      
R2 
Strict 1.4466 1.4059 1.1455 2.7900 0.5081 
+/-1 3.9042 4.3030 4.3565 8.4504 3.7612 
+/-3 7.2392 9.2911 11.9538 18.6320 5.0508 
Note: Panel A (B) shows the results expressed in percentages for the Barrier Proximity Test for 
Level 0 (1) at strict prices and for two different barrier bands. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. R2 adjusted is expressed in percentage. 
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Table 3. Wilcoxon’s rank test between medians of returns 
Panel A. Level 0 
  XX.00 XX.50 XX.70 XX.80 XX.90 
Strict 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 -0.0022/0.0004 -0.0013/0.0000 0.0004/0.0000 -0.0019/0.0007 -0.0020/0.0007 
# Obs 603 584 589 600 627 
Value 1.2428 0.4479 0.8535 1.3051 1.3666 
+/-1 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 -0.0019/0.0000 -0.0009/0.0000 -0.0004/0.0000 -0.0013/0.0846 -0.0020/0.0007 
# Obs 634 603 615 633 652 
Value 1.2745 0.1806 0.6448 1.0341 1.4167 
+/-3 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 -0.0013/0.0000 -0.0007/0.000 0.0012/0.0000 -0.0014/0.0007 -0.0013/0.0000 
# Obs 666 653 661 686 702 
Value 0.9802 0.0349 1.0674 1.4188 0.9444 
 
Panel B. Level 1 
  X3.0X X4.5X X5.0X X7.0X X8.0X 
Strict 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 0.0004/0.0000 0.0000/0.0000 -0.0002/0.0000 -0.0022/0.0000 -0.0018/0.0000 
# Obs 124 140 120 104 85 
Value 0.2764 0.0095 0.3049 0.5130 0.5963 
+/-1 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 0.0012/0.0000 0.0000/0.0000 0.0000/0.0000 0.0000/0.0000 -0.0013/0.0000 
# Obs 160 195 168 147 114 
Value 0.9290 0.1601 0.4411 0.0634 0.5108 
+/-3 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 0.0015/-0.0006 0.0000/0.0000 0.0007/-0.0010 0.0014/0.0000 -0.0013/0.0000 
# Obs 222 273 261 210 154 
Value 0.9236 0.1828 0.5301 0.3610 0.7994 
Note: The table shows the Wilcoxon’s rank test between the median of returns on days where a 
barrier or barrier band has been touched and those where it has not. The null hypothesis tests 
the equality in medians against the alternative hypothesis that tests if the median on days on 
which a barrier has been reached is greater than the median on those days on which it has not. 
Panel A (B) shows the results for the psychological barriers considered in level 0 (1). The test has 
been performed for the strict barrier and +/-1 and +/-3 M-values above and below the strict barrier. 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 indicates the median of returns of days when a barrier has been touched and the median 
of returns of days when a barrier has not been touched, respectively. # Obs is the number of days 
on which a barrier or barrier band has been reached and Value is the Wilcoxon’s rank test statistic. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Wilcoxon’s rank test between medians of intraday volatility 
Panel A. Level 0 
  XX.00 XX.50 XX.70 XX.80 XX.90 
Strict 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 0.0168,0.0109 0.0146,0.0111 0.0166,0.0112 0.0170,0.0110 0.0167,0.0107 
Value 13.5076*** 9.1853*** 11.4879*** 12.5605*** 13.2362*** 
+/-1 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 0.0166,0.0108 0.0163,0.0111 0.0165,0.0111 0.0167,0.0110 0.0167,0.0106 
Value 13.5202*** 11.1988*** 11.4845*** 12.3878*** 13.8184*** 
+/-3 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 0.1165,0.0464 0.1165,0.0450 0.0163,0.0109 0.0163,0.0107 0.0165,0.0105 
Value 13.742*** 10.3826*** 11.7115*** 12.4374*** 13.7035*** 
 
Panel B. Level 1  
  X3.0X X4.5X X5.0X X7.0X X8.0X 
Strict 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 0.0151,0.0131 0.0115,0.0135 0.0113,0.0134 0.0179,0.0129 0.0217,0.0128 
Value 2.2838** 2.5448 2.9226 3.9048*** 7.2407*** 
+/-1 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 0.0138,0.0132 0.0110,0.0137 0.0106,0.0136 0.0165,0.0129 0.0187,0.0127 
Value 1.4599* 4.6123 4.721 3.8744*** 7.5086*** 
+/-3 
𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 0.0140,0.0131 0.0108,0.0138 0.0101,0.0139 0.0161,0.0128 0.0180,0.0125 
Value 2.246** 6.5761 7.2413 3.7664*** 8.0100*** 
 
Note: The table shows the Wilcoxon’s rank test statistic between the median of the intraday 
volatility on days where a barrier or barrier band have been touched and those where it has not. 
The null hypothesis tests the equality in the intraday volatility against the alternative hypothesis 
that tests if the median on days on which a barrier has been reached is greater than the median 
on those days on which it has not. Panel A (B) shows the results for the psychological barriers 
considered in level 0 (1). The test has been performed for the strict barrier and +/-1 and +/-3 M-
values above and below the strict barrier. 𝑀𝑏/𝑀𝑛𝑏 indicates the median of intraday volatility of 
days when a barrier has been touched and the median of intraday volatility of days when a barrier 
has not been touched, respectively, and Value is the Wilcoxon’s rank test statistic. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Returns and variance behaviour on days with psychological prices 
Panel A. Level 0 
    XX.00 XX.50 XX.70 XX.80 XX.90 
  
𝛽𝑈𝐵 
 
Strict 0.0106*** 0.0132*** 0.0117*** 0.0104*** 0.0120*** 
+/-1 0.0102*** 0.0128*** 0.0117*** 0.0114*** 0.0125*** 
+/-3 0.0112*** 0.0122*** 0.0117*** 0.0118*** 0.0123*** 
 
      
𝛽𝐷𝐵 
 
Strict -0.0121*** -0.0110*** -0.0122*** -0.0129*** -0.0128*** 
+/-1 -0.0123*** -0.0112*** -0.0121*** -0.0130*** -0.0127*** 
+/-3 -0.0115*** -0.0116*** -0.0118*** -0.0130*** -0.0122*** 
 
      
𝛽𝑈𝐴 
 
Strict -0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0019* -0.0002 
+/-1 -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0021* -0.0006 
+/-3 0.0000 -0.0023** -0.0017 -0.0016 0.0001 
       
𝛽𝐷𝐴 
 
Strict -0.0010 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0008 
+/-1 -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0011 
+/-3 -0.0012 -0.0013 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0011 
 
      
𝜙𝑈𝐵 
Strict 0.1546*** 0.0642*** 0.0827*** 0.1124*** 0.1370*** 
+/-1 0.1376*** 0.0810*** 0.0723*** 0.0946*** 0.1323*** 
+/-3 0.1362*** 0.0841*** 0.0724*** 0.0889*** 0.1279*** 
 
      
𝜙𝐷𝐵 
Strict 0.2898*** 0.2405*** 0.2112*** 0.2677*** 0.2642*** 
+/-1 0.2718*** 0.2557*** 0.1955*** 0.2498*** 0.2568*** 
+/-3 0.2826*** 0.2471*** 0.1995*** 0.2348*** 0.2621*** 
 
      
𝜙𝑈𝐴 
Strict -0.1760*** -0.1040*** -0.1087*** -0.1248*** -0.1585*** 
+/-1 -0.1559*** -0.1227*** -0.0918*** -0.1137*** -0.1550*** 
+/-3 -0.1556*** -0.1268*** -0.0906*** -0.1090*** -0.1527*** 
 
      
𝜙𝐷𝐴 
Strict -0.2440*** -0.2003*** -0.1537*** -0.2237*** -0.2204*** 
+/-1 -0.2098*** -0.2118*** -0.1276*** -0.2035*** -0.2124*** 
+/-3 -0.2408*** -0.1984*** -0.1202*** -0.1927*** -0.2265*** 
 
      
R2 adjusted 
Strict 17.7286 18.2035 19.2460 18.5994 19.7592 
+/-1 17.6368 18.1999 19.5418 19.4636 20.2197 
+/-3 18.3416 19.0902 19.7489 20.3937 21.0073 
 
 
 
  
 117 
Panel B. Level 1 
    X3.0X X4.5X X5.0X X7.0X X8.0X 
  
𝛽𝑈𝐵 
 
Strict 0.0116*** 0.0111*** 0.0093*** 0.0096*** 0.0153*** 
+/-1 0.0106*** 0.0120*** 0.0106*** 0.0116*** 0.0156*** 
+/-3 0.0125*** 0.0129*** 0.0126*** 0.0129*** 0.0167*** 
 
      
𝛽𝐷𝐵 
 
Strict -0.0127*** -0.0062*** -0.0048****** -0.0089*** -0.0185*** 
+/-1 -0.0154*** -0.0084*** -0.006*** -0.0114*** -0.0186*** 
+/-3 -0.0159*** -0.0097*** -0.0079*** -0.0110*** -0.0134*** 
 
      
𝛽𝐴𝐵 
 
Strict -0.0003 -0.0042** -0.0032** -0.0005 -0.0023 
+/-1 0.0036** -0.0026* -0.0016 0.0001 -0.0024 
+/-3 0.0040** -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0043 
       
𝛽𝐷𝐵 
 
Strict 0.0000 -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0004 0.0018 
+/-1 0.0019 -0.0012 -0.003** 0.0001 0.0037 
+/-3 0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0036* 0.0001 -0.0040 
 
      
𝜙𝑈𝐵 
Strict -0.1847*** -0.1738*** -0.1388*** -0.0240 0.0782 
+/-1 -0.2057*** -0.1599*** -0.1579*** -0.0835* 0.0401 
+/-3 -0.2160*** -0.1733*** -0.2146*** -0.0369 0.0436 
 
      
𝜙𝐷𝐵 
Strict 0.0938** 0.0926* 0.0713 0.1958*** -0.1392* 
+/-1 0.0514 0.0200 -0.0245 0.1119** -0.1158 
+/-3 0.0465 0.0481 0.0385 0.0354 0.0338 
 
      
𝜙𝑈𝐴 
Strict 0.0810 0.1228*** 0.0210 -0.0917* -0.0457 
+/-1 0.0762 0.1069*** 0.0183 -0.0371 0.0160 
+/-3 0.1289** 0.1061*** 0.0879** 0.0204 -0.0666 
 
      
𝜙𝐷𝐴 
Strict -0.0286 -0.1209** -0.0603 -0.0709 0.2777*** 
+/-1 0.0310 -0.0391 0.0512 -0.0053 0.2078*** 
+/-3 0.0033 -0.0582 -0.0015 -0.0210 0.1276** 
 
      
R2 adjusted 
Strict 2.7595 2.5408 1.6195 2.9609 4.1711 
+/-1 3.5425 3.1922 2.5991 3.8686 4.7150 
+/-3 5.2138 3.7977 3.9544 5.1054 5.5462 
Note: The table shows the impact on returns and variance before and after a psychological price 
when prices are in a bullish or bearish market. UB is a dummy variable which takes value 1 during 
the 3 days before a psychological price is touched if the market is bullish and 0 otherwise, DB will 
take value 1 during the 3 days before reaching the psychological price if the market is bearish 
and 0 otherwise, UA will take value 1 during the 3 days after reaching a psychological price if the 
market before the price touches the barrier has been bullish and 0 otherwise, and DA will be equal 
to 1 during the 3 days if the market before the price touches the barrier has been bearish. In Panel 
A are shown the results for Level 0 and in Panel B we can find the results for Level 1. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. R2 adjusted is expressed in percentage.  
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Table 6. Volume behaviour on days with psychological prices 
Panel A. Level 0 
    XX.00 XX.50 XX.70 XX.80 XX.90 
𝛽𝑈𝐵 
 
Strict -0.1423** -0.2570*** -0.2168*** -0.1505** -0.1356** 
+/-1 -0.1365** -0.2571*** -0.2164*** -0.1779*** -0.1204* 
+/-3 -0.1210* -0.2711*** -0.2173* -0.1421** -0.1175* 
 
      
𝛽𝐷𝐵 
 
Strict -0.1024 -0.1954*** -0.1657*** -0.0663 -0.0780 
+/-1 -0.0903 -0.2325*** -0.1947*** -0.0585 -0.0731 
+/-3 -0.0898 -0.2307*** -0.1920*** -0.0681 -0.0887 
 
      
𝛽𝑈𝐴 
 
Strict -0.1370* -0.2277*** -0.2263*** -0.1651** -0.1564** 
+/-1 -0.1421* -0.2071*** -0.2241*** -0.1817** -0.1429** 
+/-3 -0.1361* -0.2091*** -0.2158*** -0.1444** -0.1254* 
       
𝛽𝐷𝐴 
 
Strict -0.0065 -0.0657 -0.0226 0.0155 -0.0002 
+/-1 0.0085 -0.0701 -0.0283 0.0326 0.0076 
+/-3 0.0061 -0.0792 -0.0404 0.0431 0.0248 
 
      
R2 adjusted 
Strict 1.7459 6.5807 4.5411 2.0045 1.7819 
+/-1 1.6863 6.7542 4.9037 2.7935 1.3955 
+/-3 1.4451 6.6482 4.8524 1.8057 1.2436 
 
Panel B. Level 1 
    X3.0X X4.5X X5.0X X7.0X X8.0X 
𝛽𝑈𝐵 
 
Strict -0.1021 -0.238** -0.2141* 0.1388 0.2665* 
+/-1 -0.1045 -0.1365 -0.2284** 0.1606 0.2107 
+/-3 -0.1470 -0.1796* -0.1928* 0.0628 0.2400* 
 
      
𝛽𝐷𝐵 
 
Strict -0.1009 -0.2398** -0.0261 0.1589 0.0736 
+/-1 -0.0863 -0.2634*** -0.0513 0.1908 0.0892 
+/-3 -0.0916 -0.1793** -0.1921 0.1838 -0.0135 
 
      
𝛽𝑈𝐴 
 
Strict -0.0961 -0.1548 -0.2100 0.1289 0.0998 
+/-1 -0.0163 -0.0464 -0.1565 0.0963 0.1114 
+/-3 -0.0598 -0.1107 -0.1316 0.1214 0.1728 
       
𝛽𝐷𝐴 
 
Strict 0.0116 -0.0686 -0.0155 0.2817*** 0.1011 
+/-1 0.0224 -0.1173 0.0344 0.2210** 0.1959 
+/-3 0.0638 -0.0530 0.0606 0.2165** 0.2104 
 
      
R2 adjusted 
Strict 0.3277 3.5593 1.6724 3.0186 1.5128 
+/-1 0.1107 3.5256 1.8194 3.6445 2.4741 
+/-3 0.5923 3.7453 3.3256 3.9908 3.3041 
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Note: The table shows the impact on volume before and after a psychological price when prices 
are in a bullish or bearish market. UB is a dummy variable which takes value 1 during the 3 days 
before a psychological price is touched if the market is bullish and 0 otherwise, DB will take value 
1 during the 3 days before reaching the psychological price if the market is bearish and 0 
otherwise, UA will take value 1 during the 3 days after reaching a psychological price if the market 
before the price touches the barrier has been bullish and 0 otherwise, and DA will be equal to 1 
during the 3 days if the market before the price touches the barrier has been bearish. In Panel A 
are shown the results for Level 0 and in Panel B we can find the results for Level 1. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. R2 adjusted is expressed in percentage.  
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Figure 1. Evolution of the price of the EUA December futures contracts 
Note: Figure 1 draws the historical evolution of the price of the EUA ECX December futures 
contracts in Phase II from 18 December 2007 to 17 December 2012. The sample used contains 
intraday prices and all the December maturities of Phase II are included to build the continuous 
front contract series.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of the M values 
Figure 2a. Distribution of the M values at level 0 
 
Figure 2b. Distribution of the M values at level 1 
Note: Figure 2a shows the empirical distribution of the M-values at level 0, which is the decimal 
part of the price. Figure 2b shows the empirical distribution of the M-values at level 1, which 
considers the pair of the unit and the first decimal of the price.  
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Figure 3. Example of barrier bands around a barrier level 
 
Note: Figure 3 shows a graphical example of the three regions in which we can consider that the 
price can be a psychological barrier. The three ranges are if the price is exactly the barrier (strict), 
and +/-1 and +/-3 M-values around the barrier level. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of the futures options 
Figure 4a. Distribution of the futures options by trades 
 
Figure 4b. Distribution of the futures options by volume 
Note: Figure 4a shows the empirical distribution of the futures options by number of trades at 
each strike price. Figure 4b shows the empirical distribution of the futures options by the total 
volume traded at each strike price. 
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DO CARBON TRADERS BEHAVE AS 
A HERD? 
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1. Introduction 
In a general sense, herding can be defined as the act of placing together 
individual animals into a group with the intention of guiding them from place to 
place. Although herding is commonly used to describe animal behavior, we can 
also find herding behavior in humans that affects the decision-making process in 
fields like finance. Herding in finance is interpreted as the tendency of investors 
to mimic the actions of other investors. Specifically, Avery and Zemsky (1998) 
define herding in financial markets as a switch in the opinion of traders to the 
direction of the crowd. According to Spyrou (2013), market participants may infer 
information from the actions of previous participants and investors may react to 
the arrival of fundamental information. Therefore, someone in the market who 
knew about the existence of the herding effect and started to see early signs of a 
herding process occurring might place orders to take advantage of the effect and 
to better place his orders on the expectation that the trend was going to continue, 
with the aim of closing his positions before the current run ended. 
In the literature on herding, we find two views of the phenomenon: irrational or 
rational.24 The first one, also known as intentional herding, is mainly focused on 
psychology where people follow one another with the intention of copying the 
same decisions. This type of behavior can destabilize the market due to massive 
buys or sells increasing volatility and contributing to bubbles or financial crashes. 
The second view of herding is the rational or spurious herding that happens when 
investors react at the same time to certain market conditions or to the arrival of 
information. Devenow and Welch (1996) identify three causes for the existence 
                                                          
24 See Devenow and Welch (1996), Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001), Spyrou (2013), and Galariotis, Rong and Spyrou 
(2015), among others, for comprehensive reviews of the financial literature on herding. 
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of rational herding: The first one makes reference to payoff externalities, in the 
sense that investors decide to imitate decisions taken by other agents in order to 
ensure their remuneration. The second one points to principal-agent problems 
where agents decide to follow or lead the herd due to reputational conditions. 
Finally, the third reason for the existence of rational herding is based on the 
existence of information cascades. The idea is that agents obtain useful 
information by observing the decisions of previous agents, to the point that they 
decide to refuse to use their own information on the belief that there are some 
other investors that are better informed, and they decide to act similarly. This last 
explanation is the most popular among researchers. In fact, Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Welch (1992) show that following the decisions 
of other investors can be optimal because these previous agents have better 
information and, as a consequence, followers reject their private information. 
Galariotis, Rong and Spyrou (2015) make an empirical literature review about the 
studies related to the herding effect and classify the studies into two categories 
that deal with the empirical tools employed to examine herd behavior in financial 
markets. The first group is composed of those methodologies that aim to detect 
institutional investor and analyst herding using micro-data, while the second 
group of methodologies investigates herding towards the market average and 
relies on aggregate market data. Kodres and Pritsker (1996), unlike the two 
categories of empirical works that are based on equity markets, examine whether 
large institutions herd in financial futures markets. They detect statistically 
significant herding among some classes of institutions in several futures contracts 
using daily position data. Specifically, their data consist of positions reported by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as part of the large trader reporting 
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system in which those market participants with a closing position at the end of 
the trading session above the threshold established for each futures contract 
must report their position.  
Although we are not aware of any studies about herding in the European Carbon 
Market, there are several papers that have studied other behavioural aspects of 
this market. Palao and Pardo (2012, 2014) observed that carbon traders tend to 
concentrate their orders in transaction prices ending in 0 and 5 and in sizes of 1 
to 5 contracts and in multiples of 5. Furthermore, they demonstrate that more 
clustered prices have more clustered sizes. Crossland, Li and Roca (2013) study 
momentum investment strategies in the European Carbon Market. These 
strategies are based on buying those assets that in the past have been winners 
and selling those that in the past have been losers. They detect short-term 
momentum and medium-term overreaction strategies that remain achievable 
after taking into account transaction costs. Chau, Kuo and Shi (2015) analyze 
whether carbon traders buy (sell) after a price rise and sell (buy) after a price fall. 
They do not find any significant feedback trading in emissions markets and their 
explanation is that the vast majority of investors in the carbon market are 
institutions that are less susceptible to behaviorally biased trading than retail 
investors. Finally, Palao and Pardo (2017) detect the existence of psychological 
prices that act as resistance or support levels in the EUA price and show that 
intraday volatility is greater before a barrier has been reached and decreases 
after touching it. 
This chapter follows the line of research of Kodres and Pritsker (1996) and adds 
new evidence to the scarce literature on herding in futures markets. Specifically, 
we study the existence of herding behavior in the European Futures Carbon 
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Market by using an intraday trade database that allows us to study herding trends 
at high frequencies while distinguishing, at the same time, if the trade that 
provokes the run is buyer or seller initiated.  
The European Futures Carbon Market is characterized by being highly dominated 
by professional market participants with presumably extensive financial training 
and, as a consequence, it is supposed that psychological influences on their 
trading strategies should play a limited role. In fact, Patterson and Sharma (2005, 
2007) argue that the reason why many previous studies in the literature on 
herding do not find any effect is due to the analyses only focusing on the behavior 
of professional traders or institutional investors. Furthermore, given that this 
market is blind, the trading positions are not made available to other market 
participants, and this fact should make the likelihood of finding herding behavior 
even more difficult.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes briefly 
the European Carbon Market and the data used to perform this study. Section 3 
applies the theory of runs to test the existence of the herding effect. Section 4 
measures the herding effect and detects some herding patterns. Section 5, based 
on previous empirical papers on herding, investigates possible market drivers 
that can affect herding formation and, additionally, analyzes if herding 
destabilizes the carbon market. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Market and data description 
The European Commission launched in 2005 the European Union Emission 
Trading System (EU ETS). The aim of the scheme created under the Directive 
2003/87/EC was to establish a multinational system, now formed by the 28 
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member countries and the three countries of the European Economic Area (EEA), 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, which cover around 45% of the Greenhouse 
Gases (GHGs) emitted by the countries included in the system. The EU ETS, 
with more than 12,000 installations covered by the scheme, is the world’s largest 
emissions market in terms of installations covered and volume traded. 
The EU ETS is a cap and trade system, where the limit of GHGs that can be 
emitted is fixed. This limit is reduced each year for the purpose of achieving the 
objective of emitting 21% less GHGs in 2020 than in 2005, which means a 
reduction of 1.74% per year. Installations participating in the EU ETS must 
monitor and report their emissions for each calendar year, and by 30 April of the 
following year each company must surrender enough allowances (known as 
European Union Allowances, or EUAs) to cover all its emissions. Otherwise, they 
will suffer a non-compliance penalty and heavy fines will be imposed.  
The EU ETS is organized into trading periods or Phases. Phase I took place 
between 2005 and 2007 and is known as the pilot period where the main objective 
was having an emissions market fully operative when the Kyoto Protocol 
commitment started. Phase II occurred in the same period as the Kyoto Protocol 
emissions commitment which ran from 2008 to 2012. With the start of Phase II, 
a number of changes were incorporated into the program: the inclusion of 
additional GHGs, the incorporation of the three EAA states into the EU ETS, and 
the possibility of banking and borrowing.25 Phase II was characterized by the 
plummet of the price of EUAs that fell from its maximum price due to a large 
                                                          
25 Banking refers to the possibility of using allowances of the present period in the following one and borrowing is just the 
opposite, using allowances of futures periods to surrender current emissions requirements. Borrowing is allowed only in 
the same phase while banking is allowed both in the same phase and between phases. 
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surplus of allowances that can mainly be explained both by the economic crisis 
that took place during this period and the over-allocation of EUAs inherited from 
Phase I. 
Phase III goes from 2013 to 2020 and additional significant changes have been 
introduced into the scheme. From this phase on, there is one single cap for all 
the countries that take part in the EU ETS, instead of the National Allocation Plan 
(NAP) system used in the previous phases. Moreover, the grandfathering system 
is being gradually abandoned. In 2013, more than 40% of the allowances were 
auctioned. Furthermore, some new sectors, such as petrochemicals and gas, 
have been incorporated into the program. Finally, Phase IV is scheduled to run 
from 2021 to 2030. 
The European Commission is implementing several aspects to improve the 
functionality of the EU ETS. Particularly, the efforts are focused on trying to solve 
the problem of the surplus of allowances that at the start of Phase III was 
estimated at more than 2.1 billion allowances. In the short term, the Commission 
has applied so called “back-loading”, which means delaying the auctioning of 900 
million allowances until the period 2019-2020, thereby reducing the volume that 
should be auctioned during the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 by 400, 300 and 200 
million allowances, respectively. The idea is to increase the demand for credits 
during these years without affecting the total number of allowances that will be 
auctioned during Phase III. These allowances will be placed in the Market 
Stability Reserve (MSR). The MSR is a long-term measure developed by the 
European Commission which will be established in 2018 and operate from 1 
January 2019. The MSR is a rule-based mechanism through which the auction 
volumes are adjusted in an "automatic manner" under pre-defined conditions that 
 132 
reduce the amount of EUAs that are auctioned if an upper threshold of EUAs in 
circulation is exceeded, and releases them if the EUAs in circulation fall short of 
a lower threshold. 
EUAs can be traded in different platforms. For our analysis we have employed 
data from ICE Futures Europe, which is the reference market for trading carbon 
emissions in Europe. In this platform, the three most important futures contracts 
of the EU ETS are traded: EU Allowances (EUAs), EU Aviation Allowances 
(EUAAs) and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). There are contracts with 
monthly and quarterly maturities, however the benchmark of the market is the 
annual contract which expiries the last Monday of December. Therefore, we have 
chosen the ICE EUA December futures contract as the reference for the price of 
the EUA. 
Table 1 shows the evolution of the ICE EUA December futures contract in terms 
of volume of euros negotiated, number of contracts, and the average price in 
€/tonne traded each calendar year. As can be seen, in spite of the decrease in 
the EUA average price, the yearly trading volume has increased dramatically 
since Phase I. 
ICE Futures Europe operates an electronic order-driven market with market 
makers and brokers. The transactions take place on a blind broker basis, that is, 
neither the buyer nor the seller knows their counterparties. The daily session 
starts with a pre-open period of 15 minutes (from 6:45 a.m. UK local time) to 
enable market members to input orders in readiness for the beginning of trading. 
The pre-trading period finishes with a single call auction, where the opening price 
and the allocated volume are determined by an algorithm. During the continuous 
session, from 7:00 to 17:00, investors can submit limit orders, market orders, and 
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block orders. The futures market runs from 16:50:00 – 16:59:59 UK local time for 
the purpose of determining the settlement price, which is the weighted average 
during this period. The future contracts are traded in lots. Each lot equals 1,000 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent, that is, 1,000 EUAs. The minimum tick size is €0.01. 
The sample we have used goes from December 18, 2012 to December 31, 2015. 
All the maturities belong to Phase III ICE EUA December futures contracts and 
the series contain the time stamp, the price, the size and the sign of the 
transaction (buyer or seller initiated), for all the trades that took place during the 
chosen period where a total of 1,214,304 transactions were made. 
3. Runs test 
One intuitive way of analyzing the presence of herding behavior in the ICE futures 
market is to study the evolution of the sign of the EUA price changes. Whether 
herding is intentional or unintentional, we should be able to observe a succession 
of trades that form an upward or downward trend in price changes. Following 
Gibbons and Chakraborti (2003, p.76), a run is defined as a succession of one or 
more types of symbols which are followed or preceded by a different symbol or 
no symbol at all. For instance, an up (down) run is created when the price of the 
EUA futures contract increases (decreases) consecutively until the price changes 
in the opposite direction. At this point, it is important to highlight that Palao and 
Pardo (2017) show the existence of psychological barriers in the EUA prices. 
They observe that once the price has touched a key level, EUA prices remain 
around it or rebound in the opposite direction. For this reason, we have also 
studied runs that allow not only ups or downs in prices but also their repetition. 
Therefore, we have followed two dichotomization criteria. A first one that 
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separates the observations of the original sample between sequences of positive 
price changes (Up) and negative price changes (Down), and a second criterion 
that distinguishes sequences of positive price changes allowing price repetitions 
(Zero&Up) from sequences of negative price changes allowing price repetitions 
(Zero&Down). 
Next, we have performed a test for randomness that is based on the total number 
of runs (R) in an ordered sequence of n elements of two types, n1 elements of 
type 1 and n2 elements of type 2. If the null hypothesis of randomness applies, 
the distribution of the statistic will follow a normal distribution with the following 
mean and variance: 
𝜇 =
2𝑛1𝑛2
𝑛1+𝑛2
+ 1, 𝜎2 =
2𝑛1𝑛2(2𝑛1𝑛2−𝑛1−𝑛2)
(𝑛1+𝑛2)2(𝑛1+𝑛2−1)
 . 
The Z statistic is calculated as: 
𝑍 =
𝑅 + 𝑐 − 𝜇
𝜎
 
where R is the sum of the observed number of runs of type 1 and runs of type 2, 
and c is 0.5 if 𝑅 < 𝜇 and -0.5 otherwise. At this point, it is important to note that 
the null hypothesis of randomness can be rejected if the total number of runs is 
too large or too small.  
The results are shown in Table 2. Panel A shows the results where the run is 
created independently of who initiates the order that originates the sequence, 
which we have called the General Case. Panel B and C present the results taking 
into account whether the run is buyer or seller initiated, respectively. In each 
panel we include the number of observations, the number of runs for each type, 
and the statistic Z that follows a standardized normal distribution. The three 
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panels show similar results and all Z values indicate the rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 1% level. However, the lack of randomness when we compare 
sequences of positive and negative changes (Up vs Down) in all the panels is 
due to the large number of runs, while when we take into account the possibility 
of sequences with repetitions in prices (Zero&Up versus Zero&Down) the null is 
rejected because of the existence of too few runs. This is also the case when we 
study the randomness of buyer vs seller initiated runs (see the last row in Panel 
A). It is interesting to note that although there are many more observations of 
buyer initiated trades than seller initiated ones, the number of runs is quite 
similar.26 
All in all, the above findings indicate that a certain level of herding behavior is 
present in the European Futures Carbon Market.  
The reduction in the number of runs when we introduce the possibility of repetition 
of prices (see Panel A in Table 2) provokes an increase in the lengths of the runs. 
This feature can also be observed in Table 3 that shows the weighted percentage 
of occurrence of the lengths of each run per day. In each case runs are grouped 
using two scenarios: the first one, in which we have split the sample when the 
price increases, stays the same or decreases, and the second one, where we 
allow the repetition of prices. 
[Insert here Table 3] 
Panel A in Table 3 shows the results for the general case. We observe that 
sequences with a length of 1 run are the most frequent, 65% for the first scenario 
                                                          
26 This result is contrary to that observed both by Wermers (1999) and Zhou and Lai (2009) that suggest that sell-herding 
is much more frequent that buy-side herding for equity markets. 
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and 32% in the second scenario. We also observe that the cases of up and down 
are quite similar in the first scenario, representing about 60% of the total runs, in 
which successions with a length of 1 run comprise 55% and the remaining lengths 
around 5%. Alternatively, in the second scenario, when we take together zeros 
with ups and downs, we observe higher frequency in larger runs, in fact, more 
than 20% of the total sequences have a length equal to or higher than 10. 
Therefore, as we expected, when we consider runs that allow for the repetition of 
prices, the presence of herding strengthens. 
Panel B presents the results for buyer initiated runs. The upward movements are 
most frequent in the first scenario and the majority of the up runs are with a length 
of 1, representing 38%. For the whole sample, up runs make up 40% and 
downward runs only 9%. The second scenario shows a similar pattern as in Panel 
A but with an overall weight of Zero&Up runs of 64%. Finally Panel C displays 
the results for seller initiated runs. We can see just the opposite patterns to those 
detected in Panel B, with the highest frequency in downward runs (66%). 
The fact that we observe downward runs when the buyer has initiated the run or 
upward runs when the initiator of the run is the seller indicates that runs can take 
any sign independently of who has initiated the run. 
4. Herding measures and patterns 
4.1. Herding measures 
Several herding measures have been used in the literature on herding, mainly in 
equity markets. One of the most common herding measures is the so-called 
Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation, first used by Chang, Cheng and Khorana 
(2000). This measure is based on the comparison of asset returns with respect 
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to the market return. Another widely applied statistic is that proposed by 
Lakonishok, Sheifer and Vishny (1992). This measure considers herding as the 
tendency of market participants to accumulate on the same side of the market in 
a specific stock and at the same time. This measure is calculated as the 
difference between the number of investors who buy (sell) a security in a time 
frame against their theoretical values.  
The above mentioned measures have some features in common. They analyze 
the existence of herding in equity markets by employing a cross-sectional 
analysis, they require low frequency data –from daily to quarterly data– and, 
furthermore, they are able to detect herding only under extreme market 
conditions. These characteristics do not fit with our objectives. We are interesting 
in analyzing the evolution of daily herding behavior in a futures market, and under 
any market conditions, not necessarily extreme ones. For all these reasons, we 
have chosen the Herding Intensity measure proposed by Patterson and Sharma 
(2006). Following Simões Veira and Valente Pereira (2015), this method captures 
intraday order sequences, considered to offer the ideal frequency for testing the 
presence of herding behavior.  
The statistic proposed by Patterson and Sharma (2006) is based on the 
information cascades model. These cascades take place when runs from buyer 
or seller initiated transactions last longer than would be expected if market 
participants had used their own information. The expression that measures the 
Herding Intensity is: 
𝐻𝐼𝑠,𝑡 =
𝑥𝑠,𝑡
√𝜎𝑠,𝑡
2
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The statistic 𝑥𝑠,𝑡 is defined as follows: 
𝑥𝑠,𝑡 =
(𝑟𝑠,𝑡 +
1
2) − 𝑛𝑡𝑝𝑠,𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑠,𝑡)
√𝑛𝑡
 
where 𝑟𝑠,𝑡 is the number of runs of type s on day t, 𝑛𝑡 is the total number of trades 
of each day and 𝑝𝑠 is the probability of occurrence of a run of type s. Under 
asymptotic conditions, the statistic has a normal distribution with zero mean and 
variance:  
𝜎𝑠,𝑡
2 = 𝑝𝑠,𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑠,𝑡) − 3𝑝𝑠,𝑡
2 (1 − 𝑝𝑠,𝑡)
2
 
In our case, we have considered 5 different type of runs: Up, Zero, Down and 
their combinations Zero&Up and Zero&Down. If herding does exist, the statistic 
of herding intensity should take significantly negative values, since the actual 
number of runs will be lower than expected. In this way, more negative values of 
the statistic will indicate higher herding intensity.27 
4.2. Herding patterns 
The next step is to analyze the evolution of the herding measure through time. 
However, based on previous empirical findings, we have decided to take into 
account some variables with the intention of capturing some seasonality patterns 
that could affect the level of herding behavior in the European Carbon Market. 
Firstly, following Chang et al. (2000) there is evidence of higher herding levels in 
emerging markets compared to developed ones. They attribute such higher 
levels to deficiencies in information quality that create uncertainty in the emerging 
                                                          
27 This measure is applied, among others, for Blasco, Corredor and Ferreruela (2010, 2012) and Simões and Valente 
(2015) in their analysis about herding behavior in the Spanish and Portuguese stock market, respectively. 
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market. Simões Veira and Valente Pereira (2015) confirm this idea and indicate 
that almost all studies designed to detect herding behavior in developing stock 
markets and in relatively small illiquid capital markets found evidence of its 
existence. Therefore, it seems that herding is more likely to occur in less 
developed markets. To study this idea, we have included a variable Trend that 
counts the number of days of the sample. 
Secondly, we also test if the herding intensity level changes through the year. 
Analyses performed by Klein (2013) and Galariotis et al. (2015) show that herding 
varies over time with a higher intensity in periods of turmoil. Regarding the 
European Carbon Market, Lucia, Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2015) show that 
the first quarter of the year is the period with the highest level of speculation. The 
rationale is that from the end of February, when companies receive their permits 
for the current year, till mid-May, when the EU Commission releases the report 
with the verified emissions, companies that know their real emissions can develop 
some trading strategies to try to exploit information not yet revealed to the market.  
Thirdly, as we have previously mentioned, Palao and Pardo (2012) detect the 
strong presence of price clustering in the European Carbon Market at prices 
ending in digits 0 and 5. The existence of price clustering can alter the behavior 
of carbon traders, allowing traders to profit by posting orders before the quotation 
reaches a clustered price or by executing their limit orders at certain prices. Given 
that carbon traders concentrate their orders at these key prices, when the EUA 
trade prices arrive at these levels, the length of the runs will be longer than 
normal. Therefore, it is expected that more herding intensity will be observed on 
those days where the level of price clustering is abnormally higher.  
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Finally, according to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001), reactions to public 
information is considered one of the possible causes of unintentional herding. 
Therefore, we have analyzed if the arrival of new public information to the 
European Carbon Market intensifies the level of herding among carbon traders.  
All in all, to perform this analysis we deploy the following equation: 
𝐻𝐼𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡
+ 𝛽𝐶𝑁𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡 +  𝜖𝑠,𝑡 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 accounts for the number of days of the sample, 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 is 
a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the first quarter of the year and 0 
otherwise, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 is computed as the inverse of the normal cumulative 
standard frequency of prices ended in 0 or 5 for each day,28 and 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡 
is a dummy variable that that takes value 1 on days on which the European 
Commission makes public new information that affects the European Carbon 
Market and 0 otherwise.29 Finally, 𝜖𝑠,𝑡 are the residuals of equation for each type 
of run s, on day t. 
We have run the equation using three different samples: the general case that 
takes into account all the trades independently of the sign of the trade and 
another two samples which are split by the initiator of the trade – buyer or seller30. 
In these three samples we will show five s scenarios: Up, Zero, Down and the 
                                                          
28 In the study developed by Palao and Pardo (2012) the authors show that the inverse of normal cumulative standard 
frequency of prices ended in 0 or 5 for each day is a good proxy of price clustering. 
29 We have chosen this news about free allocation and leakage sector, market proposal reforms and estimations of 
realized emissions. All the chosen dates are reported in Annex I. 
30 We have also calculated the variable 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 for the three samples, all the data, buyer and seller initiated. 
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combinations Zero&Up and Zero&Down, each one of these scenarios belonging 
to one type of run.31  
Table 4 presents the results. Panel A shows EU patterns for the general case 
that considers both buyer and seller initiated trades. First of all, the significance 
of the intercept and its negative coefficient confirms the existence of the herding 
effect in the five scenarios at the 1% level. The coefficient of the variable Trend 
is significant and positive suggesting that herding intensity decreases when the 
market is getting mature, probably due to the fact that carbon traders are more 
experienced. The coefficients 𝛽𝑆𝑃 and 𝛽𝑃𝐶 are also significant, but negative. The 
negative value for the first dummy indicates that carbon traders increase their 
herding behavior during the most speculative period that goes from January to 
March, while the negative coefficient for the second variable confirms that herding 
behavior is partially explained by the concentration of orders at the same price.  
Finally, the negative and significant coefficient of the dummy 𝛽𝐶𝑁 indicates that 
the level of herding increases on those days on which important information is 
released by the EU Commission.  
Note that the results for the five scenarios are very homogenous with values of 
adjusted R2 around 20%. However, it is important to observe that all the 
coefficients are lower in the last two cases (Zero&Up and Zero&Down) in which 
the repetition of prices is allowed. 
Looking at Panels B and C, we see two important differences depending on who 
initiates the run. Firstly, Panel B shows that the arrival of news that increases 
                                                          
31 All regressions estimated in this study has been carried out using both ordinary least squares and the Newey and West 
correction that accounts for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems in the error terms in the models. 
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herding only has a slight influence in bearish scenarios, but not in bullish ones. 
Secondly, Panel C indicates that variable Trend is not significant, what means 
that the level of herding over time for sellers has remained the same. 
Furthermore, we notice that when runs are seller initiated, the arrival of carbon 
news always increases the level of herding. 
5. Market drivers 
Kremer and Nautz (2013) argue that the empirical literature on herding has 
explored its possible causes via the link between herding and information by 
considering variables that proxy the availability of information. Following this idea, 
we analyze in this section some factors that can influence carbon herding 
behavior. 
Venezia, Nashikkar and Shapira (2011) analyze herding in the case of 
professional and amateur investors that trade in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and 
observe a positive and significant coefficient of the number of trades on the 
herding measure. They suggest that the factors leading to a greater intensity of 
trading also lead to a greater alignment of the traders’ positions. In the same line, 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) also find a positive effect between the 
number of trades and herding behavior across mutual funds. Therefore, the first 
variable that we have considered is the trading frequency, defined as the number 
of daily trades.  
The second variable that we have taken into account is daily volatility. According 
to Gleason, Mathur and Peterson (2004) and Tan, Chiang, Mason and Nelling 
(2008) people tend to herd more in situations with higher uncertainty. As it is 
commonly assumed in the financial literature, we associate higher levels of 
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uncertainty with higher levels of volatility. Specifically, to measure intraday 
volatility, we employ the estimator proposed by Parkinson (1980) that is 
computed using the maximum and the minimum of each day. The expression is 
as follows: 
𝜎𝑡 = √
1
4𝑙𝑜𝑔2
(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑡)2 
where 𝐻𝑡 and 𝐿𝑡  are the highest and the lowest EUA traded prices on day t, 
respectively. 
The third market variable that we have considered is the time to maturity. Chiang, 
Li, Tan and Nelling (2013) suggest that the test for herding should consider its 
dynamic behavior. As the EUA futures contract nears its expiry, the amount of 
information available in the market would tend to be greater and the herding 
intensity measure should decrease. To explore if herding is time-varying, we have 
counted the number of days that remain to the expiry of each contract. 
Finally, we have included the effect of extreme market returns on herding. Tan et 
al. (2008) observe that herding tends to be more intense during bull markets. 
Further, Chiang and Zheng (2010) point out that herding will be more prevalent 
during periods of market stress, defining market stress as periods of extreme 
returns. In order to analyze the impact of this variable on herding intensity, we 
have applied the methodology employed by Christie and Huang (1995), analyzing 
the impact of extreme returns with two dummy variables which indicate positive 
(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) and negative (𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑡) extreme returns that will take value 1 when returns 
are in the percentiles 95 and 5, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
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The above-described variables have been regressed against the residuals of the 
EU patterns equation performed in the previous section. Therefore, the final 
structure of the market drivers’ equation is as follows:  
𝜖𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝐹 log(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑡) + 𝛽𝑉𝜎𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
+ 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝜔𝑠,𝑡 
Table 5 shows the regression output for the general case. We observe a positive 
relationship between herding intensity and trading frequency and volatility. The 
higher the trading frequency, the greater the carbon investors that are aligned to 
trade in the same direction. Regarding volatility, the higher the volatility, the 
higher the herding intensity measure, indicating that carbon traders herd more on 
riskier days. Furthermore, the coefficient that captures the vicinity of the futures 
contract is significantly positive, indicating that the fewer the number of days to 
the maturity of the EUA December futures contract, the higher the level of 
herding. Therefore, time to maturity has a positive influence on true behavior, 
reflecting an increase in the phenomenon at the end of the life of each futures 
contract. Finally, both extreme returns intensify herding behavior, especially 
when they are extremely negative. 32 
As we have seen, EUA volatility returns affects herding behavior in European 
carbon markets. However, there exists huge empirical evidence that the behavior 
of market agents can influence the volatility in stock markets.33 Furthermore, the 
frequency analysis shown in Table 3 indicates that around 64.5% (66.2%) of 
                                                          
32 This analysis has also been carried out both for buyer and seller initiated case, obtaining similar results. For the sake 
of space, these results have not been reported in the paper but are available upon request from the authors. 
33 As a consequence of this destabilizing effect, the classical market risk models would be underweighting the real market 
risk, as Morris and Shin (1999) and Persaud (2000) show. See Blasco, Corredor and Ferreruela (2012) for a 
comprehensive review of the impact of herding on volatility.  
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buyer (seller) initiated trades were Zero&Up (Zero&Down). If carbon traders buy 
after price increases or sell after price decreases, they can destabilize EUA 
market prices via herding behavior. In order to test if herding affects EUA volatility 
or market returns, we have regressed volatility (𝜎𝑡) and EUA return (𝑅𝑡), defined 
as the first log-difference of the EUA carbon price series, against the daily herding 
intensity measure with 5 lags, as it appears in the following equations: 
𝜎𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡−𝑙𝐻𝐼𝑠,𝑡−𝑙
5
𝑙=1
+ 𝜖𝑠,𝑡 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡−𝑙𝐻𝐼𝑠,𝑡−𝑙
5
𝑙=1
+ 𝜖𝑠,𝑡 
Table 6 present the results. The coefficients of all the past measures of herding 
intensities that are significant are negative, indicating a positive relationship 
between volatility and returns and the level of herding. Although the effect of 
herding on EUA returns is weak (Panel B), its influence on EUA volatility lasts 
until the third lag at the 1% significance level (Panel A). This indicates that past 
EUA herding behavior leads to higher volatility.34 
6. Conclusions 
In this chapter we show for the first time the existence of the herding effect in the 
European Futures Carbon market, taking into account intraday data. Preliminary 
tests prove the presence of some herding behavior due to the lack of randomness 
in sequences of positive or negative changes in EUA prices. Additionally, and 
explained by the presence of EUA psychological barriers, we show that the length 
                                                          
34 We have also run the same analysis for buyer and seller initiated trades with similar results. They are available upon 
request. 
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of the sequences increases markedly when we introduce the possibility of the 
repetition of prices that occurs when prices reach an EUA price barrier. 
The EU patterns analysis confirms the existence of the herding effect, although 
its effect is diminishing over time. Furthermore, we observe that the herding level 
increases in speculative periods, on those days on which the price clustering 
effect is stronger, and with the arrival of new information. Regarding market 
drivers, we find that herding behavior is positively related with the number of 
trades, the intraday volatility and on days with extreme returns. On the contrary, 
herding is less intense when the EUA futures contracts reach their expiry. All 
these results appear to support the claim that the higher the availability of 
information, the lower the level of herding. Finally, we show that carbon volatility 
overreacts to past herding behavior, which means that the herding effect affects 
and is affected by carbon volatility. 
The results obtained in this chapter should be of interest both to academics and 
to carbon practitioners. On one hand, we add new insights to the sparse literature 
on herding in futures markets and, on the other hand, we show that psychological 
influences can play an important role in trading strategies in the European 
Futures Carbon Market, in spite of it being a blind market that is highly dominated 
by skilled professional market participants.  
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Annex: tables and figures 
Table 1. EUA futures price and trading volume 
Year Negotiation (€) # trades 
Average 
price (€/t) 
2005 974,830,550 4,389 22.69 
2006 3,863,747,450 21,973 17.08 
2007 11,482,898,690 84,727 17.62 
2008 19,146,498,980 171,774 22.74 
2009 23,002,292,760 318,981 13.60 
2010 42,831,298,310 338,964 14.80 
2011 43,673,216,110 394,131 13.33 
2012 35,989,018,200 483,058 7.68 
2013 24,694,339,700 553,316 4.59 
2014 32,024,212,410 546,895 6.03 
2015 27,969,042,380 390,618 7.71 
 
Note. The table shows the negotiation in euros, the number of trades and the average price for 
each calendar year for December futures contracts. The last time the database was updated was 
December 31st, 2015. Source: ICE ECX and prepared by the authors. 
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Table 2.  Runs tests 
 
Panel A. General 𝑛1/𝑛2 𝑟1/𝑟2 𝑍 
Up vs Down 130,909/129,636 121,388/119,911 435.0436 
Zero&Up vs Zero&Down 618,055/596,246 87,017/86,984 -786.0479 
Buyer vs Seller 636,415/577,889 109,513/109,564 -703.4147 
 
 
Panel B. Buyer 𝑛1/𝑛2 𝑟1/𝑟2 𝑍 
Up vs Down 107,742/24,303 101,325/23,425 779.6194 
Zero&Up vs Zero&Down 487,008/149,404 95,538/52,447 -281.4627 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Table 2 shows the results for runs tests where the null hypothesis is that elements of two 
different types of the same sample follow a random process. In the table are shown the number 
of observations of elements of type1 (n1) and type 2 (n2); the number of runs of type 1 (r1) and 
type 2 (r2), and the statistic Z that follows a normal distribution. Panel A shows the results for the 
general case, Panel B for buyer initiated runs, and Panel C for seller initiated runs. We have 
considered four types of sequences: Up for a sequence of positive price changes, Down for a 
sequence of negative price changes, Zero&Up for a sequence of positive price changes allowing 
price repetitions, and Zero&Down for a sequence of negative price changes allowing price 
repetitions. 
  
Panel C. Seller 𝑛1/𝑛2 𝑟1/𝑟2 𝑍 
Up vs Down 23,167/105,333 22,051/98,761 781.7753 
Zero&Up vs Zero&Down 131,047/446,842 49,141/96,123 -215.2964 
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Table 3.  Frequency analysis 
Panel A. General 
 
Scenario #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ≥10 Total 
Up 27.9234 1.9716 0.1578 0.0171 0.0035 0.0010 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 30.0747 
Zero 10.1171 6.3993 4.5265 3.3737 2.5918 2.0864 1.6830 1.3604 1.1134 6.9649 40.2166 
Down 27.5064 2.0249 0.1553 0.0168 0.0042 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 29.7087 
Total 65.5470 10.3959 4.8397 3.4076 2.5995 2.0881 1.6833 1.3604 1.1134 6.9652 100.00 
            
Scenario #2  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ≥10 Total 
Zero&Up 16.6792 7.0333 4.3178 3.0138 2.3626 1.8506 1.5937 1.3178 1.1345 10.7063 50.0095 
Zero&Down 15.4298 7.4706 4.6092 3.3195 2.4373 2.0155 1.6638 1.3661 1.1718 10.5068 49.9905 
Total 32.1090 14.5039 8.9270 6.3333 4.8000 3.8661 3.2575 2.6839 2.3063 21.2131 100.00 
 
 
Panel B. Buyer 
 
Scenario #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ≥10 Total 
Up 38.5619 2.2246 0.1544 0.0170 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 40.9602 
Zero 17.8539 9.1651 5.7168 3.8545 2.6721 1.9885 1.5333 1.1658 0.9176 4.7026 49.5703 
Down 9.1440 0.3016 0.0198 0.0024 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 9.4695 
Total 65.5598 11.6912 5.8911 3.8739 2.6761 1.9885 1.5333 1.1658 0.9176 4.7026 100.00 
            
Scenario #2  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ≥10 Total 
Zero&Up 22.9584 10.1625 6.5284 4.4829 3.3679 2.5651 2.1658 1.7137 1.3887 9.2259 64.5592 
Zero&Down 17.5504 6.8723 3.6098 2.1218 1.3785 0.9001 0.6433 0.4318 0.3521 1.5806 35.4408 
Total 40.5088 17.0348 10.1382 6.6047 4.7464 3.4652 2.8091 2.1455 1.7407 10.8065 100.00 
 
 
Panel C. Seller 
 
Scenario #1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ≥10 Total 
Up 8.7439 0.3737 0.0303 0.0054 0.0021 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 9.1562 
Zero 18.8704 9.5224 5.7276 3.8861 2.6641 1.9217 1.4130 1.0597 0.8313 3.9393 49.8356 
Down 38.4932 2.3303 0.1632 0.0170 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 41.0083 
Total 66.1075 12.2264 5.9211 3.9085 2.6703 1.9221 1.4134 1.0597 0.8313 3.9397 100.00 
            
Scenario #2  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ≥10 Total 
Zero&Up 17.4021 6.6624 3.3401 1.9434 1.2047 0.7903 0.5232 0.3862 0.2960 1.2804 33.8288 
Zero&Down 23.2714 11.2471 7.1036 4.9193 3.5287 2.7701 2.0989 1.6859 1.3630 8.1830 66.1712 
Total 40.6735 17.9095 10.4437 6.8627 4.7335 3.5604 2.6221 2.0721 1.6590 9.4635 100.00 
 
Note. Table 3 shows the weighted percentage of occurrence of the length of each run for each 
scenario. Two scenarios are shown: the first one considers cases in which the prices rise, stay 
equal or fall, and the second one allows the repetition of prices. Panel A, B, and C show the result 
for the whole sample, only for buyer initiated trades and only for seller initiated trades, 
respectively.   
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Table 4. EU patterns 
Panel A. General 
 
 Up Zero Down Zero&Up Zero&Down 
𝛼 -102.6891*** -100.9300*** -102.8328*** -128.8311*** -128.8313*** 
𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 0.0140** 0.0139** 0.0141** 0.0188** 0.0188** 
𝛽𝑆𝑃 -18.0517*** -17.6767*** -18.0028*** -22.7015*** -22.6998*** 
𝛽𝑃𝐶 -20.2805*** -20.0913*** -20.2867*** -25.3968*** -25.3961*** 
𝛽𝐶𝑁 -10.6002** -10.5476** -10.5639*** -13.5263** -13.5290** 
      
Adjusted R2 0.2007 0.1980 0.2003 0.2088 0.2088 
 
Panel B. Buyer 
 Up Zero Down Zero&Up Zero&Down 
𝛼 -70.5850*** -69.5802*** -76.1770*** -88.2703*** -91.3744*** 
𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 0.0135*** 0.0141*** 0.0161*** 0.0178*** 0.0190*** 
𝛽𝑆𝑃 -9.6375*** -9.7489*** -10.6274*** -12.1756*** -13.0645*** 
𝛽𝑃𝐶 -11.3752*** -11.4931*** -11.9112*** -14.3923*** -14.6316*** 
𝛽𝐶𝑁 -5.4263 -5.5759 -6.4322* -7.1839 -7.6555* 
      
Adjusted R2 0.1553 0.1628 0.1822 0.1653 0.1805 
 
Panel C. Seller 
 Up Zero Down Zero&Up Zero&Down 
𝛼 -68.6766*** -61.9295*** -62.9241*** -82.4546*** -78.1763*** 
𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 0.0072 0.0045 0.0041 0.0084 0.0056 
𝛽𝑆𝑃 -15.9767*** -15.4029*** -15.3471*** -19.3684*** -19.5469*** 
𝛽𝑃𝐶 -9.7979*** -9.8303*** -9.5964*** -12.0543*** -11.9899*** 
𝛽𝐶𝑁 -9.8354*** -9.4597*** -9.1026*** -12.0296*** -11.5323*** 
      
Adjusted R2 0.1962 0.1827 0.1770 0.1937 0.1871 
 
Note. Table 4 shows the impact of some EU patterns on herding intensity in five scenarios: Up, 
Zero, Down, Zero&Up and Zero&Down. These patterns are Trend, 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑, which accounts for 
the number of days of the sample, 𝛽𝑆𝑃 represents the variable Critical Period which is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 in the first quarter of the year and 0 otherwise, 𝛽𝑃𝐶 is Price Clustering 
which is the inverse of normal cumulative standard frequency of prices ending in 0 or 5 for each 
day and, finally, Carbon News represented by 𝛽𝐶𝑁 which is a dummy variable that takes value 1 
on those days when the EU Commission publishes new information important for the European 
Carbon Market. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Panels A, B 
and C show results for the whole sample, and for buyer and seller initiated trades, respectively.  
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Table 5. Market drivers 
 
 Up Zero Down Zero&Up Zero&Down 
𝛼 188.3601*** 183.7694*** 188.6774*** 236.0069*** 236.0338*** 
𝛽𝑇𝐹 -27.3876*** -26.7367*** -27.4294*** -34.2671*** -34.2710*** 
𝛽𝑉 -109.0932** -117.5602** -109.9114** -139.4668** -139.4048** 
𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑀 0.1022*** 0.1023*** 0.1021*** 0.1256*** 0.1256*** 
𝛽𝐻 -6.9044** -6.8464** -7.2288** -8.7745** -8.7713** 
𝛽𝐿 -8.1275** -7.8130** -7.5572** -9.5523** -9.5516** 
      
Adjusted R2 0.6066 0.5988 0.6059 0.6152 0.6153 
 
Note. Table 5 shows the impact of some EU market drivers on herding intensity in five scenarios: 
Up, Zero, Down, Zero&Up and Zero&Down. The dependant variable is the residual of EU pattern 
estimation output and the market drivers are 𝛽𝑇𝐹 that accounts for the natural logarithm of the 
number of orders traded each day, 𝛽𝑉 proxies the daily volatility, 𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑀 is a dummy variable that 
accounts for the days remaining to the expiry and, finally, 𝛽𝐻 and 𝛽𝐿 both are dummy variables 
that take value 1 when the daily return is in the 95% and 5% percentiles, respectively and 0 
otherwise. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Table 6. Market destabilization and herding behavior 
 
Panel A. EUA Volatility 
  Up Zero Down Zero&Up Zero&Down 
𝛼 -0.0179*** -0.0175*** -0.0177*** -0.0184*** -0.0184*** 
𝛽𝑡−1 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002 
𝛽𝑡−2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001*** 
𝛽𝑡−3 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001 
𝛽𝑡−4 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001*** 
𝛽𝑡−5 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
      
Adjusted R2 0.1535 0.1526 0.1526 0.1589 0.1589 
 
Panel B. EUA Returns 
  Up Zero Down Zero&Up Zero&Down 
𝛼 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 
𝛽𝑡−1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
𝛽𝑡−2 -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0001* -0.0001* 
𝛽𝑡−3 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
𝛽𝑡−4 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
𝛽𝑡−5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      
Adjusted R2 0.0031 0.0030 0.0026 0.0031 0.0031 
 
Note. The table shows the estimation output of the linear regression of the volatility and returns 
against the herding intensity using as independent variables the herding intensity measure lagged 
from 1 to 5 days. Panel A shows the results for volatility while Panel B shows the results for 
returns. The study has been carried out for the five scenarios: Up, Zero, Down, Zero&Up and 
Zero&Down. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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Annex I. Market news 
Date Description 
24/01/2013 Linking EU ETS with Australia: Commission recommends opening formal negotiations 
25/01/2013 Free allocation of allowances in 2013 
30/01/2013 Consultation meetings on the options for structural measures to strengthen the EU 
Emissions Trading ... 
05/03/2013 Consultation on registry options to facilitate linking of Australian and EU emissions trading 
systems 
16/04/2013 Commission reacts to European Parliament back-loading vote 
16/05/2013 EU ETS: continuing decline in emissions but growing surplus of allowances in 2012 
06/06/2013 Stakeholder consultation on new carbon leakage list launched 
18/06/2013 Member States approve EEX as Germany's phase 3 auction platform 
03/07/2013 Commission welcomes EP vote on ETS 'backloading' 
10/07/2013 Member States approve addition of sectors to the carbon leakage list for 2014 
05/09/2013 Commission finalizing decision on industrial free allocation for phase three 
05/09/2013 Commission clears way for harmonized free allocation to industry for phase three 
24/09/2013 Experts to explore one of the options for EU ETS structural measures 
08/11/2013 Back-loading proposal takes step forward 
11/12/2013 EU Climate Change Committee makes progress on back-loading 
18/12/2013 Commission gives green light for a first set of Member States to allocate allowances for 
calendar year 2013 
08/01/2014 EU Climate Change Committee agrees back-loading 
26/02/2014 Commission gives green light for free allocation by all Member States 
27/02/2014 Back-loading: 2014 auction volume reduced by 400 million allowances 
05/05/2014 Commission submits proposed carbon leakage list for 2015-2019 
14/05/2014 EU ETS emissions estimated down at least 3% in 2013 
16/05/2014 Commission to hear experts on technical aspects of proposed market stability reserve 
04/07/2014 Commission publishes first status update for New Entrants' Reserve (NER) and impact of 
cessation rules 
09/07/2014 EU Climate Change Committee agrees proposed carbon leakage list for the period 2015-
2019 
16/07/2014 European Securities and Markets Authority launches consultation on the implementation of 
new financial markets rules that are relevant for EU ETS 
27/10/2014 European Commission adopts the carbon leakage list for the period 2015-2019 
10/02/2015 Aviation/ETS: Update of the aircraft operators list 
23/07/2015 Commission publishes status update for New Entrants' Reserve and allocation reductions 
 
Note. The table shows the dates selected as the most important for the European Carbon 
Market during Phase III and its description. Source EU Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/index_en.htm  
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1. Conclusions 
This PhD dissertation analyzes the influence of some behavioral aspects of 
trading participants over the European Carbon Market, more precisely in the 
European Union Allowance (EUA). Next are described the major and minor 
findings. 
1.1. Major findings 
I. We have proved the existence of price clustering in the European Carbon 
Market where prices ending tend to be concentrated at round numbers 
ended in 0 and 5. 
II. There it exists a size clustering effect where carbon traders tend to cluster 
their orders in small sizes and in round numbers multiples of five contracts. 
III. We have shown the existence of key prices that modifies the behavior of 
carbon market actors, explained both by the existence of price clustering 
effect and rounded exercise prices in EUA options. 
IV. In this study we show for first time the existence of the herding effect in the 
European Futures Carbon Market despite of being a blind market and 
dominated by professional participants. 
1.2. Minor findings 
I. Price clustering effect is greater when the lack of information is higher in 
the market, higher volatility and less trading frequency. 
II. Our analysis also shows that price and size resolution in the European 
Carbon Market are complementary so that carbon traders place orders 
rounding both, price and size. 
III. The presence of key prices affects to volatility increasing it before touching 
the barrier and decreases after it. Also returns and volume dynamics are 
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modified with the existence of psychological prices ended in zero rounded 
prices. 
IV. A pattern analysis shows that herding is intesified with the level of 
speculation and other behavioral biases like psychological prices or price 
clustering. 
2. Further research 
The study carried out in the dissertation of this doctoral thesis has explored the 
influence of behavioral finance over the European Carbon Market, but this work 
should be considered as a starting point in the study of how human behavior 
influences in the emissions market. 
As it has been said, the study developed in Chapter III is the first are in assessing 
the impact of technical analysis over the European Carbon Market. This work can 
be extended with the analysis of other common technical analysis tools such as 
moving averages or Bollinger bands. Furthermore, it will be useful for this type of 
analysis to develop a method to determine the most suitable time horizon to 
analyze the right psychological price in each period and analyzing all of these 
studies in an intraday level. 
Chapter IV could be extended in two different ways, the first one is related to the 
analysis of herding in sizes instead of prices. Preliminary showed that the first 
trade of a run is statistically significant greater than the rest of the run. Moreover, 
the study of the level of autocorrelation in volume can offer new insights in terms 
of developing trading strategies that allows to take better positions in terms of 
price and time. The second approach of herding is based in the study of herding 
among market data providers and exchanges. It is of interest to know if the main 
market data providers and exchanges make public price transactions at the same 
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time and if these prices are equal, or in contrast, if it exists a leader that is the 
first one in providing new changes in the quotation and the others follow him. This 
information is quite relevant when choosing the exchange to trade and/or the 
market data provider to have the most updated information. 
Additionally, a common further line of research that could be applied for all the 
chapters is the study of the predictive power of the detected anomalies by 
analyzing the profitability of several trading strategies with out-of-sample data. To 
this end, it would be necessary to establish the rules that define when to enter 
into the carbon market or to exit from it. 
Alternatively, one of the proposals of European Commission to improve the 
European Union Emission Trading System, is to establish a soft price corridor or 
collar to the EUA price. The supporters of the establishment a price collar argue 
that the measure will give more stability to the market, also those companies that 
invest in low carbon technologies would see reduced the risk of invest in these 
type of installations. The introduction of a price floor will also aim many industries 
covered by the program to trigger to low carbon investments. 
This price floor will be controlled through auctions, if the auction price is below 
the low threshold the auction will be canceled and the allowances will be placed 
in the reserve until the price reach the upper threshold. Furthermore, this 
minimum price for the EUA will evolve yearly with a predetermined path. The 
introduction of this new measure in the EU ETS can motivate new studies about 
the behavior of carbon market participants, such as, the use of options with strike 
price in the floor price on the auction days. Furthermore, we could interpret this 
collar like psychological barriers, so we could analyze the investor behavior when 
the price is near to these upper or lower threshold. 
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1. Introducción 
Puesto que ninguno de los cuatro capítulos que forman parte de esta tesis está 
escrito en algunas de las dos lenguas oficiales de la Universidad de Valencia, en 
cumplimiento de su normativa, a continuación se resume en castellano dicha 
tesis doctoral describiendo el campo de estudio, los datos empleados, el objetivo 
y la metodología y los resultados y las conclusiones que se derivan de ella. 
1.1. Finanzas del comportamiento 
Esta tesis se enmarca dentro del campo de las finanzas del comportamiento, el 
cual propone teorías basadas en la psicología y la sociología con el fin de 
explicar algunas anomalías observadas en los mercados financieros. 
Las finanzas del comportamiento tratan de llenar el hueco de los modelos 
financieros clásicos, basados en mercados plenamente eficientes donde todos 
los agentes interactúan de forma racional entre ellos, y que muchas veces se 
han mostrado incapaces de explicar matemáticamente algunos aspectos del 
comportamiento del mercado. 
En concreto, esta tesis se centra en el análisis de cuatro sesgos observados en 
los mercados financieros. El primero sería la agrupación en precios, el cual 
puede ser definido como la tendencia a observar ciertos precios negociados más 
frecuentemente que otros, este fenómeno puede afectar a la parte decimal del 
precio, a la parte entera o a ambos. Siguiendo la Teoría de los Mercados 
Eficientes, en ausencia de fricciones en el mercado, los precios en cualquier 
situación deberían estar uniformemente distribuidos a través de cualquier precio 
puesto que todos los precios tienen la misma probabilidad teórica de poder ser 
negociados y, por tanto, la presencia de una agrupación en los precios de las 
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transacciones realizadas es considerada como una fuente de ineficiencia de 
mercado debido a que los precios no seguirían un paseo aleatorio. 
El segundo aspecto analizado en esta tesis tiene que ver con la agrupación en 
tamaños, esto es, la concentración de órdenes en determinados tamaños de 
negociación. La presencia de esta anomalía afectaría a la liquidez del activo 
puesto que podría dificultar a los inversores la negociación de las posiciones 
deseadas, viéndose penalizados tanto en precio, teniendo que negociar a niveles 
más profundos del libro de órdenes, como en tiempo, teniendo que esperar más 
tiempo para poder negociar el número de activos o contratos deseados al precio 
objetivo. 
Son cuatro las teorías las que parecen explicar la agrupación en precios y 
tamaños. En primer lugar estaría la hipótesis de resolución, la cual establece que 
la presencia de incertidumbre lleva a los participantes del mercado a redondear 
tanto el precio como el tamaño a negociar. En segundo lugar se encontraría la 
hipótesis de atracción que sugiere que los inversores prefieren ciertos números 
sobre otros sin ninguna explicación racional. En tercer lugar, la hipótesis de la 
negociación establece que la agrupación en precios y en tamaños ocurre por una 
cuestión de conveniencia a la hora de negociar los activos en el mercado. El 
inversor utilizaría un reducido grupo de valores con el fin de reducir los costes de 
negociación ya que de este modo la información que tendría que ser procesada 
por los agentes sería menor y podrían llegar a acuerdos más fácilmente. Por 
último, la hipótesis de colusión sugiere que los creadores de mercado podrían 
intentar negociar determinados precios y tamaños de órdenes solo para 
incrementar las ganancias por los márgenes de las transacciones. 
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Otros sesgo psicológico que aparece con frecuencia tanto en los agentes que 
negocian en el mercado como en los medios que se encargan de informar sobre 
dichos mercados es la existencia de barreras psicológicas. Este fenómeno, al 
igual que el efecto agrupación, hace que los participantes del mercado confieran 
una importancia especial a determinados precios sobre otros, creando así un 
impedimento mental en los individuos que causa un  cambio sus decisiones de 
negociación cuando la cotización del activo se acerca dichas barreras 
psicológicas. 
El fenómeno de las barreras psicológicas, también llamadas precios barrera o 
precios clave, ha sido tratado con anterioridad en la literatura financiera la cual 
ha sugerido varias explicaciones posibles para la aparición de dicho efecto. La 
primera teoría relaciona las barreras con el concepto de anclaje, esta teoría 
sugiere que los individuos se fijan en un precio reciente para posicionar sus 
órdenes que podría prevalecer como importante para los analistas del mercado. 
La segunda teoría está relacionada con el ya descrito efecto agrupación en la 
hipótesis de la negociación, el cual indica que los inversores tienden a redondear 
los precios para simplificar su proceso de negociación lo cual les otorga una 
importancia superior al resto. Finalmente, la tercera explicación del efecto de las 
barreras psicológicas está relacionada con la existencia de determinados precios 
clave que facilitan la posibilidad de hacer coberturas con contratos de opciones, 
dado que las opciones son comúnmente negociadas con precios de ejercicio 
estándar que aparecen propuestos en las condiciones generales de los 
contratos. 
Finalmente, el último aspecto psicológico que estudiaremos es el llamado efecto 
imitación. Este efecto, comúnmente asociado con el comportamiento animal de 
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ir en manada o en un rebaño, es usado también en finanzas para definir la 
tendencia de los inversores a imitar las acciones de otros inversores.  
Este efecto gregario puede ser visto desde dos puntos de vista: racional e 
irracional. La primera visión contempla el efecto imitación como una reacción del 
mercado a la llegada de nueva información que afecta al mercado, lo cual, 
estaría en línea con la Teoría de los Mercados Eficientes. El segundo punto de 
vista, también conocido como efecto gregario intencional, esta principalmente 
centrado en la psicología, donde los agentes se siguen unos a los otros con la 
intención de copiar la misma decisión. Algunas razones que justificarían tal 
comportamiento pueden ser la existencia de recompensas por batir un 
determinado índice, los problemas de agencia o la existencia de cascadas de 
información. Este tipo de comportamiento gregario intencional puede 
desestabilizar el mercado debido a compras o ventas masivas que incrementan 
la volatilidad y que pueden contribuir a la creación de  burbujas o de quiebras 
financieras. 
1.2. El Mercado Europeo de Carbono 
El Mercado Europeo de Carbono es el principal instrumento de la política 
climática europea a la hora de evitar el incremento de emisiones de gases de 
efecto invernadero y fue creado en enero de 2005 bajo la directiva 2003/87/EC. 
El Sistema Europeo de Intercambio de Emisiones es un sistema multinacional 
que cubre generadores eléctricos, industria pesada, industria intensiva en 
energía y las emisiones del sector aeronáutico de los 28 países miembros y los 
tres países del Área Económica Europea, Islandia, Liechtenstein y Noruega 
estando sujetas al programa más de 12.000 instalaciones que cubren alrededor 
del 45% de las emisiones de gas de la Unión Europea. Con estas cifras el 
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Sistema Europeo de Intercambio de Emisiones es el mayor mercado de 
emisiones tanto en términos de volumen de emisiones negociadas como en 
términos de instalaciones cubiertas. 
El Sistema Europeo de Intercambio de Emisiones es un sistema basado en una 
negociación, donde se fija un límite o tope para determinar la cantidad total de 
gases de efecto invernadero que pueden ser emitidas. Este límite se reduce cada 
año, haciendo que de este modo la cantidad total de emisiones se reduzcan. Las 
instalaciones participantes en el programa están obligadas a monitorizar e 
informar de sus emisiones anuales y entregar el 30 de abril del año siguiente los 
suficientes derechos de emisión como para cubrir sus emisiones. En caso 
contrario, tendrán una penalización por incumplimiento y se les impondrá 
severas multas. 
La vida del programa puede ser dividido en fases: Fase I desde 2005 a 2007, 
Fase II desde 2008 a 2012, Fase III desde 2013 a 2020 y Fase IV que tendrá 
lugar desde 2021 a 2030. El objetivo de reducción de emisiones es emitir en 
2020 un 21% menos que en 2005, esto se traduce en una reducción anual de 
1,74% para las Fases I a III y emitir un 43% menos en 2030 por lo que la 
reducción anual será de 2,2% durante esta fase. 
La Fase I fue un periodo de prueba, cuyo principal objetivo fue establecer un 
mercado de emisiones totalmente operativo para el comienzo del Compromiso 
del Protocolo de Kyoto. En esta fase, cada país miembro elaboró un Plan 
Nacional de Asignación de emisiones que tuvo que ser aprobado por la Comisión 
Europea. Dado que fue la primera fase y los países no tenían datos creíbles 
sobre emisiones los límites fueron fijados basados en expectativas. 
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La Fase II transcurrió a la vez que el Compromiso del Protocolo de Kyoto. 
Durante esta fase nuevos gases de efecto invernadero fueron incorporados al 
programa, (óxido nitroso y perfluorocarbonos) y el número de países miembros 
del programa se incrementó con la incorporación de los estados del Área 
Económica Europea. Otro aspecto importante que se introdujo fue la posibilidad 
de usar derechos del periodo actual en el siguiente (banking) y justo lo contrario, 
usar derechos de periodos futuros para cubrir los requerimientos actuales de 
entrega de derechos de emisiones (borrowing). El uso de los derechos de 
periodos futuros está permitido solo dentro de la misma fase, mientras que los 
derechos que se guarden para ser entregados a futuro podrán utilizarse tanto en 
la fase a la que corresponden estos derechos como en fases posteriores. 
A partir de la Fase III, los Planes Nacionales de Asignación son abandonados y 
desde esta fase se establece un solo límite de emisiones para todos los países 
miembros. Además, la libre asignación de los derechos de emisión a las 
instalaciones se redujo gradualmente. En 2013, más del 40% de las emisiones 
fueron subastadas. Por otro lado, durante esta fase la Comisión también centró 
sus esfuerzos en reducir el exceso de derechos de emisión implementando 
medidas en el corto plazo tales como un retraso en la subasta de 900 millones 
de derechos de los años 2014, 2015 y 2016 para ser subastados en 2019 y 2020. 
También se tiene previsto que comience a operar, en enero de 2019, la Reserva 
de Estabilidad del Mercado, un mecanismo regulado donde los volúmenes 
subastados son ajustados de una “forma automática” bajo condiciones 
predefinidas que reducen la cantidad de emisiones que son subastadas si un 
límite superior de emisiones en circulación es excedido, y liberadas si los 
derechos de emisiones en circulación bajan de un determinado umbral. 
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La propuesta para la Fase IV es reducir las emisiones a un nivel 43% inferior a 
2005 con una reducción anual del 2,2%. Los esfuerzos también se centrarán en 
revisar el sistema de libre asignación de derechos reduciéndola a los cerca de 
50 sectores con alto riesgo de relocalización de la producción fuera de la Unión 
Europea. Además, las referencias para la libre asignación de derechos de 
emisión serán actualizadas con el fin de reflejar los cambios tecnológicos 
acaecidos desde al año 2008. 
El principal activo del Sistema Europeo de Intercambio de Emisiones es el 
derecho de emisión, el cual, da derecho a emitir una tonelada de CO2 o gas 
equivalente. La evolución de la cotización del derecho de emisión se ha visto 
afectada principalmente por dos eventos acaecidos tanto en la primera como en 
la segunda fase. Al final de la Fase I, debido a la imposibilidad de usar los 
derechos sobrantes de la Fase I en la siguiente fase, el precio del derecho de 
emisión se hundió llegando a cotizar a 0 €. En la Fase II, estos problemas de 
exceso de derechos de emisión continuaron y, que junto con la crisis financiera, 
influyeron en una baja demanda de derechos de emisión. En conjunto, todos 
estos eventos, tanto de la Fase I como de la Fase II provocaron que el precio del 
derecho de emisión haya oscilado entre 0 € y 30 € desde 2006 a 2015. 
1.3. El mercado ICE ECX 
Actualmente existen cuatro plataformas que ofrecen la posibilidad de negociar 
contratos del Sistema de Comercio de Emisiones de la Unión Europea: Nasdaq 
OMX, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, European Energy Exchange  e Inter 
Continental Exchange. De entre todas ellas, Inter Continental Exchange (ICE) es 
la plataforma más activa y concentra la mayoría del volumen. 
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En el ICE se pueden negociar tres tipos de contratos de futuro cuyo subyacentes 
son: Derechos de Emisión de la Unión, Derechos de Aviación de la Unión y 
Certificados de Reducción de Emisiones. Además, es posible negociarlos al 
contado (futuros diarios) y en los mercados de opciones. No obstante, el contrato 
de referencia en el mercado es el contrato de futuro con  vencimiento anual, el 
cual vence el último lunes de diciembre. 
El mercado de futuros europeos de ICE opera un mercado electrónico dirigido 
por órdenes con creadores de mercado e intermediarios. La sesión diaria 
empieza con una pre apertura de 15 minutos (desde las 6:45 hora de Reino 
Unido) que permite a los miembros del mercado registrar órdenes disponibles 
para el comienzo de la negociación. La sesión previa a la negociación termina 
con una subasta, donde el precio de apertura y el volumen son determinados 
mediante un algoritmo. Durante la sesión continua de 7:00 a 17:00, los inversores 
pueden enviar órdenes límite, de mercado y órdenes en bloques. El periodo de 
fijación del precio de cierre va desde las 16:50:00 a las 16:59:59 horas de Reino 
Unido, el cual, es una media ponderada de las órdenes cruzadas en este periodo. 
El contrato de futuros es negociado en lotes. Cada lote equivale a 1.000 
toneladas de CO2 equivalentes, esto es, 1.000 derechos de emisión. La unidad 
mínima de negociación fue 0,05 € hasta el 27 de marzo de 2007 cuando cambio 
a 0,01 €. 
1.4. Datos 
El activo sobre el que trata toda esta tesis doctoral es el derecho de emisión de 
la Unión Europea. En concreto, dado que es la referencia aceptada por el 
mercado, a lo largo de toda la tesis se ha trabajado con futuros de derechos de 
emisión con vencimiento diciembre, negociados en ICE, que tal y como se ha 
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indicado anteriormente, es la plataforma que concentra la mayoría de la actividad 
entre todas las que negocian derechos de emisión. 
La base de datos está compuesta por datos diarios e intradiarios. Para ambos, 
hemos elegido contratos de futuros con vencimientos de 2005 hasta 2020. Las 
series intradiarias contienen la fecha y la hora de las transacciones, el precio, el 
tamaño y el signo de la transacción, esto es, tomando información que nos indica 
si la transacción se ha iniciado por el comprador o por el vendedor. Además, la 
base de datos de opciones intradiaria que se ha usado contiene el precio de 
ejercicio. Por otro lado, los datos diarios contienen el precio de apertura, el precio 
de cierre, el precio máximo, el precio mínimo, el volumen total y el interés abierto. 
Todos los precios están expresados en euros, la hora está expresada en el huso 
horario GMT, y el volumen y el interés abierto están expresados en lotes. 
A lo largo de la tesis doctoral se han utilizado distintas sub muestras con un doble 
objetivo: poder obtener la mayor información posible en cada uno de los análisis 
y comprobar su evolución temporal. En primer lugar, hemos usado ambas series 
de datos, diarios e intradiarios, para los contratos de futuros del derecho de 
emisión con vencimiento en 2010. El periodo muestral comprende desde el 21 
de septiembre de 2006 hasta el 20 de diciembre de 2010 donde 304.189 
transacciones tuvieron lugar. Este contrato de futuro pertenece a la Fase II pero 
empezó a ser negociado durante la Fase I por lo que podemos comparar si hay 
alguna diferencia según el periodo en el cual el futuro es negociado. 
Posteriormente, se han incluido nuevas series de contratos de futuros para 
comprobar la evolución temporal de los efectos detectados. En concreto, se han 
estudiado vencimientos de diciembre de los años 2010, 2011 y 2012. El periodo 
muestral analizado comprende desde el 21 de septiembre de 2006 al 20 de 
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diciembre de 2010, desde el 23 de marzo de 2006 hasta el 10 de diciembre de 
2011 y desde el 23 de marzo de 2006 al 17 de diciembre de 2012 para los 
contratos de futuros de 2010, 2011 y 2012, respectivamente. De esta forma, se 
analiza toda la vida de estos tres contratos. Un total de 304.189, 359.003 y 
491.205 transacciones tuvieron lugar para el primer, segundo y tercer contrato, 
respectivamente. 
Una vez comprobada la consistencia de los efectos a través de los distintos 
contratos de futuros, a continuación se construyó la serie continua de futuros con 
vencimiento en el mes de diciembre. En este caso, todos los contratos eran de 
la Fase II y el periodo comprende desde el 18 de diciembre de 2007 al 17 de 
diciembre de 2012. Se utilizaron tres tipos diferentes de datos, diarios e 
intradiarios para futuros e intradiarios para opciones. La muestra resultante 
contiene 1.306.765 transacciones para un volumen total negociado de 9.201.096 
contratos de futuros y el precio oscilaba entre 5,61€ y 29,69€. 
Finalmente, se utilizaron datos diarios e intradiarios de los contratos de futuros 
con vencimiento en Fase III, más concretamente, se escogieron los contratos de 
futuros con vencimiento en diciembre de los años 2013, 2014 y 2015. Durante 
este periodo, desde el 18 de diciembre de 2012 hasta el 14 de diciembre de 
2015, se hicieron un total de 1.214.304 transacciones. 
2. Objetivos y metodología 
El objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es el estudio de determinados aspectos 
psicológicos que pueden influir sobre el comportamiento de los inversores en el 
Mercado Europeo de Carbono, poniendo el foco en los precios de los contratos 
de futuros sobre los derechos de emisión. En concreto, el objetivo es determinar 
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la existencia de agrupación en precios, determinar la existencia de agrupación 
en tamaños y comprobar su relación con el efecto de la agrupación en precios, 
analizar la existencia de barreras psicológicas y determinar cómo estas afectan 
a la dinámica de algunas variables clave tales como son el rendimiento, la 
volatilidad o el volumen y, por último, investigar la presencia de un efecto 
gregario entre los inversores en el mercado de derechos. 
En primer lugar, se estudia la agrupación en precios, que se define como la 
tendencia a negociar determinados precios de manera más frecuente que otros, 
pudiendo afectar esta repetición a la parte decimal del precio, a la parte entera o 
a ambas. En ausencia de fricciones en el mercado, los precios deberían estar 
uniformemente distribuidos entre cualquiera de los posibles valores puesto que 
cada uno de ellos tienen la misma probabilidad teórica de ocurrencia. Por tanto, 
la aparición de este fenómeno se considera una anomalía en el mercado que 
ocasiona una ruptura con la Teoría de los Mercados Eficientes. 
Por tanto, el primer objetivo de este capítulo es documentar la evidencia de 
agrupación en precios en el mercado de futuros sobre derechos de emisión  
cotizados en ICE utilizando datos de transacciones intradiarias. El 
comportamiento del precio del derecho de emisión es crucial por lo que la 
investigación de agrupación de los precios del derecho de emisión puede aportar 
una nueva visión sobre la eficiencia del mercado europeo de futuros de CO2. 
Para la elaboración de este estudio, hemos elegido contratos de futuro con 
vencimiento en diciembre de 2010 pertenecientes a la Fase II del programa. 
La primera parte del estudio se centra en observar la distribución del último 
decimal de la serie de precios y contrastar si sigue una distribución uniforme, lo 
que supondría el cumplimiento de la Teoría de los Mercados Eficientes. Para 
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determinar el nivel de agrupación del último decimal se ha usado una medida 
que, aunque suele ser empleada en análisis sobre poder de concentración del 
mercado, en nuestro caso se ha utilizado para comprobar si los precios están 
repartidos equitativamente entre todos los valores posibles o, en cambio, 
comprobar si hay algunos con más peso que otros. 
Finalmente, para concluir el estudio sobre la agrupación en precios, se han 
estudiado los factores clave que provocan este efecto sobre los precios de CO2 
a través de un modelo de análisis multivariante. Basándonos en estudios previos, 
se han elegido como posibles factores la volatilidad intradiaria, la frecuencia 
diaria medida como el número de transacciones diarias, el tamaño medio de la 
transacción y una medida que utiliza el ratio entre la variación diaria del interés 
abierto y el volumen diario y que se ha utilizado para determinar el nivel de 
especulación en el mercado. 
Posteriormente, tras haber analizado la agrupación en precios, la segunda parte 
de la tesis se ha centrado en estudiar si los agentes del mercado también 
agrupan sus órdenes en determinados tamaños y en, tal caso, bajo qué 
circunstancias ocurre. 
Existen numerosos estudios sobre la liquidez de los mercados y, en concreto 
sobre la liquidez del mercado de CO2 pero, ningún estudio se ha centrado en 
estudiar la amplitud de dicha liquidez. Este es un aspecto importante a tener en 
cuenta ya que la existencia de la agrupación de órdenes en determinados 
tamaños hace que los inversores no puedan ejecutar sus órdenes a los precios 
deseados provocando así unos mayores costes de transacción. Por tanto, la 
capacidad para negociar grandes cantidades a bajos costes puede ser 
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obstaculizada cuando el tamaño de las órdenes se encuentra concentrado en 
determinados tamaños. 
Para la elaboración de este segundo estudio se han utilizado datos de 
transacciones intradiarias de los futuros sobre derechos de emisión con 
vencimiento diciembre de los años 2010, 2011 y 2012 cotizados en ICE. 
Como paso previo, se ha realizado un análisis de frecuencia de la ocurrencia de 
los tamaños de órdenes negociados para observar su distribución. Además, se 
ha realizado una regresión lineal múltiple usando variables ficticias para 
determinar si los tamaños múltiplo de cinco tienen una presencia 
significativamente superior al resto. A continuación, para analizar el efecto de la 
agrupación en tamaños se ha usado una variable que reflejará el número diario 
de tamaños distintos que se pueden negociar. De este modo, se comprueba si 
el mercado ofrece un número amplio o reducido de tamaños distintos a los cuales 
negociar. Utilizando esta variable, se ha realizado una comparación entre las 
medianas del número de tamaños distintos de le los precios más afectados por 
el efecto agrupación en precios y la mediana del resto de precios. De este modo, 
se ha comprobado si hay indicios de que ambos efectos, la agrupación en 
precios y la agrupación en tamaños son complementarios. 
Finalmente, y de nuevo siguiendo la literatura previa, se ha estimado un modelo 
de regresión lineal multivariante en donde para cada día tendremos dos 
observaciones, una para la muestra donde los precios están afectados por el 
efecto agrupación y otra para el resto. De este modo, podremos ver si factores 
como la volatilidad intradiaria, el número de transacciones diarias, el tamaño 
medio de la transacción o, el nivel de especulación en el mercado afectan al 
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número de tamaños distintos negociados y si estos tienen un comportamiento 
distinto en presencia del efecto agrupación en precios o no. 
Una vez concluido el estudio sobre la agrupación en tamaños y precios nos 
interesa saber si determinados precios, a los cuales los participantes del 
mercado le atribuyen propiedades diferenciadoras, alteran el normal 
funcionamiento de los mercados, influyendo en factores clave tales como el 
rendimiento, la volatilidad o el volumen negociado de los derechos de emisión. 
El estudio del comportamiento pasado de los precios y otros indicadores como 
el volumen negociado es ampliamente usado en el análisis técnico, el cual es 
frecuentemente aplicado tanto por la comunidad inversora como por un amplio 
número de medios de comunicación financieros. En concreto, los medios tienden 
a utilizar expresiones tales como precios barrera, soportes o resistencias para 
referirse a determinados niveles de precios que aparentemente parecen influir 
en el comportamiento de  los inversores. Durante este estudio, se ha analizado 
la presencia de precios barrera en el Mercado Europeo de Carbono. Conviene 
señalar que este mercado está  dominado por profesionales por lo que las 
influencias psicológicas deberían jugar un rol limitado. 
Para analizar la existencia e impacto de determinados precios clave en el 
mercado de emisiones hemos utilizado la serie continua formada por los 
vencimientos en diciembre para la Fase II del mercado (los futuros con 
vencimiento diciembre 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 y 2012). 
A lo largo de este tercer estudio nos hemos centrado en la búsqueda de los 
llamados precios barrera que forman resistencias o soportes, los cuales son 
precios identificados por los agentes de mercado como de especial relevancia y 
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donde sistemáticamente la cotización no puede exceder de este precio en una 
tendencia alcista o rebasarlo a la baja en una tendencia bajista. Se ha analizado 
la existencia de estas barreras a diferentes niveles del precio, donde cada nivel 
es una representación numérica de dos dígitos del precio. En nuestro caso, se 
ha estudiado el nivel 0, compuesto por los dos decimales del precio, y el nivel 1, 
compuesto por la unidad y el primer decimal. Para su análisis, se ha comprobado 
las distribuciones del precio en ambos niveles, a las que se ha aplicado un test 
de bondad con el fin de comprobar si la distribución empírica se ajusta a la 
distribución esperada, o si por el contrario, hay unos precios más frecuentes que 
otros. Esto es importante ya que en nuestro caso son susceptible de ser barrera 
aquellos precios con una frecuencia mayor. Alrededor de estos precios 
identificados como potenciales precios barrera, se ha definido dos bandas, una 
superior y otra inferior, a las cuales les hemos dado el mismo tratamiento de 
precio barrera ya que la cotización podría empezar a verse influenciada por la 
cercanía a estos precios clave, sin llegar a tocarlos  
Un precio se ha considerado como barrera si, cuando la cotización alcanza dicho 
valor, éste afecta significativamente al comportamiento del mercado. Para 
comprobar este hecho, se han definido cuatro variables ficticias cada una de las 
cuales toma valor 1 tres días antes de tocar la barrera en un movimiento alcista 
y los tres días posteriores a tocar la barrera en un movimiento alcista, tres días 
antes de tocar la barrera en un movimiento bajista y los tres posteriores a tocar 
la barrera del movimiento bajista. Estos cuatro escenarios se han incluido en la 
estimación de un modelo ARMA-GARCH, más concretamente un EGARCH(1,1). 
El objetivo es comprobar cómo se comportan el rendimiento y la volatilidad en 
estas cuatro situaciones. Por último, y siguiendo la misma metodología que en 
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el estudio del resto de sesgos psicológicos, se ha analizado el comportamiento 
de otras variables como el volumen o el interés abierto mediante un modelo de 
regresión lineal. 
La última parte de la tesis doctoral se ha centrado en el conocido efecto gregario 
o efecto rebaño. En un sentido general, el comportamiento gregario puede ser 
definido como el acto de poner juntos a los animales en un grupo con la intención 
de guiarlos de un lugar a otro. Aunque este comportamiento es comúnmente 
usado para describir el comportamiento de los animales, también podemos 
encontrar este comportamiento en humanos afectando al proceso de toma de 
decisiones en campos como las finanzas. El comportamiento gregario en 
finanzas es interpretado como la tendencia de los inversores a imitar las acciones 
de otros inversores, dicho efecto imitación puede suponer que unos inversores 
cambien su propia opinión para adoptar el criterio que sigue la mayoría. En la 
práctica, alguien en el mercado que tenga conocimiento acerca de la existencia 
del efecto rebaño y empezase a observar señales tempranas de que se está 
formando un proceso de imitación, podría poner órdenes para tomar ventaja de 
este efecto con la expectativa de que la tendencia va a continuar y con la 
intención de cerrar sus posiciones antes de que dicho efecto desaparezca. 
El cuarto capítulo analiza la presencia del efecto imitación en el mercado europeo 
de emisiones, caracterizado por ser un mercado ciego en donde la gran mayoría 
de los participantes en el mercado son institucionales. Por tanto ambas 
características nos permiten, estudiar la existencia del efecto rebaño bajo 
condiciones muy restrictivas. Para el análisis se han elegido futuros con 
vencimiento diciembre de la Fase III, concretamente los correspondientes a los 
años 2013, 2014 y 2015, negociados en ICE. 
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Una forma intuitiva de estudiar la presencia del efecto gregario es analizar la 
evolución en el cambio del signo de los precios del derecho de emisión, 
observando series crecientes o decrecientes en los cambios del precio en el caso 
de estar presente este efecto imitación. Además, debido al efecto barrera 
descrito anteriormente también admitiremos como parte de un proceso de 
imitación no solo aquellas sucesiones de precios que sean estrictamente alcistas 
o bajistas sino también aquellas en las que el precio se repite. Para comprobar 
si las secuencias formadas por los cambios del signo del precio se producen de 
forma aleatoria, o por el contrario estas rachas son fruto de un efecto imitación, 
se ha aplicado un test de rachas.  
Una vez identificada la existencia de este fenómeno, el siguiente objetivo ha sido 
medir la intensidad del efecto gregario y estudiar su impacto, tanto en la dinámica 
del precio del derecho de emisión como en las variables más importantes del 
mercado. A tal fin, se ha elegido una medida que refleja la intensidad del efecto 
imitación que nos permita capturar las secuencias intradiarias además de 
analizar la evolución diaria del futuro bajo cualquier circunstancia y no solo en 
circunstancias de rendimientos extremos como ocurre con otras medidas usadas 
en la literatura. Este estudio sobre las dinámicas del precio del CO2 se ha llevado 
a cabo a través de una regresión lineal, donde se ha comprobado si a medida 
que el mercado es más maduro el efecto persiste, y donde se ha analizado si en 
el periodo de más especulación el nivel del efecto rebaño varía. Adicionalmente, 
se ha incluido una variable que identifica el nivel de agrupación en precios, 
analizado al principio de la tesis doctoral, y, por último, una variable ficticia que 
tomará valor 1 los días en los que la Comisión Europea ha revelado información 
importante para el mercado y 0 el resto de días. 
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Tras estudiar los factores clave que afectan al comportamiento imitación en el 
mercado de derechos, se ha analizado el comportamiento de las variables de 
mercado ante el efecto imitación. Este análisis consistirá en una regresión lineal 
sobre el residuo de la estimación anterior. En concreto, las variables 
independientes que se incorporarán han sido el número de transacciones diarias, 
la volatilidad intradiaria, el tiempo hasta vencimiento de cada contrato y dos 
variables ficticias que capturan rendimientos extremadamente altos y bajos. 
Para finalizar, se ha estudiado si el efecto imitación puede llegar a desestabilizar 
el mercado alterando el comportamiento de los rendimientos y/o de la volatilidad, 
para ello se han regresado contra estos dos factores la variable que mide la 
intensidad del efecto gregario hasta con 5 retardos. De esta forma se ha 
estudiado si el efecto rebaño influye en las decisiones posteriores que toman los 
agentes del mercado. 
3. Resultados 
En primer lugar, los resultados sobre la agrupación en precios muestran que 
existe una fuerte repetición del último decimal en ciertos valores, principalmente 
en 0 y 5, los cuales presentan una frecuencia de ocurrencia estadísticamente 
más elevada que el resto de decimales. Este hecho es además, corroborado por 
las medidas de concentración de mercado analizadas. También se observa que 
pese a que este efecto es persistente a lo largo de toda la muestra, hay una 
ligera reducción de su importancia con el paso del tiempo, hecho que podría 
venir explicado por la hipótesis de atracción. Aplicando la misma metodología a 
distintos escenarios como precio el máximo, el precio mínimo, el primer precio 
del día, el último negociado y el precio de cierre observamos que todos los casos 
 185 
presentan este efecto de agrupación en precios salvo el precio de cierre, que 
presenta una distribución uniforme. 
El análisis multivariante indica que la agrupación de precios se incrementa 
cuanto mayor es la volatilidad del mercado y disminuye cuanto mayor es la 
liquidez del mismo, es decir, cuanto menor es la información disponible en el 
mercado. Estos resultados sugieren que la concentración de los precios en 
determinados números es debido a que los participantes del mercado intentan 
hacer menos costosas sus operaciones. Por tanto, además, de la hipótesis de 
atracción parece tener cabida también como explicación de este sesgo 
psicológico la hipótesis de negociación. 
Los análisis posteriores sobre la agrupación en tamaños revelan que la 
concentración de precios sigue vigente para contratos posteriores al vencimiento 
del 2010. Los primeros resultados acerca de la agrupación en tamaños muestran 
que la mayoría de los tamaños negociados son de pequeña magnitud, hecho 
que podría explicarse por la preferencia de los inversores a la hora de negociar 
tamaños de órdenes pequeños con el fin de no revelar información al resto del 
mercado. Además, la regresión lineal efectuada sobre los tamaños en múltiplos 
de 5 muestra también que estos tamaños tienen una presencia mayor que el 
resto de tamaños. 
El análisis multivariante realizado con el fin de conocer los factores clave que 
afectan a la agrupación en tamaños arroja varios resultados interesantes. En 
primer lugar, se observa que el efecto redondeo tiene lugar al mismo tiempo en 
tamaños y en precios. En segundo lugar, el modelo de regresión múltiple muestra 
que la volatilidad es mayor en presencia del efecto redondeo en precios y, en 
tercer lugar, se observa que la concentración de los tamaños se incrementa en 
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aquellos días donde la liquidez del mercado es menor y en los días donde hay 
aperturas o cierres masivos de posiciones en contratos de futuros. 
Respecto al estudio llevado a cabo sobre las barreras psicológicas, los primeros 
resultados muestran la existencia de determinados precios clave que afectan de 
forma significativa a la evolución de la cotización del mercado de derechos de 
emisión. Encontramos, en primer lugar, que tanto para el caso de los números 
decimales (nivel 0) como para las unidades y el primer decimal (nivel 1)  hay 
determinados valores cuya distribución empírica distan de su distribución teórica 
y, por tanto, son susceptibles de ser precios barrera. 
La estimación del modelo EGARCH(1,1) realizada para comprobar el efecto de 
estos precios barrera sobre los rendimientos y sobre la volatilidad en los 
diferentes escenarios analizados muestra que el precio al llegar a estas barreras 
o bien toca la barrera e invierte la tendencia actual o se mantiene alrededor de 
la barrera. En el análisis de la volatilidad, se observa que ésta es mayor antes 
de alcanzar los precios clave y se reduce una vez que se han superados. Por 
último, con respecto al volumen, se observa que este decrece en movimientos 
alcistas donde el precio se aproxima a la barrera. 
Los resultados de la existencia del efecto imitación en el mercado de derechos 
de emisión muestran cierto efecto gregario debido a la ausencia de aleatoriedad 
en las secuencias de cambios positivos o negativos en el precio del derecho. A 
este respecto, habría que añadir que la presencia de precios psicológicos hace 
que la longitud de las secuencias se incremente, sin necesidad de que estas 
sean estrictamente alcistas o bajistas. 
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Un análisis de las pautas del mercado de derechos de emisión muestra que el 
efecto rebaño se intensifica con el nivel de especulación y otros sesgos 
psicológicos tales como la agrupación en precios. Al mismo tiempo, también se 
observa que cuando la Comisión Europea publica información relevante sobre el 
mercado, la intensidad del efecto rebaño se intensifica, influyendo especialmente 
a aquellos inversores que posicionan órdenes de venta.  
En el estudio de la relación del efecto gregario con las principales variables del 
mercado detectamos mayor efecto imitación cuando la incertidumbre aumenta y 
cuanto mayor es el número de transacciones. Finalmente, mostramos que este 
efecto imitación contribuye a la desestabilización del mercado, dado que tanto la 
volatilidad como los rendimientos se ven alterados por el grado de imitación de 
días anteriores, lo que provoca que los participantes del mercado acaben 
sobrerreaccionando. 
4. Conclusiones 
Esta tesis doctoral analiza la influencia de cuatro aspectos del comportamiento 
de los agentes negociadores en el mercado de derechos de emisión de la Unión 
Europea. A continuación se expondrán las principales conclusiones obtenidas. 
Hemos demostrado la existencia de agrupación en precios, donde las 
terminaciones de los precios tienden a estar concentradas en precios terminados 
en 0 y 5. Esta concentración de los precios es mayor cuando mayor es la 
ausencia de información en el mercado, mayor es la volatilidad y menor es la 
frecuencia de negociación 
En primer lugar, el conocimiento de este fenómeno es importante, primero 
porque esta medida podría ser empleada para reflejar la cantidad de información 
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disponible en el mercado. En segundo lugar, dado que los precios no siguen un 
camino aleatorio los gestores de riesgos deberían dedicar un mayor esfuerzo a 
la hora de encontrar modelos alternativos que tengan en cuenta el agrupamiento 
de precios. En tercer lugar, el conocimiento de este fenómeno puede derivar en 
estrategias ganadoras en el Mercado Europeo de Carbono. 
Se ha demostrado la existencia del efecto de agrupación de los tamaños de las 
órdenes, donde los inversores tienden a agrupar sus órdenes en tamaños 
pequeños o en números múltiplos de 5 contratos con el fin de simplificar el 
proceso de negociación. Nuestros análisis también detectan que la agrupación 
en precios y tamaños en el Mercado Europeo de Carbono son fenómenos 
complementarios por lo que los participantes en este mercado fijan órdenes 
redondeando tanto precio como tamaño de la transacción. Además, observamos 
que este fenómeno se ve intensificado cuando la volatilidad es alta, hay poca 
liquidez y cuando el deseo de abrir o cerrar posiciones es alto. 
El resultado del estudio demuestra la imposibilidad de los participantes del 
mercado de derechos a la hora de negociar los tamaños de órdenes que deseen. 
Esto implica que los agentes que deseen negociar grandes cantidades deberán 
hacerlo en precios que terminen en múltiplos de 0 o 5 y, a la vez, reducir el 
tamaño de las órdenes o partir las órdenes en múltiplos de 5. 
Hemos mostrado también la existencia de precios clave que modifican el 
comportamiento de los actores del mercado. Este fenómeno puede ser explicado 
tanto por la existencia de agrupación en precios como por el redondeo en los 
precios de ejercicio de opciones sobre el derecho de emisión.  
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Cabría añadir también que la presencia de precios clave afecta a la volatilidad, 
incrementándola antes de tocar la barrera y disminuyéndola después de tocarla. 
Este efecto barrera del precio afecta también a las dinámicas del rendimiento, 
haciendo que se revierta o se estanque al llegar al precio barrera, y del volumen, 
el cual disminuye al aproximarse la cotización al precio clave. 
Finalmente, en esta tesis doctoral mostramos por primera vez la existencia del 
efecto imitación en el mercado de derechos de emisión, a pesar de ser un 
mercado ciego. Además, este efecto se incrementa cuando la cotización del 
derecho se acerca a los llamados precios barrera y ante la presencia de sesgos 
psicológicos como la agrupación en precios. Por último, también encontramos 
que el efecto gregario se intensifica con el aumento de la incertidumbre y en los 
días con rendimientos extraordinarios, mientras que por el contrario, este efecto 
se reduce cuando el contrato se acerca a su vencimiento. 
El estudio sobre el efecto gregario puede ser de interés tanto a académicos como 
para los participantes del mercado. Por un lado, añade una nueva visión a los 
escasos estudios sobre este fenómeno en mercados de futuros y, por otra parte, 
el efecto gregario puede implementarse en el desarrollo de estrategias de 
negociación en mercados de futuros sobre el CO2 a pesar de ser un mercado 
ciego. 
5. Líneas de investigación futuras 
Esta tesis doctoral ha estudiado la influencia de las finanzas del comportamiento 
sobre el Mercado Europeo de Derechos de Emisión sobre el CO2. De hecho, 
este trabajo podría ser considerado como un punto de partida en el estudio de 
como el comportamiento humano influye en el mercado de derechos. 
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Como se ha dicho anteriormente, el estudio desarrollado acerca de los precios 
barrera, es el primero en analizar el papel que juega el análisis técnico en el 
mercado de derechos. Este trabajo puede ser extendido con el estudio de otras 
herramientas de análisis técnico tales como el uso de medias móviles o las 
bandas de Bollinger. Además, sería de interés para este tipo de análisis 
desarrollar un método que permita determinar el horizonte temporal en el cual un 
precio psicológico tiene efectividad y evaluar todos estos estudios a un nivel 
intradiario. 
Otra línea de investigación se puede desarrollar a partir del estudio sobre el 
efecto imitación. En concreto, se puede extender este análisis desde dos 
enfoques. El primero estaría relacionado con el estudio del efecto gregario en 
tamaños en lugar de en órdenes, puesto que análisis preliminares realizados en 
el cuarto capítulo mostraban que la primera orden de la secuencia tiene un 
tamaño estadísticamente superior al resto. Además, el estudio sobre el nivel de 
autocorrelación en el volumen podría ofrecer nuevas conclusiones para 
desarrollar estrategias de inversión ganadoras que permitieran tomar mejores 
posiciones en términos de tiempo y precio. El segundo enfoque del efecto 
gregario estaría basado en el estudio de este fenómeno entre proveedores de 
datos y cámaras de negociación ya que sería de interés conocer si los principales 
proveedores de datos y plazas de negociación hacen publica las transacciones 
al mismo tiempo y si el precio es igual o, al contrario, si existe un líder que es el 
primero en ofrecer nuevos cambios en la cotización y los otros le siguen. Esta 
información es muy importante a la hora de elegir. 
Adicionalmente, una futura línea de investigación futura que podría ser aplicada 
a todos los capítulos es el estudio del poder predictivo de las anomalías 
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detectadas analizando la rentabilidad de de varias estrategias de negociación 
con datos fuera de muestra. Para tal fin, sería necesario establecer las reglas 
que definen cuando entrar en el mercado de emisiones y cuando salir de él. 
Alternativamente, una de las propuestas que la Comisión Europea está 
estudiando de cara a reformar el Esquema Europeo de Emisiones es el 
establecimiento de un túnel en el precio del derecho de emisión. Los defensores 
de esta idea argumentan que esta medida dará más estabilidad al mercado, ya 
que aquellos que inviertan en tecnologías bajas en emisiones verán reducido el 
riesgo de costear dichas mejoras mientras otros competidores que no hayan 
invertido en dichas tecnologías se estarían beneficiando de unos precios del 
derecho de emisión bajos. La inclusión de un precio suelo animaría también a 
muchas industrias sujetas al programa a poner en marcha inversiones bajas en 
emisiones. 
El precio suelo estaría controlado a través de las subastas, si el precio de la 
subasta cayera por debajo del umbral inferior, la subasta sería cancelada y los 
derechos pasarían a la reserva hasta que el precio alcanzara el umbral superior. 
Además, este precio mínimo del derecho de emisión iría evolucionando 
anualmente siguiendo un patrón determinado. 
Pues bien, la inclusión de esta nueva medida podría motivar nuevos estudios 
acerca del comportamiento de los participantes del Mercado Europeo de 
Carbono, como por ejemplo, el uso de opciones con precio de ejercicio en el 
precio suelo los días de subasta. Por otro lado, podríamos interpretar este canal 
como nuevas barreras psicológicas, por lo que se podría analizar el 
comportamiento de los inversores cuando el precio está cerca de este umbral 
superior o inferior. 
